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I. Moot Court: Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia; Altitude Express, 
Inc. v. Zarda 
 
Moot Court: Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia; Altitude Express, Inc. v. Zarda  
 
“SUPREME COURT TO DECIDE WHETHER LANDMARK CIVIL RIGHTS LAW APPLIES TO GAY 
AND TRANSGENDER WORKERS” 
Adam Liptak  
“ON L.G.B.T. RIGHTS, THE SUPREME COURT ASKS THE QUESTION” 
Linda Greenhouse 
“SUPREME COURT TO RULE ON GAY, TRANSGENDER EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS” 
Jess Bravin and Brent Kendall 
“COURT TO TAKE UP LBGT RIGHTS IN THE WORKPLACE”  
Amy Howe  
“TITLE VII AND LGBT DISCRIMINATION: THE PATH TO THE HIGH COURT” 
Melissa Legault  
“THIS LANDMARK RULING COULD BRING LOGIC TO CIVIL RIGHTS LAWS” 
Caroline Polisi   
“TWO NEW PETITIONS CALL ON SCOTUS TO DECIDE WORKPLACE PROTECTIONS FOR GAYS, 
LESBIANS” 
Alison Frankel  
“11TH CIRC. DRAWS JUDGE’S IRE WITH EN BANC REVIEW REFUSAL” 
Kat Green  
“11TH CIRCUIT JOINS OTHERS IN HOLDING SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION NOT 
COVERED TITLE VII”  
Julie Furer Stahr  
“2ND CIRCUIT DEMOLISHES KEY DOJ ARGUMENT AGAINST WORKPLACE PROTECTION FOR 
GAYS” 
Alison Frankel  
“2ND CIRCUIT (AGAIN) FINDS ANTI-GAY DISCRIMINATION LEGAL UNDER TITLE VII” 
Chris Johnson 
“TRUMP’S BATTLE OVER LGBT DISCRIMINATION IS JUST BEGINNING” 
Emma Green 
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Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia 
 
Ruling Below: Bostock v. Clayton Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 723 Fed. Appx. 964 (11th Cir. 2018) 
Overview: Bostock brings employment discrimination suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964. He argued that the County discriminated against him based on sexual orientation and 
gender stereotyping. The County contends that Bostock was terminated due to the improper 
handling of CASA funds. The district court dismissed based on failure to state a claim.  
Issue: Whether discrimination against an employee because of sexual orientation constitutes 
prohibited employment discrimination “because of . . . sex” within the meaning of Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
Gerald Lynn BOSTOCK, Plaintiffs—Appellant 
 
v. 
 
CLAYTON COUNTY Board of Commissions, Defendant, Clayton County, Defendant—
Appellee 
 
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit 
 
Decided on May 10, 2018 
 
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]  
 
TJOFLAT, WILSON, and NEWSOM, 
Circuit Judges, PER CURIAM:  
 
Gerald Lynn Bostock appeals the district 
court’s dismissal of his employment 
discrimination suit under Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 
2000e-2(a)(1), against Clayton County, 
Georgia, for failure to state a claim. On 
appeal, Bostock argues that the County 
discriminated against him based on sexual 
orientation and gender stereotyping. After a 
careful review of the record and the parties’ 
briefs, we affirm. “We review de novo the 
district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss 
under [Fed. R. Civ. P.] 12(b)(6) for failure to 
state a claim, accepting the allegations in the 
complaint as true and construing them in the 
light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Issues 
not briefed on appeal are deemed abandoned. 
Title VII prohibits employers from 
discriminating against employees on the 
basis of their sex. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a). 
This circuit has previously held that 
“[d]ischarge for homosexuality is not 
prohibited by Title VII.” And we recently 
confirmed that Blum remains binding 
precedent in this circuit. In Evans, we 
specifically rejected the argument that 
Supreme Court precedent in Oncale v. 
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Sundowner Offshore Servs., and Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, supported a cause of 
action for sexual orientation discrimination 
under Title VII.  
As an initial matter, Bostock has abandoned 
any challenge to the district court’s dismissal 
of his gender stereotyping claim under Glenn 
because he does not specifically appeal the 
dismissal of this claim. Moreover, the district 
court did not err in dismissing Bostock’s 
complaint for sexual orientation 
discrimination under Title VII because our 
holding in Evans forecloses Bostock’s claim. 
And under our prior panel precedent rule, we 
cannot overrule a prior panel’s holding, 
regardless of whether we think it was wrong, 
unless an intervening Supreme Court or 
Eleventh Circuit en banc decision is issued.  
AFFIRMED. 
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Altitude Express, Inc. v. Zarda  
 
Ruling Below: Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100 (2d. Cir. 2018) 
 
Overview: This is a case concerning employment discrimination based on sexual orientation. Don 
Zarda was terminated from his skydiving business employment after disclosing his sexual 
orientation to a client. He sued under the New York Human Rights Law and Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964. Zarda claimed that in addition to discrimination based on his sexual 
orientation, he was also discriminated for his gender. The defendants contend that Zarda’s Title 
VII claim should be dismissed because Zarda repeatedly testified that he believed the termination 
reason was because of his sexual orientation.  
Issue: Whether the prohibition in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(a)(1), against employment discrimination “because of . . . sex” encompasses discrimination 
based on an individual’s sexual orientation. 
Melissa ZARDA, co-independent executor of the estate of Donald Zarda, and William 
Allen Moore, Jr., co-independent executor of the estate of Donald Zarda, Appellant 
 
v. 
 
ALTITUDE EXPRESS, INC., doing business as Skydive Long Island, and Ray Maynard, 
Appellee 
 
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit  
 
Decided on February 26, 2018 
 
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]
KATZMANN, Chief Judge: 
 
Donald Zarda, a skydiving instructor, 
brought a sex discrimination claim under 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
("Title VII") alleging that he was fired from 
his job at Altitude Express, Inc., because he 
failed to conform to male sex stereotypes by 
referring to his sexual orientation. Although 
it is well-settled that gender stereotyping 
violates Title VII's prohibition on 
discrimination "because of ... sex," we have 
previously held that sexual orientation 
discrimination claims, including claims that 
being gay or lesbian constitutes 
nonconformity with a gender stereotype, are 
not cognizable under Title VII.  
At the time Simonton and Dawson were 
decided, and for many years since, this view 
was consistent with the consensus among our 
sister circuits and the position of the Equal 
 30 
Employment Opportunity Commission 
("EEOC" or "Commission"). But legal 
doctrine evolves and in 2015 the EEOC held, 
for the first time, that "sexual orientation is 
inherently a 'sex-based consideration;' 
accordingly an allegation of discrimination 
based on sexual orientation is necessarily an 
allegation of sex discrimination under Title 
VII." Since then, two circuits have revisited 
the question of whether claims of sexual 
orientation discrimination are viable under 
Title VII. In March 2017, a divided panel of 
the Eleventh Circuit declined to recognize 
such a claim, concluding that it was bound by 
Blum , 597 F.2d at 938, which "ha[s] not been 
overruled by a clearly contrary opinion of the 
Supreme Court or of [the Eleventh Circuit] 
sitting en banc ." One month later, the 
Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc, took "a fresh 
look at [its] position in light of developments 
at the Supreme Court extending over two 
decades" and held that "discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation is a form of sex 
discrimination.” In addition, a concurring 
opinion of this Court recently called "for the 
Court to revisit" this question, emphasizing 
the "changing legal landscape that has taken 
shape in the nearly two decades since 
Simonton issued," and identifying multiple 
arguments that support the conclusion that 
sexual orientation discrimination is barred by 
Title VII.  
Taking note of the potential persuasive force 
of these new decisions, we convened en banc 
to reevaluate Simonton and Dawson in light 
of arguments not previously considered by 
this Court. Having done so, we now hold that 
Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis 
of sexual orientation as discrimination 
"because of ... sex." To the extent that our 
prior precedents held otherwise, they are 
overruled.  
We therefore VACATE the district court's 
judgment on Zarda's Title VII claim and 
REMAND for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. We AFFIRM the 
judgment of the district court in all other 
respects.  
BACKGROUND 
The facts and procedural history of this case 
are discussed in detail in our prior panel 
decision. See Zarda v. Altitude Express , 855 
F.3d 76, 79–81 (2d Cir. 2017). We recite 
them only as necessary to address the legal 
question under consideration.  
In the summer of 2010, Donald Zarda, a gay 
man, worked as a sky-diving instructor at 
Altitude Express. As part of his job, he 
regularly participated in tandem skydives, 
strapped hip-to- hip and shoulder-to-shoulder 
with clients. In an environment where close 
physical proximity was common, Zarda's co-
workers routinely referenced sexual 
orientation or made sexual jokes around 
clients, and Zarda sometimes told female 
clients about his sexual orientation to assuage 
any concern they might have about being 
strapped to a man for a tandem skydive. That 
June, Zarda told a female client with whom 
he was preparing for a tandem skydive that 
he was gay "and ha[d] an ex- husband to 
prove it." Although he later said this 
disclosure was intended simply to preempt 
any discomfort the client may have felt in 
being strapped to the body of an unfamiliar 
man, the client alleged that Zarda 
inappropriately touched her and disclosed his 
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sexual orientation to excuse his behavior. 
After the jump was successfully completed, 
the client told her boyfriend about Zarda's 
alleged behavior and reference to his sexual 
orientation; the boyfriend in turn told Zarda's 
boss, who fired shortly Zarda thereafter. 
Zarda denied inappropriately touching the 
client and insisted he was fired solely because 
of his reference to his sexual orientation.  
One month later, Zarda filed a discrimination 
charge with the EEOC concerning his 
termination. Zarda claimed that "in addition 
to being discriminated against because of 
[his] sexual orientation, [he] was also 
discriminated against because of [his] 
gender." In particular, he claimed that "[a]ll 
of the men at [his workplace] made light of 
the intimate nature of being strapped to a 
member of the opposite sex," but that he was 
fired because he "honestly referred to [his] 
sexual orientation and did not conform to the 
straight male macho stereotype."  
In September 2010, Zarda brought a lawsuit 
in federal court alleging, inter alia , sex 
stereotyping in violation of Title VII and 
sexual orientation discrimination in violation 
of New York law. Defendants moved for 
summary judgment arguing that Zarda's Title 
VII claim should be dismissed because, 
although "Plaintiff testifie[d] repeatedly that 
he believe[d] the reason he was terminated 
[was] because of his sexual orientation ... [,] 
under Title VII, a gender stereotype cannot be 
predicated on sexual orientation." In March 
2014, the district court granted summary 
judgment to the defendants on the Title VII 
claim. As relevant here, the district court 
concluded that, although there was sufficient 
evidence to permit plaintiff to proceed with 
his claim for sexual orientation 
discrimination under New York law, plaintiff 
had failed to establish a prima facie case of 
gender stereotyping discrimination under 
Title VII.  
While Zarda's remaining claims were still 
pending, the EEOC decided Baldwin, holding 
that "allegations of discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation necessarily state a 
claim of discrimination on the basis of sex." 
The Commission identified three ways to 
illustrate what it described as the 
"inescapable link between allegations of 
sexual orientation discrimination and sex 
discrimination." First, sexual orientation 
discrimination, such as suspending a lesbian 
employee for displaying a photo of her 
female spouse on her desk while not 
suspending a man for displaying a photo of 
his female spouse, "is sex discrimination 
because it necessarily entails treating an 
employee less favorably because of the 
employee's sex."  Second, it is "associational 
discrimination" because "an employee 
alleging discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation is alleging that his or her 
employer took his or her sex into account by 
treating him or her differently for associating 
with a person of the same sex." Lastly, sexual 
orientation discrimination "necessarily 
involves discrimination based on gender 
stereotypes," most commonly 
"heterosexually defined gender norms." 
Shortly thereafter, Zarda moved to have his 
Title VII claim reinstated based on Baldwin . 
But, the district court denied the motion, 
concluding that Simonton remained binding 
precedent.  
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Zarda's surviving claims, which included his 
claim for sexual orientation discrimination 
under New York law, went to trial, where 
defendants prevailed. After judgment was 
entered for the defendants, Zarda appealed. 
As relevant here, Zarda argued that Simonton 
should be overturned because the EEOC's 
reasoning in Baldwin demonstrated that 
Simonton was incorrectly decided. By 
contrast, defendants argued that the court did 
not need to reach that issue because the jury 
found that they had not discriminated based 
on sexual orientation.  
The panel held that "Zarda's [federal] sex- 
discrimination claim [was] properly before 
[it] because [his state law claim was tried 
under] a higher standard of causation than 
required by Title VII." However, the panel 
"decline[d] Zarda's invitation to revisit our 
precedent," which "can only be overturned by 
the entire Court sitting in banc." The Court 
subsequently ordered this rehearing en banc 
to revisit Simonton and Dawson 's holdings 
that claims of sexual orientation 
discrimination are not cognizable under Title 
VII.  
DISCUSSION 
I. JURISDICTION  
We first address the defendants' challenge to 
our jurisdiction. Article III of the 
Constitution grants federal courts the 
authority to hear only "Cases" and 
"Controversies." U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 
1. As a result, "a federal court has neither the 
power to render advisory opinions nor 'to 
decide questions that cannot affect the rights 
of litigants in the case before them.' " The 
defendants argue that any decision on the 
merits would be an advisory opinion because 
Zarda did not allege sexual orientation 
discrimination in his EEOC charge or his 
federal complaint and therefore the question 
of whether Title VII applies to sexual 
orientation discrimination is not properly 
before us.  
Irrespective of whether defendants' argument 
is actually jurisdictional, its factual premises 
are patently contradicted by both the record 
and the position defendants advanced below. 
Zarda's EEOC complaint explained that he 
was "making this charge because, in addition 
to being discriminated against because of 
[his] sexual orientation, [he] was also 
discriminated against because of [his] 
gender." Zarda specified that his supervisor 
"was hostile to any expression of [his] sexual 
orientation that did not conform to sex 
stereotypes," and alleged that he "was fired ... 
because ... [he] honestly referred to [his] 
sexual orientation and did not conform to the 
straight male macho stereotype." Zarda 
repeated this claim in his federal complaint, 
contending that he was "an openly gay man" 
who was "discharge[ed] because of a 
homophobic customer" and "because his 
behavior did not conform to sex stereotypes," 
in violation of Title VII.  
Defendants plainly understood Zarda's 
complaint to have raised a claim for sexual 
orientation discrimination under Title VII. In 
their motion for summary judgment, 
defendants argued that Zarda's claim "relies 
on the fact that Plaintiff is homosexual, not 
that he failed to comply with male gender 
norms. Thus, Plaintiff merely attempts to 
bring a defective sexual orientation claim 
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under Title VII, which is legally invalid." The 
district court ultimately agreed.  
Having interpreted Zarda's Title VII claim as 
one for sexual orientation discrimination for 
purposes of insisting that the claim be 
dismissed, defendants cannot now argue that 
there is no sexual orientation claim to prevent 
this Court from reviewing the basis for the 
dismissal. Both defendants and the district 
court clearly understood that Zarda had 
alleged sexual orientation discrimination 
under Title VII. As a result, Zarda's Title VII 
claim is neither unexhausted nor unpled, and 
so it may proceed. 
II. SEXUAL ORIENTATION 
DISCRIMINATION 
A. The Scope of Title VII  
"In passing Title VII, Congress made the 
simple but momentous announcement that 
sex, race, religion, and national origin are not 
relevant to the selection, evaluation, or 
compensation of employees." The text of 
Title VII provides, in relevant part:  
It shall be an unlawful employment 
practice for an employer ... to fail or 
refuse to hire or to discharge ... or 
otherwise to discriminate against any 
individual with respect to his [or her] 
compensation, terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment, because of 
such individual's race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin ....  
This "broad rule of workplace equality," 
"strike[s] at the entire spectrum of disparate 
treatment" based on protected characteristics, 
"regardless of whether the discrimination is 
directed against majorities or minorities." As 
a result, we have stated that "Title VII should 
be interpreted broadly to achieve equal 
employment opportunity."  
In deciding whether Title VII prohibits 
sexual orientation discrimination, we are 
guided, as always, by the text and, in 
particular, by the phrase  "because of ...  sex." 
However, in interpreting this language, we do 
not write on a blank slate. Instead, we must 
construe the text in light of the entirety of the 
statute as well as relevant precedent. As 
defined by Title VII, an employer has 
engaged in "impermissible consideration of 
... sex ... in employment practices" when "sex 
... was a motivating factor for any 
employment practice," irrespective of 
whether the employer was also motivated by 
"other factors." Accordingly, the critical 
inquiry for a court assessing whether an 
employment practice is "because of ... sex" is 
whether sex was "a motivating factor."  
Recognizing that Congress intended to make 
sex "irrelevant" to employment decisions, 
Griggs , the Supreme Court has held that 
Title VII prohibits not just discrimination 
based on sex itself, but also discrimination 
based on traits that are a function of sex, such 
as life expectancy, Manhart, and non-
conformity with gender norms, Price 
Waterhouse. As this Court has recognized, 
"any meaningful regime of 
antidiscrimination law must encompass such 
claims" because, if an employer is " '[f]ree to 
add non-sex factors, the rankest sort of 
discrimination' " could be worked against 
employees by using traits that are associated 
with sex as a proxy for sex. Applying Title 
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VII to traits that are a function of sex is 
consistent with the Supreme Court's view that 
Title VII covers not just "the principal evil[s] 
Congress was concerned with when it 
enacted" the statute in 1964, but also 
"reasonably comparable evils" that meet the 
statutory requirements.  
With this understanding in mind, the question 
before us is whether an employee's sex is 
necessarily a motivating factor in 
discrimination based on sexual orientation. If 
it is, then sexual orientation discrimination is 
properly understood as "a subset of actions 
taken on the basis of sex."  
B. Sexual Orientation Discrimination as a 
Subset of Sex Discrimination  
We now conclude that sexual orientation 
discrimination is motivated, at least in part, 
by sex and is thus a subset of sex 
discrimination. Looking first to the text of 
Title VII, the most natural reading of the 
statute's prohibition on discrimination 
"because of ... sex" is that it extends to sexual 
orientation discrimination because sex is 
necessarily a factor in sexual orientation. 
This statutory reading is reinforced by 
considering the question from the perspective 
of sex stereotyping because sexual 
orientation discrimination is predicated on 
assumptions about how persons of a certain 
sex can or should be, which is an 
impermissible basis for adverse employment 
actions. In addition, looking at the question 
from the perspective of associational 
discrimination, sexual orientation 
discrimination —which is motivated by an 
employer's opposition to romantic 
association between particular sexes—is 
discrimination based on the employee's own 
sex.  
1. Sexual Orientation as a Function of 
Sex  
a. "Because of ... sex"  
We begin by considering the nature of sexual 
orientation discrimination. The term "sexual 
orientation" refers to "[a] person's 
predisposition or inclination toward sexual 
activity or behavior with other males or 
females" and is commonly categorized as 
"heterosexuality, homosexuality, or 
bisexuality." To take one example, 
"homosexuality" is "characterized by sexual 
desire for a person of the same sex." To 
operationalize this definition and identify the 
sexual orientation of a particular person, we 
need to know the sex of the person and that 
of the people to whom he or she is attracted. 
Because one cannot fully define a person's 
sexual orientation without identifying his or 
her sex, sexual orientation is a function of 
sex. Indeed sexual orientation is doubly 
delineated by sex because it is a function of 
both a person's sex and the sex of those to 
whom he or she is attracted. Logically, 
because sexual orientation is a function of sex 
and sex is a protected characteristic under 
Title VII, it follows that sexual orientation is 
also protected.  
Choosing not to acknowledge the sex-
dependent nature of sexual orientation, 
certain amici contend that employers 
discriminating on the basis of sexual 
orientation can do so without reference to 
sex. In support of this assertion, they point to 
Price Waterhouse , where the Supreme Court 
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observed that one way to discern the 
motivation behind an employment decision is 
to consider whether, "if we asked the 
employer at the moment of the decision what 
its reasons were and if we received a truthful 
response, one of those reasons would be" the 
applicant or employee's sex. Relying on this 
language, these amici argue that a "truthful" 
response to an inquiry about why an 
employee was fired would be "I fired him 
because he is gay," not "I fired him because 
he is a man." But this semantic sleight of 
hand is not a defense; it is a distraction. The 
employer's failure to reference gender 
directly does not change the fact that a "gay" 
employee is simply a man who is attracted to 
men. For purposes of Title VII, firing a man 
because he is attracted to men is a decision 
motivated, at least in part, by sex. More 
broadly, were this Court to credit amici 's 
argument, employers would be able to rebut 
a discrimination claim by merely 
characterizing their action using alternative 
terminology. Title VII instructs courts to 
examine employers' motives, not merely their 
choice of words. As a result, firing an 
employee because he is "gay" is a form of sex 
discrimination.  
The argument has also been made that it is 
not "even remotely plausible that in 1964, 
when Title VII was adopted, a reasonable 
person competent in the English language 
would have understood that a law banning 
employment discrimination 'because of sex' 
also banned discrimination because of sexual 
orientation[.]" Even if that were so, the same 
could also be said of multiple forms of 
discrimination that are indisputably 
prohibited by Title VII, as the Supreme Court 
and lower courts have determined. Consider, 
for example, sexual harassment and hostile 
work environment claims, both of which 
were initially believed to fall outside the 
scope of Title VII's prohibition.  
In 1974, a district court dismissed a female 
employee's claim for sexual harassment 
reasoning that "[t]he substance of [her] 
complaint [was] that she was discriminated 
against, not because she was a woman, but 
because she refused to engage in a sexual 
affair with her supervisor." The district court 
concluded that this conduct, although 
"inexcusable," was "not encompassed by 
[Title VII]."  The D.C. Circuit reversed. 
Unlike the district court, it recognized that 
the plaintiff "became the target of her 
supervisor's sexual desires because she was a 
woman ." (emphasis added). As a result the 
D.C. Circuit held that "gender cannot be 
eliminated from [plaintiff's formulation of 
her claim] and that formulation advances a 
prima facie case of sex discrimination within 
the purview of Title VII" because "it is 
enough that gender is a factor contributing to 
the discrimination." Today, the Supreme 
Court and lower courts "uniformly" 
recognize sexual harassment claims as a 
violation of Title VII, notwithstanding the 
fact that, as evidenced by the district court 
decision in Barnes , this was not necessarily 
obvious from the face of the statute.  
The Supreme Court has also acknowledged 
that a "hostile work environment," although 
it "do[es] not appear in the statutory text," 
violates Title VII by affecting the 
"psychological aspects of the workplace 
environment[.]"As Judge Goldberg, one of 
the early proponents of hostile work 
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environment claims, explained in a case 
involving national origin discrimination,  
[Title VII's] language evinces a 
Congressional intention to define 
discrimination in the broadest 
possible terms. Congress chose 
neither to enumerate specific 
discriminatory practices, nor to 
elucidate in extenso the parameter of 
such nefarious activities. Rather, it 
pursued the path of wisdom by being 
unconstrictive, knowing that constant 
change is the order of our day and that 
the seemingly reasonable practices of 
the present can easily become the 
injustices of the morrow.  
Stated differently, because Congress could 
not anticipate the full spectrum of 
employment discrimination that would be 
directed at the protected categories, it falls to 
courts to give effect to the broad language 
that Congress used.  
The Supreme Court gave voice to this 
principle of construction when it held that 
Title VII barred male-on-male sexual 
harassment, which "was assuredly not the 
principal evil Congress was concerned with 
when it enacted Title VII," and which few 
people in 1964 would likely have understood 
to be covered by the statutory text. But the 
Court was untroubled by these facts. 
"[S]tatutory prohibitions," it explained, 
"often go beyond the principal evil to cover 
reasonably comparable evils, and it is 
ultimately the provisions of our laws rather 
than the principal concerns of our legislators 
by which we are governed." Applying this 
reasoning to the question at hand, the fact that 
Congress might not have contemplated that 
discrimination "because of ... sex" would 
encompass sexual orientation discrimination 
does not limit the reach of the statute.  
The dissent disagrees with this conclusion. It 
does not dispute our definition of the word 
"sex," nor does it argue that this word had a 
different meaning in 1964. Instead, it charges 
us with "misconceiv[ing] the fundamental 
public meaning of the language of" Title VII. 
at 143 (emphasis omitted). According to the 
dissent, the drafters included "sex" in Title 
VII to "secure the rights of women to equal 
protection in employment," and had no 
intention of prohibiting sexual orientation 
discrimination. We take no position on the 
substance of the dissent's discussion of the 
legislative history or the zeitgeist of the 
1960s, but we respectfully disagree with its 
approach to interpreting Title VII as well as 
its conclusion that sexual orientation 
discrimination is not a "reasonably 
comparable evil," to sexual harassment and 
male-on-male harassment. Although 
legislative history most certainly has its uses, 
in ascertaining statutory meaning in a Title 
VII case, Oncale specifically rejects reliance 
on "the principal concerns of our legislators," 
—the centerpiece of the dissent's statutory 
analysis. Rather, Oncale instructs that the 
text is the lodestar of statutory interpretation, 
emphasizing that we are governed "by the 
provisions of our laws." The text before us 
uses broad language, prohibiting 
discrimination "because of ... sex," which 
Congress defined as making sex "a 
motivating factor." We give these words their 
full scope and conclude that, because sexual 
orientation discrimination is a function of 
sex, and is comparable to sexual harassment, 
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gender stereotyping, and other evils long 
recognized as violating Title VII, the statute 
must prohibit it.  
b. “But for” an Employee’s Sex  
Our conclusion is reinforced by the Supreme 
Court's test for determining whether an 
employment practice constitutes sex 
discrimination. This approach, which we call 
the "comparative test," determines whether 
the trait that is the basis for discrimination is 
a function of sex by asking whether an 
employee's treatment would have been 
different "but for that person's sex." To 
illustrate its application to sexual orientation, 
consider the facts of the recent Seventh 
Circuit case addressing a Title VII claim 
brought by Kimberly Hively, a lesbian 
professor who alleged that she was denied a 
promotion because of her sexual orientation. 
Accepting that allegation as true at the 
motion-to-dismiss stage, the Seventh Circuit 
compared Hively, a female professor 
attracted to women (who was denied a 
promotion), with a hypothetical scenario in 
which Hively was a male who was attracted 
to women (and received a promotion). Under 
this scenario, the Seventh Circuit concluded 
that, as alleged, Hively would not have been 
denied a promotion but for her sex, and 
therefore sexual orientation is a function of 
sex. From this conclusion, it follows that 
sexual orientation discrimination is a subset 
of sex discrimination.   
The government, drawing from the dissent in 
Hively, argues that this is an improper 
comparison. According to this argument, 
rather than "hold[ing] everything constant 
except the plaintiff's sex" the Hively 
majority's comparison changed "two 
variables—the plaintiff's sex and sexual 
orientation." In other words, the Seventh 
Circuit compared a lesbian woman with a 
heterosexual man. As an initial matter, this 
observation helpfully illustrates that sexual 
orientation is a function of sex. In the 
comparison, changing Hively's sex changed 
her sexual orientation. Case in point.  
But the real issue raised by the government's 
critique is the proper application of the 
comparative test. In the government's view, 
the appropriate comparison is not between a 
woman attracted to women and a man 
attracted to women; it's between a woman 
and a man, both of whom are attracted to 
people of the same sex. Determining which 
of these framings is correct requires 
understanding the purpose and operation of 
the comparative test. Although the Supreme 
Court has not elaborated on the role that the 
test plays in Title VII jurisprudence, based on 
how the Supreme Court has employed the 
test, we understand that its purpose is to 
determine when a trait other than sex is, in 
fact, a proxy for (or a function of) sex. To 
determine whether a trait is such a proxy, the 
test compares a female and a male employee 
who both exhibit the trait at issue. In the 
comparison, the trait is the control, sex is the 
independent variable, and employee 
treatment is the dependent variable.  
To understand how the test works in practice, 
consider Manhart. There, the Supreme Court 
evaluated the Los Angeles Department of 
Water's requirement that female employees 
make larger pension contributions than their 
male colleagues. This requirement was based 
on mortality data indicating that female 
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employees outlived male employees by 
several years and the employer insisted that 
"the different contributions exacted from 
men and women were based on the factor of 
longevity rather than sex." Applying "the 
simple test of whether the evidence shows 
treatment of a person in a manner which but 
for that person's sex would be different," the 
Court compared a woman and a man, both of 
whose pension contributions were based on 
life expectancy, and asked whether they were 
required to make different contributions. 
Importantly, because life expectancy is a sex-
dependent trait, changing the sex of the 
employee (the independent variable) 
necessarily affected the employee's life 
expectancy and thereby changed how they 
were impacted by the pension policy (the 
dependent variable). After identifying this 
correlation, the Court concluded that life 
expectancy was simply a proxy for sex and 
therefore the pension policy constituted 
discrimination "because of ... sex." 
We can also look to the Supreme Court's 
decision in Price Waterhouse. Although that 
case did not quote Manhart 's "but for" 
language, it involved a similar inquiry: in 
determining whether discrimination based on 
particular traits was rooted in sex stereotypes, 
the Supreme Court asked whether a female 
accountant would have been denied a 
promotion based on her aggressiveness and 
failure to wear jewelry and makeup "if she 
had been a man." Otherwise said, the 
Supreme Court compared a man and a 
woman who exhibited the plaintiff's traits and 
asked whether they would have experienced 
different employment outcomes. Notably, 
being aggressive and not wearing jewelry or 
makeup is consistent with gender stereotypes 
for men. Therefore, by changing the 
plaintiff's gender, the Supreme Court also 
changed the plaintiff's gender no conformity. 
The government's proposed approach to 
Hively, which would compare a woman 
attracted to people of the same sex with a man 
attracted to people of the same sex, adopts the 
wrong framing. To understand why this is 
incorrect, consider the mismatch between the 
facts in the government's comparison and the 
allegation at issue: Hively did not allege that 
her employer discriminated against women 
with same-sex attraction but not men with 
same-sex attraction. If she had, that would be 
classic sex discrimination against a subset of 
women. See Lead Dissent at 152 n.20. 
Instead, Hively claimed that her employer 
discriminated on the basis of sexual 
orientation. To address that allegation, the 
proper question is whether sex is a 
"motivating factor" in sexual orientation 
discrimination, or, said more simply, whether 
sexual orientation is a function of sex. But, 
contrary to the government's suggestion, this 
question cannot be answered by comparing 
two people with the same sexual orientation. 
That would be equivalent to comparing the 
gender non-conforming female plaintiff in 
Price Waterhouse to a gender non- 
conforming man; such a comparison would 
not illustrate whether a particular stereotype 
is sex dependent but only whether the 
employer discriminates against gender non-
conformity in only one gender. Instead, just 
as Price Waterhouse compared a gender non-
conforming woman to a gender conforming 
man, both of whom were aggressive and did 
not wear makeup or jewelry, the Hively court 
properly determined that sexual orientation is 
sex dependent by comparing a woman and a 
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man with two different sexual orientations, 
both of whom were attracted to women.  
The government further counters that the 
comparative test produces false positives in 
instances where it is permissible to impose 
different terms of employment on men and 
women because "the sexes are not similarly 
situated." For example, the government 
posits that courts have rejected the 
comparative test when assessing employer 
policies regarding sex-segregated bathrooms 
and different grooming standards for men 
and women. Similarly, the lead dissent insists 
that our holding would preclude such policies 
if "[t]aken to its logical conclusion." Both 
criticisms are misplaced.  
A plaintiff alleging disparate treatment based 
on sex in violation of Title VII must show 
two things: (1) that he was "discriminate[d] 
against ... with respect to his compensation, 
terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment," and (2) that the employer 
discriminated "because of ... sex." The 
comparative test addresses the second prong 
of that test; it reveals whether an employment 
practice is "because of ... sex" by asking 
whether the trait at issue (life expectancy, 
sexual orientation, etc.) is a function of sex. 
In contrast, courts that have addressed 
challenges to the sex-specific employment 
practices identified by the government have 
readily acknowledged that the policies are 
based on sex and instead focused their 
analysis on the first prong: whether the 
policies impose "disadvantageous terms or 
conditions of employment." Whether sex-
specific bathroom and grooming policies 
impose disadvantageous terms or conditions 
is a separate question from this Court's 
inquiry into whether sexual orientation 
discrimination is "because of ... sex," and has 
no bearing on the efficacy of the comparative 
test.  
Having addressed the proper application of 
the comparative test, we conclude that the 
law is clear: To determine whether a trait 
operates as a proxy for sex, we ask whether 
the employee would have been treated 
differently "but for" his or her sex. In the 
context of sexual orientation, a woman who 
is subject to an adverse employment action 
because she is attracted to women would 
have been treated differently if she had been 
a man who was attracted to women. We can 
therefore conclude that sexual orientation is a 
function of sex and, by extension, sexual 
orientation discrimination is a subset of sex 
discrimination.  
2. Gender Stereotyping 
Viewing the relationship between sexual 
orientation and sex through the lens of gender 
stereotyping provides yet another basis for 
concluding that sexual orientation 
discrimination is a subset of sex 
discrimination. Specifically, this framework 
demonstrates that sexual orientation 
discrimination is almost invariably rooted in 
stereotypes about men and women.  
Since 1978, the Supreme Court has 
recognized that "employment decisions 
cannot be predicated on mere 'stereotyped' 
impressions about the characteristics of 
males or females," because Title VII 
"strike[s] at the entire spectrum of disparate 
treatment of men and women resulting from 
sex stereotypes." This is true of stereotypes 
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about both how the sexes are and how they 
should be.  
In Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court 
concluded that adverse employment actions 
taken based on the belief that a female 
accountant should walk, talk, and dress 
femininely constituted impermissible sex 
discrimination. Similarly, Manhart stands for 
the proposition that "employment decisions 
cannot be predicated on mere 'stereotyped' 
impressions about the characteristics of 
males or females," and held that female 
employees could not, by virtue of their status 
as women, be discriminated against based on 
the gender stereotype that women generally 
outlive men. Under these principles, 
employees who experience adverse 
employment actions as a result of their 
employer's generalizations about members of 
their sex, or "as a result of their employer's 
animus toward their exhibition of behavior 
considered to be stereotypically 
inappropriate for their gender may have a 
claim under Title VII[.]"  
Accepting that sex stereotyping violates Title 
VII, the "crucial question" is "[w]hat 
constitutes a gender-based stereotype." As 
demonstrated by Price Waterhouse, one way 
to answer this question is to ask whether the 
employer who evaluated the plaintiff in "sex-
based terms would have criticized her as 
sharply (or criticized her at all) if she had 
been a man." Similarly, this Court has 
observed that the question of whether there 
has been improper reliance on sex 
stereotypes can sometimes be answered by 
considering whether the behavior or trait at 
issue would have been viewed more or less 
favorably if the employee were of a different 
sex.  
Applying Price Waterhouse 's reasoning to 
sexual orientation, we conclude that when, 
for example, "an employer ... acts on the basis 
of a belief that [men] cannot be [attracted to 
men], or that [they] must not be," but takes no 
such action against women who are attracted 
to men, the employer "has acted on the basis 
of gender." This conclusion is consistent with 
Hively 's holding that same-sex orientation 
"represents the ultimate case of failure to 
conform" to gender stereotypes, and aligns 
with numerous district courts' observation 
that "stereotypes about homosexuality are 
directly related to our stereotypes about the 
proper roles of men and women. ... The 
gender stereotype at work here is that 'real' 
men should date women, and not other men,"  
This conclusion is further reinforced by the 
unworkability of Simonton and Dawson 's 
holding that sexual orientation discrimination 
is not a product of sex stereotypes. Lower 
courts operating under this standard have 
long labored to distinguish between gender 
stereotypes that support an inference of 
impermissible sex discrimination and those 
that are indicative of sexual orientation 
discrimination. Under this approach "a 
woman might have a Title VII claim if she 
was harassed or fired for being perceived as 
too 'macho' but not if she was harassed or 
fired for being perceived as a lesbian." In 
parsing the evidence, courts have resorted to 
lexical bean counting, comparing the relative 
frequency of epithets such as "ass wipe," 
"fag," "gay," "queer," "real man," and "fem" 
to determine whether discrimination is based 
on sex or sexual orientation. Claims of 
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gender discrimination have been "especially 
difficult for gay plaintiffs to bring," because 
references to a plaintiff's sexual orientation 
are generally excluded from the evidence, 
Boutillier, or permitted only when "the 
harassment consists of homophobic slurs 
directed at a heterosexual[.]" Unsurprisingly, 
many courts have found these distinctions 
unworkable, admitting that the doctrine is 
"illogical," and produces "untenable results," 
In the face of this pervasive confusion, we are 
persuaded that "the line between sex 
discrimination and sexual orientation 
discrimination is 'difficult to draw' because 
that line does not exist save as a lingering and 
faulty judicial construct." We now conclude 
that sexual orientation discrimination is 
rooted in gender stereotypes and is thus a 
subset of sex discrimination.  
The government resists this conclusion, 
insisting that negative views of those 
attracted to members of the same sex may not 
be based on views about gender at all, but 
may be rooted in "moral beliefs about sexual, 
marital and familial relationships." But this 
argument merely begs the question by 
assuming that moral beliefs about sexual 
orientation can be dissociated from beliefs 
about sex. Because sexual orientation is a 
function of sex, this is simply impossible. 
Beliefs about sexual orientation necessarily 
take sex into consideration and, by extension, 
moral beliefs about sexual orientation are 
necessarily predicated, in some degree, on 
sex. For this reason, it makes no difference 
that the employer may not believe that its 
actions are based in sex. In Manhart, for 
example, the employer claimed its policy was 
based on longevity, not sex, but the Supreme 
Court concluded that, irrespective of the 
employer's belief, the longevity metric was 
predicated on assumptions about sex. The 
same can be said of sexual orientation 
discrimination.  
To be clear, our conclusion that moral beliefs 
regarding sexual orientation are based on sex 
does not presuppose that those beliefs are 
necessarily animated by an invidious or evil 
motive. For purposes of Title VII, any belief 
that depends, even in part, on sex, is an 
impermissible basis for employment 
decisions. This is true irrespective of whether 
the belief is grounded in fact, as in Manhart, 
or lacks "a malevolent motive," Indeed, in 
Johnson Controls, the Supreme Court 
concluded that an employer violated Title VII 
by excluding fertile women from jobs that 
involved exposure to high levels of lead, 
which can adversely affect the development 
of a fetus. As the Court emphasized, "[t]he 
beneficence of an employer's purpose does 
not undermine the conclusion that an explicit 
gender-based policy is sex discrimination" 
under Title VII. Here, because sexual 
orientation is a function of sex, beliefs about 
sexual orientation, including moral ones, are, 
in some measure, "because of ... sex." The 
government responds that, even if 
discrimination based on sexual orientation 
reflects a sex stereotype, it is not barred by 
Price Waterhouse because it treats women no 
worse than men. We believe the government 
has it backwards. Price Waterhouse, read in 
conjunction with Oncale, stands for the 
proposition that employers may not 
discriminate against women or men who fail 
to conform to conventional gender norms. It 
follows that the employer in Price 
Waterhouse could not have defended itself by 
claiming that it fired a gender-non-
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conforming man as well as a gender-non-
conforming woman any more than it could 
persuasively argue that two wrongs make a 
right. To the contrary, this claim would 
merely be an admission that the employer has 
doubly violated Title VII by using gender 
stereotypes to discriminate against both men 
and women. By the same token, an employer 
who discriminates against employees based 
on assumptions about the gender to which the 
employees can or should be attracted has 
engaged in sex-discrimination irrespective of 
whether the employer uses a double-edged 
sword that cuts both men and women. 
3. Associational Discrimination  
The conclusion that sexual orientation 
discrimination is a subset of sex 
discrimination is further reinforced by 
viewing this issue through the lens of 
associational discrimination. Consistent with 
the nature of sexual orientation, in most 
contexts where an employer discriminates 
based on sexual orientation, the employer's 
decision is predicated on opposition to 
romantic association between particular 
sexes. For example, when an employer fires 
a gay man based on the belief that men should 
not be attracted to other men, the employer 
discriminates based on the employee's own 
sex.  
This Court recognized associational 
discrimination as a violation of Title VII in 
Holcomb v. Iona College, a case involving 
allegations of racial discrimination. 
Holcomb, a white man, alleged that he was 
fired from his job as the assistant coach of a 
college basketball team because his employer 
disapproved of his marriage to a black 
woman. This Court concluded that Holcomb 
had stated a viable claim, holding that "an 
employer may violate Title VII if it takes 
action against an employee because of the 
employee's association with a person of 
another race." Although the Court considered 
the argument that the alleged discrimination 
was based on the race of Holcomb's wife 
rather than his own, it ultimately concluded 
that "where an employee is subjected to 
adverse action because an employer 
disapproves of interracial association, the 
employee suffers discrimination because of 
the employee's own race."  
Applying similar reasoning, the Fifth, Sixth, 
and Eleventh Circuits have reached the same 
conclusion in racial discrimination cases. 
Other circuits have indicated that 
associational discrimination extends beyond 
race to all of Title VII's protected classes. We 
agree and we now hold that the prohibition on 
associational discrimination applies with 
equal force to all the classes protected by 
Title VII, including sex.  
This conclusion is consistent with the text of 
Title VII, which "on its face treats each of the 
enumerated categories exactly the same" 
such that "principles ... announce[d]" with 
respect to sex discrimination "apply with 
equal force to discrimination based on race, 
religion, or national origin," and vice versa. It 
also accords with the Supreme Court's 
application of theories of discrimination 
developed in Title VII race discrimination 
cases to claims involving discrimination 
based on sex.  
As was observed in Christiansen, "[p]utting 
aside romantic associations," the notion that 
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employees should not be discriminated 
against because of their association with 
persons of a particular sex "is not 
controversial." If an employer disapproves of 
close friendships among persons of opposite 
sexes and fires a female employee because 
she has male friends, the employee has been 
discriminated against because of her own sex. 
"Once we accept this premise, it makes little 
sense to carve out same-sex [romantic] 
relationships as an association to which these 
protections do not apply." Applying the 
reasoning of Holcomb, if a male employee 
married to a man is terminated because his 
employer disapproves of same-sex marriage, 
the employee has suffered associational 
discrimination based on his own sex because 
"the fact that the employee is a man instead 
of a woman motivated the employer's 
discrimination against him."  
In this scenario, it is no defense that an 
employer requires both men and women to 
refrain from same-sex attraction or 
relationships. In Holcomb, for example, the 
white plaintiff was fired for his marriage to a 
black woman. If the facts of Holcomb had 
also involved a black employee fired for his 
marriage to a white woman, would we have 
said that because both the white employee 
and black employee were fired for their 
marriages to people of different races, there 
was no discrimination "because of ... race"? 
Of course not. It is unthinkable that "tak[ing] 
action against an employee because of the 
employee's association with a person of 
another race," would be excused because two 
employees of different races were both 
victims of an anti- miscegenation workplace 
policy. The same is true of discrimination 
based on sexual orientation.  
Although this conclusion can rest on its own 
merits, it is reinforced by the reasoning of 
Loving v. Virginia. In Loving , the 
Commonwealth of Virginia argued that anti-
miscegenation statutes did not violate the 
Equal Protection Clause because such 
statutes applied equally to white and black 
citizens. The Supreme Court disagreed, 
holding that "equal application" could not 
save the statute because it was based "upon 
distinctions drawn according to race." 
Constitutional cases like Loving "can provide 
helpful guidance in [the] statutory context" of 
Title VII. Accordingly, we find that Loving 's 
insight—that policies that distinguish 
according to protected characteristics cannot 
be saved by equal application—extends to 
association based on sex.  
Certain amici supporting the defendants 
disagree, arguing that applying Holcomb and 
Loving to same-sex relationships is not 
warranted because anti-miscegenation 
policies are motivated by racism, while 
sexual orientation discrimination is not 
rooted in sexism. Although these amici offer 
no empirical support for this contention, 
amici supporting Zarda cite research 
suggesting that sexual orientation 
discrimination has deep misogynistic roots. 
But the Court need not resolve this dispute 
because the amici supporting defendants 
identify no cases indicating that the scope of 
Title VII's protection against sex 
discrimination is limited to discrimination 
motivated by what would colloquially be 
described as sexism. To the contrary, this 
approach is squarely foreclosed by the 
Supreme Court's precedents. In Oncale, the 
Court explicitly rejected the argument that 
Title VII did not protect male employees 
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from sexual harassment by male co-workers, 
holding that "Title VII's prohibition on 
discrimination 'because of ... sex' protects 
men as well as women" and extends to 
instances where the "plaintiff and the 
defendant ... are of the same sex." This male-
on-male harassment is well-outside the 
bounds of what is traditionally 
conceptualized as sexism. Similarly, as we 
have discussed, in Manhart the Court 
invalidated a pension scheme that required 
female employees to contribute more than 
their male counterparts because women 
generally live longer than men. Again, the 
Court reached this conclusion 
notwithstanding the fact that some people 
might not describe this policy as sexist. By 
extension, even if sexual orientation 
discrimination does not evince conventional 
notions of sexism, this is not a legitimate 
basis for concluding that it does not constitute 
discrimination "because of ... sex."  
 The fallback position for those opposing the 
associational framework is that associational 
discrimination can be based only on acts—
such as Holcomb's act of getting married—
whereas sexual orientation is a status. As an 
initial matter, the Supreme Court has rejected 
arguments that would treat acts as separate 
from status in the context of sexual 
orientation. In Lawrence v. Texas, the state 
argued that its "sodomy law [did] not 
discriminate against homosexual persons," 
but "only against homosexual conduct." 
Justice O'Connor refuted this argument, 
reasoning that laws that target "homosexual 
conduct" are "an invitation to subject 
homosexual persons to discrimination." 
More recently, in a First Amendment case 
addressing whether a public university could 
require student organizations to be open to all 
students, a religious student organization 
claimed that it should be permitted to exclude 
anyone who engaged in "unrepentant 
homosexual conduct," because such 
individuals were being excluded "on the basis 
of a conjunction of [their] conduct and [their] 
belief that the conduct is not wrong," not 
because of their sexual orientation. Drawing 
on Lawrence and Bray v. Alexandria 
Women's Health Clinic , the Supreme Court 
rejected the invitation to treat discrimination 
based on acts as separate from discrimination 
based on status. Although amici 's argument 
inverts the previous defenses of policies 
targeting individuals attracted to persons of 
the same sex by arguing that Title VII's 
prohibition of associational discrimination 
protects only acts, not status, their proposed 
distinction is equally unavailing. More 
fundamentally, amici 's argument is an 
inaccurate characterization of associational 
discrimination. First, the source of the Title 
VII claim is not the employee's associational 
act but rather the employer's discrimination, 
which is motivated by "disapprov[al] of [a 
particular type of] association." In addition, 
as it pertains to the employee, what is 
protected is not the employee's act but rather 
the employee's protected characteristic, 
which is a status. Accordingly, associational 
discrimination is not limited to acts; instead, 
as with all other violations of Title VII, 
associational discrimination runs afoul of the 
statute by making the employee's protected 
characteristic a motivating factor for an 
adverse employment action.  
In sum, we see no principled basis for 
recognizing a violation of Title VII for 
associational discrimination based on race 
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but not on sex. Accordingly, we hold that 
sexual orientation discrimination, which is 
based on an employer's opposition to 
association between particular sexes and 
thereby discriminates against an employee 
based on their own sex, constitutes 
discrimination "because of ... sex." 
Therefore, it is no less repugnant to Title VII 
than anti-miscegenation policies.  
C. Subsequent Legislative Developments  
Although the conclusion that sexual 
orientation discrimination is a subset of sex 
discrimination follows naturally from 
existing Title VII doctrine, the amici 
supporting the defendants place substantial 
weight on subsequent legislative 
developments that they argue militate against 
interpreting "because of ... sex" to include 
sexual orientation discrimination. Having 
carefully considered each of amici 's 
arguments, we find them unpersuasive.  
First, the government points to the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991, arguing that this 
amendment to Title VII ratified judicial 
decisions construing discrimination "because 
of ... sex" as excluding sexual orientation 
discrimination. Among other things, the 1991 
amendment expressly "codif[ied] the 
concepts of 'business necessity' and 'job 
related' " as articulated in Griggs, and 
rejected the Supreme Court's prior decision 
on that topic in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. 
Atonio. According to the government, this 
amendment also implicitly ratified the 
decisions of the four courts of appeals that 
had, as of 1991, held that Title VII does not 
bar discrimination based on sexual 
orientation.  
In advancing this argument, the government 
attempts to analogize the 1991 amendment to 
the Supreme Court's recent discussion of an 
amendment to the Fair Housing Act ("FHA"). 
In Texas Department of Housing & 
Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities 
Project, Inc. , the Court considered whether 
disparate-impact claims were cognizable 
under the FHA by looking to, inter alia , a 
1988 amendment to the statute. The Court 
found it relevant that "all nine Courts of 
Appeals to have addressed the question" by 
1988 "had concluded [that] the [FHA] 
encompassed disparate-impact claims." 
When concluding that Congress had 
implicitly ratified these holdings, the Court 
considered (1) the amendment's legislative 
history, which confirmed that "Congress was 
aware of this unanimous precedent," and (2) 
the fact that the precedent was directly 
relevant to the amendment, which "included 
three exemptions from liability that assume 
the existence of disparate-impact claims[.]"  
The statutory history of Title VII is markedly 
different. When we look at the 1991 
amendment, we see no indication in the 
legislative history that Congress was aware 
of the circuit precedents identified by the 
government and, turning to the substance of 
the amendment, we have no reason to believe 
that the new provisions it enacted were in any 
way premised on or made assumptions about 
whether sexual orientation was protected by 
Title VII. It is also noteworthy that, when the 
statute was amended in 1991, only three of 
the thirteen courts of appeals had considered 
whether Title VII prohibited sexual 
orientation discrimination. Mindful of this 
important context, this is not an instance 
where we can conclude that Congress was 
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aware of, much less relied upon, the handful 
of Title VII cases discussing sexual 
orientation. Indeed, the inference suggested 
by the government is particularly suspect 
given that the text of the 1991 amendment 
emphasized that it was "respond[ing] to 
Supreme Court decisions by expanding the 
scope of relevant civil rights statutes in order 
to provide adequate protection to victims of 
discrimination." For these reasons, we do not 
consider the 1991 amendment to have ratified 
the interpretation of Title VII as excluding 
sexual orientation discrimination.  
Next, certain amici argue that by not enacting 
legislation expressly prohibiting sexual 
orientation discrimination in the workplace 
Congress has implicitly ratified decisions 
holding that sexual orientation was not 
covered by Title VII. According to the 
government's amicus brief, almost every 
Congress since 1974 has considered such 
legislation but none of these bills became 
law.  
This theory of ratification by silence is in 
direct tension with the Supreme Court's 
admonition that "subsequent legislative 
history is a hazardous basis for inferring the 
intent of an earlier Congress," particularly 
when "it concerns, as it does here, a proposal 
that does not become law." This is because 
"[i]t is impossible to assert with any degree 
of assurance that congressional failure to act 
represents affirmative congressional 
approval of [a particular] statutory 
interpretation." After all, "[t]here are many 
reasons Congress might not act on a decision 
..., and most of them have nothing at all to do 
with Congress' desire to preserve the 
decision." For example, Congress may be 
unaware of or indifferent to the status quo, or 
it may be unable "to agree upon how to alter 
the status quo." These concerns ring true 
here. We do not know why Congress did not 
act and we are thus unable to choose among 
the various inferences that could be drawn 
from Congress's inaction on the bills 
identified by the government. Accordingly, 
we decline to assign congressional silence a 
meaning it will not bear.  
Drawing on the dissent in Hively, the 
government also argues that Congress 
considers sexual orientation discrimination to 
be distinct from sex discrimination because it 
has expressly prohibited sexual orientation 
discrimination in certain statutes but not Title 
VII. While it is true that Congress has 
sometimes used the terms "sex" and "sexual 
orientation" separately, this observation is 
entitled to minimal weight in the context of 
Title VII.  
The presumptions that terms are used 
consistently and that differences in 
terminology denote differences in meaning 
have the greatest force when the terms are 
used in "the same act." By contrast, when 
drafting separate statutes, Congress is far less 
likely to use terms consistently, and these 
presumptions are entitled to less force where, 
as here, the government points to terms used 
in different statutes passed by different 
Congresses in different decades. Moreover, 
insofar as the government argues that 
mention of "sexual orientation" elsewhere in 
the U.S. Code is evidence that "because of ... 
sex" should not be interpreted to include 
"sexual orientation," our race discrimination 
jurisprudence demonstrates that this is not 
dispositive. We have held that Title VII's 
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prohibition on race discrimination 
encompasses discrimination on the basis of 
ethnicity, notwithstanding the fact that other 
federal statutes now enumerate race and 
ethnicity separately. The same can be said of 
sex and sexual orientation because 
discrimination based on the former 
encompasses the latter.  
In sum, nothing in the subsequent legislative 
history identified by the amici calls into 
question our conclusion that sexual 
orientation discrimination is a subset of sex 
discrimination and is thereby barred by Title 
VII.  
III. SUMMARY 
Since 1964, the legal framework for 
evaluating Title VII claims has evolved 
substantially. Under Manhart, traits that 
operate as a proxy for sex are an 
impermissible basis for disparate treatment of 
men and women. Under Price Waterhouse, 
discrimination on the basis of sex stereotypes 
is prohibited. Under Holcomb, building on 
Loving, it is unlawful to discriminate on the 
basis of an employee's association with 
persons of another race. Applying these 
precedents to sexual orientation 
discrimination, it is clear that there is "no 
justification in the statutory language ... for a 
categorical rule excluding" such claims from 
the reach of Title VII.  
Title VII's prohibition on sex discrimination 
applies to any practice in which sex is a 
motivating factor. As explained above, 
sexual orientation discrimination is a subset 
of sex discrimination because sexual 
orientation is defined by one's sex in relation 
to the sex of those to whom one is attracted, 
making it impossible for an employer to 
discriminate on the basis of sexual 
orientation without taking sex into account. 
Sexual orientation discrimination is also 
based on assumptions or stereotypes about 
how members of a particular gender should 
be, including to whom they should be 
attracted. Finally, sexual orientation 
discrimination is associational discrimination 
because an adverse employment action that is 
motivated by the employer's opposition to 
association between members of particular 
sexes discriminates against an employee on 
the basis of sex. Each of these three 
perspectives is sufficient to support this 
Court's conclusion and together they amply 
demonstrate that sexual orientation 
discrimination is a form of sex 
discrimination.  
Although sexual orientation discrimination is 
"assuredly not the principal evil that 
Congress was concerned with when it 
enacted Title VII," "statutory prohibitions 
often go beyond the principal evil to cover 
reasonably comparable evils." In the context 
of Title VII, the statutory prohibition extends 
to all discrimination "because of ... sex" and 
sexual orientation discrimination is an 
actionable subset of sex discrimination. We 
overturn our prior precedents to the contrary 
to the extent they conflict with this ruling.  
***  
Zarda has alleged that, by "honestly 
referr[ing] to his sexual orientation," he failed 
to "conform to the straight male macho 
stereotype." For this reason, he has alleged a 
claim of discrimination of the kind we now 
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hold cognizable under Title VII. The district 
court held that there was sufficient evidence 
of sexual orientation discrimination to 
survive summary judgment on Zarda's state 
law claims. Even though Zarda lost his state 
sexual orientation discrimination claim at 
trial, that result does not preclude him from 
prevailing on his federal claim because his state 
law claim was tried under "a higher standard of 
causation than required by Title VII." Thus, we 
hold that Zarda is entitled to bring a Title VII 
claim for discrimination based on sexual 
orientation.  
CONCLUSION  
Based on the foregoing, we VACATE the district 
court's judgment on the Title VII claim and 
REMAND for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. We AFFIRM the judgment of 
the district court in all other respects.  
JACOBS, Circuit Judge, Concurring:  
I concur in Parts I and II.B.3 of the opinion of 
the Court (Associational Discrimination) and 
I therefore concur in the result. Mr. Zarda 
does have a sex discrimination claim under 
Title VII based on the allegation that he was 
fired because he was a man who had an 
intimate relationship with another man. I 
write separately because, of the several 
justifications advanced in that opinion, I am 
persuaded by one; and as to associational 
discrimination, the opinion of the Court says 
somewhat more than is necessary to justify it. 
Since a single justification is sufficient to 
support the result, I start with associational 
discrimination, and very briefly explain 
thereafter why the other grounds leave me 
unconvinced. 
I 
Supreme Court law and our own precedents 
on race discrimination militate in favor of the 
conclusion that sex discrimination based on 
one's choice of partner is an impermissible 
basis for discrimination under Title VII. This 
view is an extension of existing law, perhaps 
a cantilever, but not a leap. 
First: this Circuit has already recognized 
associational discrimination as a Title VII 
violation. In Holcomb v. Iona Coll., we 
considered a claim of discrimination under 
Title VII by a white man who alleged that he 
was fired because of his marriage to a black 
woman. We held that "an employer may 
violate Title VII if it takes action against an 
employee because of the employee's 
association with a person of another race . . 
. The reason is simple: where an employee is 
subjected to adverse action because an 
employer disapproves of interracial 
association, the employee suffers 
discrimination because of the 
employee's own race."  
Second: the analogy to same-sex 
relationships is valid because Title VII "on its 
face treats each of the enumerated categories 
exactly the same"; thus principles announced 
in regard to sex discrimination "apply with 
equal force to discrimination based on race, 
religion, or national origin." And, 
presumably, vice versa. 
Third: There is no reason I can see why 
associational discrimination based on sex 
would not encompass association between 
persons of the same sex. In Oncale v. 
Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., a case in 
which a man alleged same-sex harassment, 
the Supreme Court stated that Title VII 
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prohibits "'discriminat[ion] . . . because of . . 
. sex'" and that Title VII "protects men as well 
as women." 
This line of cases, taken together, 
demonstrates that discrimination based on 
same-sex relationships is discrimination 
cognizable under Title VII notwithstanding 
that the sexual relationship is homosexual. 
Zarda's complaint can be fairly read to allege 
discrimination based on his relationship with 
a person of the same sex. The allegation is 
analogous to the claim in Holcomb, in which 
a person of one race was discriminated 
against on the basis of race because he 
consorted with a person of a different race. In 
each instance, the basis for discrimination is 
disapproval and prejudice as to who is 
permitted to consort with whom, and the 
common feature is the sorting: one is the 
mixing of race and the other is the matching 
of sex. 
This outcome is easy to analogize to Loving 
v. Virginia. While Loving was an Equal 
Protection challenge to Virginia's 
miscegenation law, the law was held 
unconstitutional because it impermissibly 
drew distinctions according to race. In the 
context of a person consorting with a person 
of the same sex, the distinction is similarly 
drawn according to sex, and is therefore 
unlawful under Title VII. 
Amicus Mortara argues that race 
discrimination aroused by couples of 
different race is premised on animus against 
one of the races (based on the idea of white 
supremacy), and that discrimination against 
homosexuals is obviously not driven by 
animus against men or against women. But it 
cannot be that the protections of Title VII 
depend on particular races; there are a lot 
more than two races, and Title VII likewise 
protects persons who are multiracial. Mr. 
Mortara may identify analytical differences; 
but to persons who experience the racial 
discrimination, it is all one. 
Mr. Mortara also argues that discrimination 
based on homosexual acts and relationships 
is analytically distinct from discrimination 
against homosexuals, who have a proclivity 
on which they may or may not act. 
Academics may seek to know whether 
discrimination is illegal if based on same-sex 
attraction itself: they have jurisdiction over 
interesting questions, and we do not. But the 
distinction is not decisive.  In any event, the 
distinction between act and attraction does 
not arise in this case because Mr. Zarda's 
termination was sparked by his avowal of a 
same-sex relationship. 
A ruling based on Mr. Zarda's same-sex 
relationship resolves this appeal; good craft 
counsels that we go no further. Much of the 
rest of the Court's opinion amounts to woke 
dicta. 
II 
The opinion of the Court characterizes its 
definitional analysis as "the most natural 
reading of Title VII." Not really. "Sex," 
which is used in series with "race" and 
"religion," is one of the words least likely to 
fluctuate in meaning. I do not think I am 
breaking new ground in saying that the word 
"sex" as a personal characteristic refers to the 
male and female of the species. Nor can there 
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be doubt that, when Title VII was drafted in 
1964, "sex" drew the distinction between 
men and women. "A fundamental canon of 
statutory construction is that, unless 
otherwise defined, words will be interpreted 
as taking their ordinary, contemporary, 
common meaning."  
In the opinion of the Court, the word "sex" 
undergoes modification and expansion. Thus 
the opinion reasons: "[l]ogically, because 
sexual orientation is a function of sex and sex 
is a protected characteristic under Title VII, it 
follows that sexual orientation is also 
protected." It is undeniable that sexual 
orientation is a "function of sex" in the 
(unhelpful) sense that it cannot be defined or 
understood without reference to sex. But 
surely that is because it has to do with sex--
as so many things do. Everything that cannot 
be understood without reference to sex does 
not amount to sex itself as a term in Title VII. 
So it seems to me that all of these arguments 
are circular as well as unnecessary. 
III 
The opinion of the Court relies in part on a 
comparator test, asking whether the 
employee would have been treated 
differently "but for" the employee's sex. But 
the comparator test is an evidentiary 
technique, not a tool for textual 
interpretation. "[T]he ultimate issue" for a 
court to decide in a Title VII case "is the 
reason for the individual plaintiff's treatment, 
not the relative treatment of different groups 
within the workplace."  The opinion of the 
Court builds on the concept of homosexuality 
as a subset of sex, and this analysis thus 
merges in a fuzzy way with the definitional 
analysis. But when the comparator test is 
used for textual interpretation, it carries in 
train ramifications that are sweeping and 
unpredictable: think fitness tests for different 
characteristics of men and women, not to 
mention restrooms. 
IV 
The opinion of the Court relies on the line of 
cases that bars discrimination based on 
sexual stereotype: the manifestation of it or 
the failure to conform to it. There are at least 
three reasons I am unpersuaded. 
Anti-discrimination law should be explicable 
in terms of evident fairness and justice, 
whereas the analysis employed in the opinion 
of the Court is certain to be baffling to the 
populace. 
The Opinion posits that heterosexuality is 
just another sexual convention, bias, or 
stereotype--like pants and skirts, or hairdos. 
This is the most arresting notion in the 
opinion of the Court. Stereotypes are 
generalizations that are usually unfair or 
defective. Heterosexuality and 
homosexuality are both traits that are innate 
and true, not stereotypes of anything else. 
If this case did involve discrimination on the 
basis of sexual stereotype, it would have been 
remanded to the District Court on that basis, 
as was done in Christiansen v. Omnicom 
Grp., Inc. The reason it could not be 
remanded on that basis is that the record does 
not associate Mr. Zarda with any sexual 
stereotyping. The case arises from his verbal 
disclosure of his sexual orientation during his 
employment as a skydiving instructor, and 
that is virtually all we know about him. It 
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should not be surprising that a person of any 
particular sexual orientation would earn a 
living jumping out of airplanes; but Mr. 
Zarda cannot fairly be described as evoking 
somebody's sexual stereotype of homosexual 
men. So this case does not present the 
(settled) issue of sexual stereotype, which I 
think is the very reason we had to go in banc 
in order to decide this case. As was made 
clear as recently as March 2017, "being gay, 
lesbian, or bisexual, standing alone, does not 
constitute nonconformity with a gender 
stereotype that can give rise to a cognizable 
gender stereotyping claim."  
CABRANES, Circuit Judge, concurring:  
I concur only in the judgment of the Court. It 
will take the courts years to sort out how each 
of the theories presented by the majority 
applies to other Title VII protected classes: 
"race, color, religion, . . . [and] national 
origin."  
This is a straightforward case of statutory 
construction. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 prohibits discrimination "because of 
. . . sex." Zarda's sexual orientation is a 
function of his sex. Discrimination against 
Zarda because of his sexual orientation 
therefore is discrimination because of his 
sex, and is prohibited by Title VII. 
That should be the end of the analysis 
SACK, Circuit Judge, concurring in the 
judgment, and in parts I (Jurisdiction), II.A 
(The Scope of Title VII), II:B.3 
(Associational Discrimination), and II:C 
(Subsequent Legislative Developments) of 
the opinion for the Court: 
We decide this appeal in the context of 
something of a revolution in American law 
respecting gender and sex. It appears to 
reflect, inter alia, many Americans' evolving 
regard for and social acceptance of gay and 
lesbian persons. We are now called upon to 
address questions dealing directly with sex, 
sexual behavior, and sexual taboos, a 
discussion fraught with moral, religious, 
political, psychological, and other highly 
charged issues. For those reasons (among 
others), I think it is in the best interests of us 
all to tread carefully; to say no more than we 
must; to decide no more than is necessary to 
resolve this appeal. This is not for fear of 
offending, but for fear of the possible 
consequences of being mistaken in one 
unnecessary aspect or another of our 
decision. 
In my view, the law of this Circuit governing 
what is referred to in the majority opinion as 
"associational discrimination" — 
discrimination against a person because of 
his or her association with another — is 
unsettled. What was embraced by this Court 
in Simonton v. Runyon, seems to have both 
been overtaken by, and to be inconsistent 
with, our later panel decision in Holcomb v. 
Iona College. Choosing between the two 
approaches, as I think we must, I agree with 
the majority that Holcomb is right and 
that Simonton is therefore wrong. It is 
principally on that basis that I concur in the 
judgment of the Court. 
My declination to join other parts of the 
majority opinion does not signal my 
disagreement with them. Rather, inasmuch 
as, in my view, this appeal can be decided on 
the simpler and less fraught theory of 
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associational discrimination, I think it best to 
stop there without then considering other 
possible bases for our judgment. 
LOHIER, Circuit Judge, concurring:  
I agree with the majority opinion that there is 
no reasonable way to disentangle sex from 
sexual orientation in interpreting the plain 
meaning of the words "because of . . . sex." 
The first term clearly subsumes the second, 
just as race subsumes ethnicity. From this 
central holding, the majority opinion 
explores the comparative approach, the 
stereotyping rationale, and the associational 
discrimination rationale to help determine 
"when a trait other than sex is . . . a proxy for 
(or function of) sex." But in my view, these 
rationales merely reflect nonexclusive 
"evidentiary technique[s]," frameworks, or 
ways to determine whether sex is a 
motivating factor in a given case, rather than 
interpretive tools that apply necessarily 
across all Title VII cases. Zarda himself has 
described these three rationales as 
"evidentiary theories" or "routes." On this 
understanding, I join the majority opinion as 
to Parts II.A and II.B.1.a, which reflect the 
textualist's approach, and join the remaining 
parts of the opinion only insofar as they can 
be said to apply to Zarda's particular case. 
A word about the dissents. My dissenting 
colleagues focus on what they variously 
describe as the "ordinary, contemporary, 
common meaning" of the words "because of 
. . . sex," the "public meaning of [those] 
words adopted by Congress in light of the 
social problem it was addressing when it 
chose those words." There are at least two 
problems with this position. First, as the 
majority opinion points out, cabining the 
words in this way makes little or no sense of 
Oncale or, for that matter, Price Waterhouse. 
Second, their hunt for the "contemporary" 
"public" meaning of the statute in this case 
seems to me little more than a roundabout 
search for legislative history. Judge Lynch's 
laudable call (either as a way to divine 
congressional intent or as an interpretive 
check on the plain text approach) to consider 
what the legislature would have decided if the 
issue had occurred to the legislators at the 
time of enactment is, unfortunately, no longer 
an interpretive option of first resort. Time and 
time again, the Supreme Court has told us 
that the cart of legislative history is pulled by 
the plain text, not the other way around. The 
text here pulls in one direction, namely, that 
sex includes sexual orientation. 
LYNCH, Circuit Judge, dissent: 
Speaking solely as a citizen, I would be 
delighted to awake one morning and learn 
that Congress had just passed legislation 
adding sexual orientation to the list of 
grounds of employment discrimination 
prohibited under Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964. I am confident that one day — 
and I hope that day comes soon — I will have 
that pleasure. 
I would be equally pleased to awake to learn 
that Congress had secretly passed such 
legislation more than a half century ago — 
until I actually woke up and realized that I 
must have been still asleep and dreaming. 
Because we all know that Congress did no 
such thing. 
I 
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Of course, today's majority does not contend 
that Congress literally prohibited sexual 
orientation discrimination in 1964. It is worth 
remembering the historical context of that 
time to understand why any such contention 
would be indefensible. 
The Civil Rights Act as a whole was 
primarily a product of the movement for 
equality for African-Americans. It grew out 
of the demands of that movement, and was 
opposed by segregationist white members of 
Congress who opposed racial equality. 
Although the bill, even before it included a 
prohibition against sex discrimination, went 
beyond race to prohibit discrimination based 
on religion and national origin, there is no 
question that it would not have been under 
consideration at all but for the national effort 
to reckon to some degree with America's 
heritage of race-based slavery and 
government-enforced segregation. 
It is perhaps difficult for people not then alive 
to understand that before the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 became law, an employer could post 
a sign saying "Help Wanted; No Negroes 
Need Apply" without violating any federal 
law — and many employers did. Even the 
original House bill, introduced with the 
support of President Kennedy's 
Administration in 1963, did not prohibit 
racial discrimination by private employers. 
Language prohibiting employment 
discrimination by private employers on the 
grounds of "race, color, religion or national 
origin" was added later by a House 
subcommittee.  
Movement on the bill was slow. It was only 
after the March on Washington in the 
summer of 1963, the assassination of 
President Kennedy in November of that year, 
and President Johnson's strong support for a 
civil rights bill that prohibited racial 
discrimination in employment, that the 
legislation made progress in Congress. But 
the private employment discrimination 
provision, like other sections of the bill 
prohibiting racial discrimination in public 
accommodations and federally funded 
programs, was openly and bitterly opposed 
by a large contingent of southern members of 
Congress. Its passage was by no means 
assured when the floor debates in the House 
began. 
From the moment President Kennedy 
proposed the Civil Rights Act in 1963, 
women's rights groups, with the support of 
some members of Congress, had urged that 
sex discrimination be included as a target of 
the legislation. The movements in the United 
States for gender and racial equality have not 
always marched in tandem — although there 
was some overlap between abolitionists and 
supporters of women's suffrage, suffragists 
often relied on the racially offensive 
argument that it was outrageous that white 
women could not vote when black men 
could. But by the 1960s, many feminist 
advocates consciously adopted arguments 
parallel to those of the civil rights movement, 
and there was growing recognition that the 
two causes were linked in fundamental ways.  
Women's rights groups had been arguing for 
laws prohibiting sex discrimination since at 
least World War II, and had been gaining 
recognition for the agenda of the women's 
rights movement in other arenas. In addition 
to supporting (at least rhetorically) civil 
 54 
rights for African-Americans, President 
Kennedy had taken tentative steps towards 
support of women's rights as well. In 
December 1961, he created the President's 
Commission on the Status of Women, 
chaired until her death by Eleanor Roosevelt. 
Among other goals, the Commission was 
charged with developing recommendations 
for "overcoming discriminations in . . . 
employment on the basis of sex," and 
suggesting "services which will enable 
women to continue their role []as wives and 
mothers while making a maximum 
contribution to the world around them."  
The Commission's report highlighted the 
increasing role of women in the workplace, 
noting (in an era when the primacy of 
women's role in child-rearing and home-
making was taken for granted) that even 
women with children generally spent no 
more than a decade or so of their lives 
engaged in full-time child care, allowing a 
significant portion of women's lives to be 
dedicated to education and employment. 
Accordingly, the Commission advocated a 
variety of steps to improve women's 
economic position. While those 
recommendations did not include federal 
legislation prohibiting employment 
discrimination on the basis of sex, they did 
include a commitment to equal opportunity in 
employment by federal contractors and 
proposed such equality as a goal for private 
employers — as well as proposing other 
innovations, such as paid maternity leave and 
universal high-quality public child care, that 
have yet to become the law of the land. 
Nevertheless, the notion that women should 
be treated equally at work remained 
controversial. By 1964, only two states, 
Hawaii and Wisconsin, prohibited sex 
discrimination in employment. Although 
decades had passed since the Supreme Court 
announced in Muller v. Oregon, that laws 
limiting the hours that women could work did 
not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, but 
rather were an appropriate accommodation 
for women's fragile constitutions and more 
pressing maternal obligations, state laws 
"protecting" women from the rigors of the 
workplace remained commonplace.  
Accordingly, when Representative Howard 
W. Smith of Virginia, a diehard opponent of 
integration and federal legislation to enforce 
civil rights for African-Americans, proposed 
that "sex" be added to the prohibited grounds 
of discrimination in the Civil Rights Act, 
there was reason to suspect that his 
amendment was an intentional effort to 
render the Act so divisive and controversial 
that it would be impossible to pass. That 
might not have been the case, however. Like 
those early suffragettes who were ambivalent 
about, or hostile to, racial equality, Smith 
also had a prior history of support for 
(presumably white) women's equality. For 
example, he had been a longstanding 
supporter of a constitutional amendment 
guaranteeing equal rights to women.  
Whatever Smith's subjective motivations for 
proposing it, the amendment was adamantly 
opposed by many northern liberals on the 
ground that it would undermine support for 
the Act as a whole. Indeed, the New York 
Times ridiculed the amendment, suggesting 
that, among other alleged absurdities, it 
would require Radio City Music Hall to hire 
male Rockettes, and concluding that "it 
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would have been better if Congress had just 
abolished sex itself."  
But despite its contested origins, the adoption 
of the amendment prohibiting sex 
discrimination was not an accident or a stunt. 
Once the amendment was on the floor, it was 
aggressively championed by a coalition 
comprising most of the (few) women 
members of the House. Its subsequent 
adoption was consistent with a long history 
of women's rights advocacy that had 
increasingly been gaining mainstream 
recognition and acceptance. 
Discrimination against gay women and men, 
by contrast, was not on the table for public 
debate. In those dark, pre-Stonewall days, 
same-sex sexual relations were criminalized 
in nearly all states. Only three years before 
the passage of Title VII, Illinois, under the 
influence of the American Law Institute's 
proposed Model Penal Code, had become the 
first state to repeal laws prohibiting private 
consensual adult relations between members 
of the same sex.  
In addition to criminalization, gay men and 
women were stigmatized as suffering from 
mental illness. In 1964, both the American 
Psychiatric Association and the American 
Psychological Association regrettably 
classified homosexuality as a mental illness 
or disorder. As the Supreme Court recently 
explained, "[f]or much of the 20th century . . 
. homosexuality was treated as an illness. 
When the American Psychiatric Association 
published the first Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders in 1952, 
homosexuality was classified as a mental 
disorder, a position adhered to until 1973." It 
was not until two years later, in 1975, that the 
American Psychological Association 
followed suit and "adopted the same position 
[as the American Psychiatric Association], 
urging all mental health professionals to 
work to dispel the stigma of mental illness 
long associated with homosexual 
orientation." Because gay identity was 
viewed as a mental illness and was, in effect, 
defined by participation in a criminal act, the 
employment situation for openly gay 
Americans was bleak. 
Consider the rules regarding employment by 
the federal government. Starting in the 1940s 
and continuing through the 1960s, thanks to 
a series of executive orders repealing long-
standing discriminatory policies, federal 
employment opportunities for African-
Americans began to open up significantly.  In 
sharp contrast, in 1953 President Eisenhower 
signed an executive order excluding persons 
guilty of "sexual perversion" from 
government employment. During the same 
period, gay federal employees, or employees 
even suspected of being gay, were 
systematically hounded out of the service as 
"security risks" during Cold-War witchhunts. 
Civil rights and civil liberties organizations 
were largely silent. In an influential book 
about the political plight of gay people, 
Edward Sagarin, writing under the 
pseudonym Donald Webster Cory, sharply 
criticized the silence of the bar. For instance, 
he described the response to the abusive 
tactics used against members of the military 
discharged for homosexual conduct as 
follows: "And who raises a voice in protest 
against such discrimination? No one. Where 
was the American Civil Liberties Union? 
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Nowhere." To the extent that civil rights 
organizations did begin to engage with gay 
rights during the early 1960s, they did so 
through the lens of sexual liberty, rather than 
equality, grouping the prohibition of laws 
against same-sex relations with prohibitions 
of birth control, abortion, and adultery. Even 
by the mid-1960s, the ACLU was identified 
by Newsweek as the only group "apart from 
the homophile organizations" that opposed 
laws criminalizing homosexual acts.  
Given the criminalization of same-sex 
relationships and arbitrary and abusive police 
harassment of gay and lesbian citizens, 
nascent gay rights organizations had more 
urgent concerns than private employment 
discrimination. As late as 1968, four 
years after the passage of Title VII, the North 
American Conference of Homophile 
Organizations proposed a "Homosexual Bill 
of Rights" that demanded five fundamental 
rights: that private consensual sex 
between adults not be a crime; that 
solicitation of sex acts not be prosecuted 
except on a complaint by someone other than 
an undercover officer; that sexual orientation 
not be a factor in granting security clearances, 
visas, or citizenship; that homosexuality not 
be a barrier to service in the military; and that 
sexual orientation not affect eligibility for 
employment with federal, state, or local 
governments. Those proposals, which 
pointedly did not include a ban on private 
sector employment discrimination against 
gays, evidently had little traction with many 
Americans at the time. The first state to 
prohibit employment discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation even in the public 
sector was Pennsylvania, by executive order 
of the governor, in 1975 — more than a 
decade after the Civil Rights Act had become 
law. It was not until 1982 that Wisconsin 
became the first state to ban both public and 
private sector discrimination based on sexual 
orientation. Notably, as discussed more fully 
below, these states did so by explicit 
legislative action adding "sexual orientation" 
to pre-existing anti-discrimination laws that 
already prohibited discrimination based on 
sex; they did not purport to "recognize" that 
sexual orientation discrimination was merely 
an aspect of already-prohibited 
discrimination based on sex. 
In light of that history, it is perhaps needless 
to say that there was no discussion of sexual 
orientation discrimination in the debates on 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. If some 
sexist legislators considered the inclusion of 
sex discrimination in the bill something of a 
joke, or perhaps a poison pill to make civil 
rights legislation even more controversial, 
evidently no one thought that adding sexual 
orientation to the list of forbidden categories 
was worth using even in that way. Nor did 
those who opposed the sex provision in Title 
VII include the possibility that prohibiting 
sex discrimination would also prevent sexual 
orientation discrimination in their parade of 
supposed horribles. When Representative 
Emanuel Celler of New York, floor manager 
for the Civil Rights Bill in the House, rose to 
oppose Representative Smith's proposed 
amendment, he expressed concern that it 
would lead to such supposed travesties as the 
elimination of "protective" employment laws 
regulating working conditions for women, 
drafting women for military service, and 
revisions of rape and alimony laws.  He did 
not reference the prohibition of sexual 
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orientation discrimination. The idea was 
nowhere on the horizon. 
II 
I do not cite this sorry history of opposition 
to equality for African-Americans, women, 
and gay women and men, and of the biases 
prevailing a half-century ago, to argue that 
the private intentions and motivations of the 
members of Congress can trump the plain 
language or clear implications of a legislative 
enactment. (Still less, of course, do I endorse 
the views of those who opposed racial 
equality, ridiculed women's rights, and 
persecuted people for their sexual 
orientation.) Although Chief Judge 
Katzmann has observed elsewhere that 
judicial warnings about relying on legislative 
history as an interpretive aid have been 
overstated, I agree with him, and with my 
other colleagues in the majority, that the 
implications of legislation flatly prohibiting 
sex discrimination in employment, duly 
enacted by Congress and signed by the 
President, cannot be cabined by citing the 
private prejudices or blind spots of those 
members of Congress who voted for it. The 
above history makes it obvious to me, 
however, that the majority misconceives the 
fundamental public meaning of the language 
of the Civil Rights Act. The problem sought 
to be remedied by adding "sex" to the 
prohibited bases of employment 
discrimination was the pervasive 
discrimination against women in the 
employment market, and the chosen remedy 
was to prohibit discrimination that adversely 
affected members of one sex or the other. By 
prohibiting discrimination against people 
based on their sex, it did not, and does not, 
prohibit discrimination against people 
because of their sexual orientation. 
A 
To start, the history of the overlapping 
movements for equality for blacks, women, 
and gays, and the differing pace of their 
progress, as outlined in the previous section, 
tells us something important about what the 
language of Title VII must have meant to any 
reasonable member of Congress, and indeed 
to any literate American, when it was passed 
— what Judge Sykes has called the "original 
public meaning" of the statute. That history 
tells us a great deal about why the legislators 
who constructed and voted for the Act used 
the specific language that they did. 
The words used in legislation are used for a 
reason. Legislation is adopted in response to 
perceived social problems, and legislators 
adopt the language that they do to address a 
social evil or accomplish a desirable goal. 
The words of the statute take meaning from 
that purpose, and the principles it adopts must 
be read in light of the problem it was enacted 
to address. The words may indeed cut deeper 
than the legislators who voted for the statute 
fully understood or intended: as relevant 
here, a law aimed at producing gender 
equality in the workplace may require or 
prohibit employment practices that the 
legislators who voted for it did not yet 
understand as obstacles to gender equality. 
Nevertheless, it remains a law aimed at 
gender inequality, and not at other forms of 
discrimination that were understood at the 
time, and continue to be understood, as a 
different kind of prejudice, shared not only 
by some of those who opposed the rights of 
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women and African-Americans, but also by 
some who believed in equal rights for women 
and people of color. 
The history I have cited is not "legislative 
history" narrowly conceived. It cannot be 
disparaged as a matter of attempts by 
legislators or their aides to influence future 
judicial interpretation — in the direction of 
results they could not convince a majority to 
support in the overt language of a statute — 
by announcing to largely empty chambers, or 
inserting into obscure corners of committee 
reports, explanations of the intended or 
unintended legal implications of a bill. Nor 
am I seeking to infer the unexpressed wishes 
of all or a majority of the hundreds of 
legislators who voted for a bill without 
addressing a particular question of 
interpretation. Rather, I am concerned with 
what principles Congress committed the 
country to by enacting the words it chose. I 
contend that these principles can be 
illuminated by an understanding of the 
central public meaning of the language used 
in the statute at the time of its enactment.  
If the specifically legislative history of the 
"sex amendment" is relatively sparse in light 
of its adoption as a floor amendment, the 
broader political and social history of the 
prohibition of sex discrimination in 
employment is plain for all to read. The 
history of the 20th century is, among other 
things, a history of increasing equality of men 
and women. Recent events remind us of how 
spotty that equality remains, and how 
inequality persists even with respect to the 
basic right of women to physical security and 
control of their own bodies. But the trend is 
clear, and it is particularly emphatic in the 
workplace. 
That history makes it equally clear that the 
prohibition of discrimination "based on sex" 
was intended to secure the rights of women 
to equal protection in employment. Put 
simply, the addition of "sex" to a bill to 
prohibit employers from "discriminat[ing] 
against any individual with respect to his [or 
her] compensation, terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment, because of such 
individual's race, color, religion, . . . or 
national origin," was intended to eliminate 
workplace inequalities that held women back 
from advancing in the economy, just as the 
original bill aimed to protect African-
Americans and other racial, national, and 
religious minorities from similar 
discrimination. The language of the Act itself 
would have been so understood not only by 
members of Congress, but by any politically 
engaged citizen deciding whether to urge his 
or her representatives to vote for it. As Judge 
Sykes noted in her dissent in the Seventh 
Circuit's encounter with the same issue we 
face today, citing a 1960s dictionary, "In 
common, ordinary usage in 1964 — and now, 
for that matter — the word 'sex' means 
biologically male or female; it does not also 
refer to sexual orientation." On the verge of 
the adoption of historic legislation to address 
bigotry against African-Americans on the 
basis of race, women in effect stood up and 
said "us, too," and Congress agreed. 
The majority cites judicial interpretations of 
Title VII as prohibiting sexual harassment, 
and allowing hostile work environment 
claims, in an effort to argue that the 
expansion they are making simply follows in 
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this line. But the fact that a prohibition on 
discrimination against members of one sex 
may have unanticipated consequences when 
courts are asked to consider carefully 
whether a given practice does, in fact, 
discriminate against members of one sex in 
the workplace does not support extending 
Title VII by judicial construction to protect 
an entirely different category of people. It is 
true that what counts as discrimination 
against members of one sex may not have 
been fully fleshed out in the minds of 
supporters of the legislation, but it is easy 
enough to illustrate how the language of a 
provision enacted to accomplish the goal of 
equal treatment of the sexes compels results 
that may not have been specifically intended 
by its enacters. 
To begin with, just as laws prohibiting racial 
discrimination, adopted principally to 
address some of the festering national wrongs 
done to African-Americans, protect members 
of all races, including then-majority white 
European-Americans, the prohibition of sex 
discrimination by its plain language protects 
men as well as women, whether or not 
anyone who voted on the bill specifically 
considered whether and under what 
circumstances men could be victims of 
gender-based discrimination. That is not an 
expansion of Title VII, but is a conclusion 
mandated by its text: Congress deliberately 
chose to protect women and minorities not by 
prohibiting discrimination against "African-
Americans" or "Jews" or "women," but by 
neutrally prohibiting discrimination against 
any individual "based on race, . . . religion, 
[or] sex." That choice of words is clearly 
intentional, and represents a commitment to a 
principle of equal treatment of races, 
religions, and sexes that is important, even if 
the primary intended beneficiaries of the 
legislation — those most in need of its 
protection — are members of the races, 
religions, and gender that have suffered the 
most from inequality in the past. 
Other interpretations of the statute that may 
not have occurred to members of the 
overwhelmingly male Congress that adopted 
it seem equally straightforward. Perhaps it 
did not occur to some of those male members 
of Congress that sexual harassment of 
women in the workplace was a form of 
employment discrimination, or that Title VII 
was inconsistent with a "Mad Men" culture in 
the office. But although a few judges were 
slow to recognize this point, as soon as the 
issue began to arise in litigation, courts 
quickly recognized that for an employer to 
expect members of one sex to provide sexual 
favors as a condition of employment from 
which members of the other sex are exempt, 
or to view the only value of female 
employees as stemming from their 
sexualization, constitutes a fundamental type 
of discrimination in conditions of 
employment based on sex. 
The reason why any argument to the contrary 
would fail is not a matter of simplistic 
application of a formal standard, along the 
lines of "well, the employer wouldn't have 
asked the same of a man, so it's sex 
discrimination." Sexual exploitation has been 
a principal obstacle to the equal participation 
of women in the workplace, and whether or 
not individual legislators intended to prohibit 
it when they cast their votes for 
Representative Smith's amendment, both the 
literal language of that amendment and the 
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elimination of the social evil at which it was 
aimed make clear that the statute must be read 
to prohibit it.  
The same goes for other forms of "hostile 
environment" discrimination. The history of 
resistance to racial integration illustrates 
why. Employers forced to take down their 
"whites only" signs could not be permitted to 
retreat to the position that "you can make me 
hire black workers, but you can't make me 
welcome them." Making black employees 
so unwelcome that they would be deterred 
from seeking or retaining jobs previously 
reserved for whites must be treated as an 
instance of prohibited racial discrimination 
— and the same clearly goes for sex 
discrimination. The Supreme Court 
recognized that point, in exactly those terms: 
The phrase "terms, conditions or 
privileges of employment" in Title 
VII is an expansive concept which 
sweeps within its protective ambit the 
practice of creating a working 
environment heavily charged with 
ethnic or racial discrimination. . . . 
Nothing in Title VII suggests that a 
hostile environment based on 
discriminatory sexual harassment 
should not be likewise prohibited. 
But such interpretations of employment 
"discrimination against any individual . . . 
based on sex" do not say anything about 
whether discrimination based on other social 
categories is covered by the statute. Just as 
Congress adopted broader language than 
discrimination "against women," it adopted 
narrower language than "discrimination 
based on personal characteristics or 
classifications unrelated to job performance." 
Title VII does not adopt a broad principle of 
equal protection in the workplace; rather, its 
language singles out for prohibition 
discrimination based on particular categories 
and classifications that have been used to 
perpetuate injustice — but not all such 
categories and classifications. That is not a 
matter of abstract justice, but of political 
reality. Those groups that had succeeded by 
1964 in persuading a majority of the 
members of Congress that unfair treatment of 
them ought to be prohibited were included; 
those who had not yet achieved that political 
objective were not. 
Thus, if Representative Smith's amendment 
had been defeated, Title VII would still be a 
landmark prohibition of the kinds of race-, 
religion-, and national origin-based 
employment discrimination that had 
historically disadvantaged blacks, Jews, 
Catholics, or Mexican-Americans. But it 
would not have protected women, and a 
subsequent shift in popular support for such 
protection would not have changed that fact, 
without legislative action. Similarly, the 
statute did not protect those discriminated 
against, similarly unfairly, on the basis of age 
or disability; that required later legislation.  
None of this, of course, is remotely to suggest 
that employment discrimination on the basis 
of sexual orientation is somehow not 
invidious and wrong. But not everything that 
is offensive or immoral or economically 
inefficient is illegal, and if the view that a 
practice is offensive or immoral or 
economically inefficient does not command 
sufficiently broad and deep political support 
to produce legislation prohibiting it, that 
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practice will remain legal. In the context of 
private-sector employment, racial 
discrimination was just as indefensible before 
1964 as it is today, but it was not illegal. 
Discrimination against women, as President 
Kennedy's commission understood, was 
just as unfair, and just as harmful to our 
economy, before Title VII prohibited it as it 
is now, but if Congress had not adopted 
Representative Smith's amendment, it would 
have remained legal. Employment 
discrimination against older workers, and 
against qualified individuals with disabilities, 
imposed unfair burdens on those categories 
of individuals in 1964, yet it remained legal 
after the Civil Rights Act of 1964 became 
law, because Congress did not at that time 
choose to prohibit such discrimination. 
Congress is permitted to choose what types 
of social problems to attack and by which 
means. The majority says that "we have 
stated that 'Title VII should be interpreted 
broadly to achieve equal employment 
opportunity,'" but of course that dictum 
appeared in the context of a discussion of 
racial discrimination. Congress, in fact, did 
not legislate in 1964 "broadly to achieve 
equal employment opportunity" 
for all Americans, but instead opted to 
prohibit only certain categories of unfair 
discrimination. It did not then prohibit, and 
alas has not since prohibited, discrimination 
based on sexual orientation. 
B 
The majority's linguistic argument does not 
change the fact that the prohibition of 
employment discrimination "because of . . . 
sex" does not protect gays and lesbians. 
Simply put, discrimination based on sexual 
orientation is not the same thing as 
discrimination based on sex. As Judge Sykes 
explained, 
[t]o a fluent speaker of the English 
language — then and now — the 
ordinary meaning of the word "sex" 
does not fairly include the concept of 
"sexual orientation." The two terms 
are never used interchangeably, and 
the latter is not subsumed within the 
former; there is no overlap in 
meaning. . . . The words plainly 
describe different traits, and the 
separate and distinct meaning of each 
term is easily grasped. More 
specifically to the point here, 
discrimination "because of sex" is not 
reasonably understood to include 
discrimination based on sexual 
orientation, a different immutable 
characteristic. Classifying people by 
sexual orientation is different than 
classifying them by sex. 
Of course, the majority does not really 
dispute this common-sense proposition. It 
does not say that "sex discrimination" in the 
ordinary meaning of the term is literally the 
same thing as "sexual orientation 
discrimination." Rather, the majority argues 
that discrimination based on sex 
encompasses discrimination against gay 
people because discrimination based on sex 
encompasses any distinction between the 
sexes that an employer might make for any 
reason. The argument essentially reads 
"discriminate" to mean pretty much the same 
thing as "distinguish." And indeed, there are 
recognized English uses of "discriminate," 
particularly when followed with "between" 
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or "from," that imply nothing invidious, but 
merely mean "to perceive, observe or note [a] 
difference," or "[t]o make or recognize a 
distinction." For example, a person with 
perfect pitch is capable of discriminating a C 
from a C-sharp. But in the language of civil 
rights, a different and stronger meaning 
applies, that references invidious distinctions: 
"To treat a person or group in an unjust or 
prejudicial manner, esp[ecially] on the 
grounds of race, gender, sexual orientation, 
etc.; frequently with against."  
And that is indeed the sense in which Title 
VII uses the word: the statute prohibits such 
practices as "fail[ing] or refus[ing] to hire or 
to discharge" persons on account of their race 
or sex or other protected characteristic, or 
"otherwise to discriminate against any 
individual" with respect to employment 
terms. In other words, it is an 
oversimplification to treat the statute as 
prohibiting any distinction between men and 
women in the workplace, still less any 
distinction that so much as requires the 
employer to know an employee's sex in order 
to be applied, the law prohibits 
discriminating against members of one sex or 
the other in the workplace. 
That point may have little bite in the context 
of racial discrimination. The different "races" 
are defined legally and socially, and not by 
actual biological or genetic differences — 
both Hitler's Nuremberg laws and American 
laws imposing slavery and segregation had to 
define, arbitrarily, how much ancestry of a 
particular type consigned persons to a 
disfavored category, since there is no 
scientific or genetic basis for distinguishing a 
"Jew" or a "member of the colored race" from 
anyone else. And since no biological factor 
can support any job qualification based on 
race, courts have taken the view that to 
distinguish is, for the most part, to 
discriminate against. But in the area of sex 
discrimination, where the groups to be treated 
equally do have potentially relevant 
biological differences, not every distinction 
between men and women in the workplace 
constitutes discrimination against one gender 
or the other. The distinctions that were 
prohibited, however, in either case, are those 
that operate to the disadvantage of 
(principally) the disfavored race or sex. That 
is the social problem that the statute aimed to 
correct. 
Opponents of Title VII, and later of the Equal 
Rights Amendment ("ERA"), were fond of 
conjuring what they thought of as 
unthinkable or absurd consequences of 
gender equality. Some of those proved not so 
unthinkable or absurd at all. Workplace 
"protective" legislation that applied only to 
women soon fell by the wayside, despite 
Representative Cellar's fears, without 
adverse consequences. But other distinctions 
based on sex remain, and their legality is 
either assumed, or at a minimum requires 
more thought than just "but that's a 
distinction based on sex, so it's illegal." 
Distinctions based on personal privacy, for 
example, remain in place. When opponents 
of the ERA, like Senator Ervin, argued that 
under the ERA "there can be no exception for 
elements of publically [sic] imposed sexual 
segregation on the basis of privacy between 
men and women," that objection was derided 
by Senator Marlow Cook of Kentucky as the 
"potty" argument. Title VII too does not 
 63 
prohibit an employer from having separate 
men's and women's toilet facilities. Nor does 
it prohibit employer policies that differentiate 
between men and women in setting 
requirements regarding hair lengths. Thus, 
in Longo v. Carlisle DeCoppet & Co., we 
held that a policy "requiring short hair on 
men and not on women" did not violate Title 
VII. 
Dress codes provide a more complicated 
example. It is certainly arguable that some 
forms of separate dress codes further 
stereotypes harmful to workplace equality for 
women; requiring female employees to wear 
"Hooters"-style outfits but male employees 
doing the same work to wear suit and tie 
would not stand scrutiny. But what of a pool 
facility that requires different styles of 
bathing suit for male and female lifeguards? 
Judge Cabranes's concurrence would seem to 
prohibit that practice, but I believe, and I 
expect Judge Cabranes would agree, that a 
pool that required both male and female 
lifeguards to wear a uniform consisting only 
of trunks would violate Title VII, while one 
that prescribed trunks for men and a bathing 
suit covering the breasts for women would 
not. 
More controversial distinctions, such as 
different fitness requirements for men and 
women applying for jobs involving physical 
strength, have also been upheld. In a recent 
case, the Fourth Circuit rejected the notion 
that Title VII prohibits gender-normed 
physical fitness benchmarks pursuant to 
which male FBI agent trainees must perform 
30 push-ups, while female trainees need only 
do 14. In upholding this distinction, the court 
noted that of "the few decisions to confront 
the use of gender-normed physical fitness 
standards in the Title VII context, none has 
deemed such standards to be 
unlawful,"  because courts have recognized 
that some physiological differences between 
men and women "impact their relative 
abilities to demonstrate the same levels of 
physical fitness,"  Thus, the court 
in Bauer recognized that to distinguish 
between the sexes is not always to 
discriminate against one or the other. Indeed, 
a failure to impose distinct fitness 
requirements for men and women may be 
found to violate Title VII, if it has a disparate 
impact on one sex and the employer cannot 
justify the requirement as a business 
necessity. Taken to its logical conclusion, 
though, the majority's interpretation of Title 
VII would do away with this understanding 
of the Act. 
These examples suffice to illustrate two 
points relevant to the supposedly simple 
interpretation of sex-based discrimination 
relied upon by the majority. First, it is not the 
case that any employment practice that can 
only be applied by identifying an employee's 
sex is prohibited. Second, neither can it be the 
case that any discrimination that would be 
prohibited if race were the criterion is equally 
prohibited when gender is used. Obviously, 
Title VII does not permit an employer to 
maintain racially segregated bathrooms, nor 
would it allow different-colored or different-
designed bathing costumes for white and 
black lifeguards. Such distinctions would 
smack of racial subordination, and would 
impose degrading differences of treatment on 
the basis of race. Precisely the same 
distinctions between men and women would 
not.  
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Nor does the example of "discrimination 
based on traits that are a function of sex, such 
as life expectancy," help the majority's cause. 
Discrimination of that sort, as the majority 
notes, could permit gross discrimination 
against female employees "by using traits 
that are associated with sex as a proxy for 
sex."  That is certainly so as to "traits that are 
a function of sex," such as pregnancy or the 
capacity to become pregnant. But it is not so 
as to discrimination based on sexual 
orientation. Same-sex attraction is not "a 
function of sex" or "associated with sex" in 
the sense that life expectancy or childbearing 
capacity are. A refusal to hire gay people 
cannot serve as a covert means of limiting 
employment opportunities for men or for 
women as such; a minority of both men and 
women are gay, and discriminating against 
them discriminates against them, as gay 
people, and does not differentially 
disadvantage employees or applicants of 
either sex. That is not the case with other 
forms of "sex-plus" discrimination that single 
out for disfavored status traits that are, for 
example, common to women but rare in men.  
C 
That "because of . . . sex" did not, and still 
does not, cover sexual orientation, is further 
supported by the movement, in both 
Congress and state legislatures, to enact 
legislation protecting gay men and women 
against employment discrimination. This 
movement, which has now been successful in 
twenty-two states — including all three in our 
Circuit — and the District of Columbia, has 
proceeded by expanding the categories of 
prohibited discrimination in state anti-
discrimination laws. In none of those states 
did the prohibition of sexual orientation 
discrimination come by judicial 
interpretation of a pre-existing prohibition on 
gender-based discrimination to encompass 
discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation. Similarly, the Executive 
Branch has prohibited discrimination against 
gay men and lesbians in federal employment 
by adding "sexual orientation" to previously 
protected grounds.  Finally, the same 
approach has been reflected in the repeated 
(but so far unsuccessful) introduction of bills 
in Congress to add "sexual orientation" to the 
list of prohibited grounds of employment 
discrimination in Title VII.  
The Department of Justice argues, relying 
on Texas Department of Housing and 
Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities 
Project, Inc., that Congress ratified judicial 
interpretations of "sex" in Title VII as 
excluding sexual orientation when it 
amended the Civil Rights Act in 1991 and 
failed to overrule judicial decisions holding 
that the sex discrimination provision of Title 
VII did not cover sexual orientation 
discrimination.  In Inclusive Communities, 
the Supreme Court held that disparate-impact 
claims are cognizable under the Fair Housing 
Act ("FHA"). In so holding, the Court found 
it relevant that Congress had amended the 
FHA after nine Courts of Appeals had held 
that the FHA allowed for disparate-impact 
claims, and did not alter the text of the Act in 
a way that would make it clear that disparate-
impact claims were not contemplated by the 
FHA. Furthermore, the Court found it 
significant that the legislative history of the 
FHA amendment made it clear that Congress 
was aware of those Court of Appeals 
decisions.  The majority dismisses this 
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argument because at the time of the 1991 
amendment to the Civil Rights Act, only 
three Courts of Appeals had ruled that Title 
VII did not cover sexual orientation, and 
Congress did not make clear, in the 
legislative history of the 1991 amendment, 
that it was aware of this precedent.  
In light of the clear textual and historical 
meaning of the sex provision that I have 
discussed above, I do not find it necessary to 
rely heavily on the more technical argument 
that strives to interpret the meaning of 
statutes by congressional actions and 
omissions that might be taken as ratifying 
Court of Appeals decisions. But I do think it 
is worth noting that the Supreme Court also 
found it relevant, in Inclusive Communities, 
that Congress had rejected a proposed 
amendment "that would have eliminated 
disparate-impact liability for certain zoning 
decisions." Here, while only three Courts of 
Appeals may have ruled on the issue by 1991, 
over twenty-five amendments had been 
proposed to add sexual orientation to Title 
VII between 1964 and 1991. All had been 
rejected. In fact, two amendments were 
proposed in 1991, one in the House and one 
in the Senate, Civil Rights Amendments Act 
of 1991, S. 574, 102d Congress; Civil Rights 
Amendments Act of 1991, H.R. 1430, 102d 
Congress, and neither of those amendments 
found its way into the omnibus bill that 
overruled other judicial interpretations of the 
Civil Rights Act. Moreover, in addition to the 
three Courts of Appeals that had ruled on the 
issue, the EEOC — the primary agency 
charged by Congress with interpreting and 
enforcing Title VII — had also held, by 1991, 
that sexual orientation discrimination fell 
"outside the purview of Title VII."  
Thus, to the extent that we can infer the 
awareness of Congress at all, the continual 
attempts to add sexual orientation to Title 
VII, as well as the EEOC's determination 
regarding the meaning of sex, should be 
considered, in addition to the three appellate 
court decisions, as evidence that Congress 
was unquestionably aware, in 1991, of a 
general consensus about the meaning of 
"because of . . . sex," and of the fact that gay 
rights advocates were seeking to change the 
law by adding a new category of prohibited 
discrimination to the statute. 
Although the Supreme Court has rightly 
cautioned against relying on legislative 
inaction as evidence of congressional intent, 
because "several equally tenable inferences 
may be drawn from such inaction, including 
the inference that the existing legislation 
already incorporated the offered 
change," surely the proposal and rejection of 
over fifty amendments to add sexual 
orientation to Title VII means something. . 
And it is pretty clear what it does not mean. 
It is hardly reasonable, in light of the EEOC 
and judicial consensus that sex 
discrimination did not encompass sexual 
orientation discrimination, to conclude that 
Congress rejected the proposed amendments 
because senators and representatives 
believed that Title VII "already incorporated 
the offered change." There may be many 
reasons why each proposal ultimately failed, 
but it cannot reasonably be claimed that the 
basic reason that Congress did not pass such 
an amendment year in and year out was 
anything other than that there was not yet the 
political will to do so. 
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This last point requires one further 
disclaimer. As with the social pre-history of 
Title VII, these later developments are not 
referenced in a dubious effort to infer the 
specific intentions of the members of 
Congress who voted for the Smith 
amendment in 1964, nor are they referenced 
to infer the specific intent of each Congress 
that was faced with proposed sexual 
orientation amendments. The point, rather, is 
that race, gender, and sexual orientation 
discrimination have been consistently 
perceived in the political world, and by the 
American population as a whole, as different 
practices presenting different social and 
political issues. At different times over the 
last few generations, the recognition of each 
as a problem to be remedied by legislation 
has been controversial, with the movements 
to define each form of discrimination as 
illegal developing at a different pace and for 
different reasons, and being opposed in each 
case by different coalitions for different 
reasons. To recognize this fact is to 
understand that discrimination against 
persons based on sex has had, in law and in 
politics, a meaning that is separate from that 
of discrimination based on sexual orientation.  
In short, Title VII's prohibition of 
employment discrimination against 
individuals on the basis of their sex is aimed 
at employment practices that differentially 
disadvantage men vis-à-vis women or 
women vis-à-vis men. That is what the 
language of the statute means to an ordinary 
"fluent speaker of the English language," that 
is the social practice that Congress chose to 
legislate against, and in light of that 
understanding, certain laws and practices that 
distinguish between men and women have 
been found to violate Title VII, and certain 
others have not. Discrimination against 
persons whose sexual orientation is 
homosexual rather than heterosexual, 
however offensive such discrimination may 
be to me and to many others, is not 
discrimination that treats men and women 
differently. The simplistic argument that 
discrimination against gay men and women is 
sex discrimination because targeting persons 
sexually attracted to others of the same sex 
requires noticing the gender of the person in 
question is not a fair reading of the text of the 
statute, and has nothing to do with the type of 
unfairness in employment that Congress 
legislated against in adding "sex" to the list of 
prohibited categories of discrimination in 
Title VII. 
III 
The majority opinion goes on to identify two 
other arguments in support of its holding: (1) 
that sexual orientation discrimination is 
actually "gender stereotyping" that 
constitutes discrimination against individuals 
based on their sex, and (2) that such 
discrimination constitutes prohibited 
"associational discrimination" analogous to 
discriminating against employees who are 
married to members of a different race. 
These arguments have the merit of 
attempting to link discrimination based on 
sexual orientation to the social problem of 
gender discrimination at which Title VII is 
aimed. But just as the "differential treatment" 
argument attempts to shoehorn sexual 
orientation discrimination into the statute's 
verbal template of discrimination based on 
sex, these arguments attempt a similar (also 
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unsuccessful) maneuver with lines of case 
law. While certain Supreme Court cases 
identify clear-cut examples of sex or race 
discrimination that may have a superficial 
similarity to the practice at issue here, the 
majority mistakes that similarity for a 
substantive one. 
A 
Perhaps the most appealing of the majority's 
approaches is its effort to treat sexual 
orientation discrimination as an instance of 
sexual stereotyping. The argument proceeds 
from the premises that "sex stereotyping 
violates Title VII," and that "same-sex 
orientation 'represents the ultimate case of 
failure to conform' to gender stereotypes," 
and concludes that an employer who 
discriminates against gay people is therefore 
"sex stereotyping" and thus violating Title 
VII. But like the other arguments adopted by 
the majority, this approach rests more on 
verbal facility than on social reality. 
In unpacking the majority's syllogism, it is 
first necessary to address what we mean by 
"sex stereotyping" that "violates Title VII." 
Invidious stereotyping of members of racial, 
gender, national, or religious groups is at the 
heart of much employment discrimination. 
Most employers do not entertain, let alone 
admit to, older forms of racialist or other 
discriminatory ideologies that hold that 
members of certain groups are inherently or 
genetically inferior and undeserving of equal 
treatment. Much more common are 
assumptions, not always even conscious, that 
associate certain negative traits with 
particular groups. A perception that women, 
for example, are not suited to executive 
positions, or are less adept at the 
mathematical and practical skills demanded 
of engineers, can be a significant hindrance 
to women seeking such positions, even when 
a particular woman is demonstrably 
qualified, or indeed even where empirical 
data show that on average women perform as 
well as or better than men on the relevant 
tasks. Refusing to hire or promote someone 
because of that sort of gender (or racial, or 
ethnic, or religious) stereotyping is not a 
separate form of sex (or race, or ethnic, or 
religious) discrimination, but is precisely 
discrimination in hiring or promotion based 
on sex (or race, or ethnicity, or religion). It 
treats applicants or employees not as 
individuals but as members of a class that is 
disfavored for purposes of the employment 
decision by reason of a trait stereotypically 
assigned to members of that group as a 
whole. For the most part, then, the kind of 
stereotyping that leads to discriminatory 
employment decisions that violate Title VII 
is the assignment of traits that are negatively 
associated with job performance (dishonesty, 
laziness, greed, submissiveness) to members 
of a particular protected class. 
Clearly, sexual orientation discrimination is 
not an example of that kind of sex 
stereotyping; an employer who disfavors a 
male job applicant whom he believes to be 
gay does not do so because the employer 
believes that most men are gay and therefore 
unsuitable. Rather, he does so because he 
believes that most gay people (whether male 
or female) have some quality that makes 
them undesirable for the position, and that 
because this applicant is gay, he must also 
possess that trait. Although that is certainly 
stereotyping, and invidiously so, it does not 
 68 
stereotype a group protected by Title VII, and 
is therefore not (yet) illegal. 
But as the majority correctly points out, that 
is not the only way in which stereotyping can 
be an obstacle to protected classes of people 
in the workplace. The stereotyping discussed 
above involves beliefs about how members 
of a particular protected category are, but 
there are also stereotypes (or more simply, 
beliefs) about how members of that group 
should be. In the case of sex discrimination in 
particular, stereotypes about how women 
ought to look or behave can create a double 
bind. For example, a woman who is 
perceived through the lens of a certain 
"feminine" stereotype may be assumed to be 
insufficiently assertive for certain positions 
by contrast to men who, viewed through the 
lens of a "masculine" stereotype, are 
presumed more likely to excel in situations 
that demand assertiveness. At the same time, 
the employer may fault a woman who 
behaves as assertively as a male comparator 
for being too aggressive, thereby failing to 
comply with societal expectations of 
femininity. 
That is the situation that a plurality of the 
Supreme Court identified in Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the key case the 
majority relies on for its "sex stereotyping" 
argument. As that opinion pointed out, "[a]n 
employer who objects to aggressiveness in 
women but whose positions require this trait 
places women in an intolerable and 
impermissible catch 22: out of a job if they 
behave aggressively and out of a job if they 
do not. Title VII lifts women out of this bind." 
The two horns of the dilemma described in 
Price Waterhouse have slightly different, yet 
equally problematic, sexist foundations: a 
female employee or applicant may be 
prejudiced by a negative assumption that 
women aren't or can't be sufficiently 
dominant for a position that requires 
leadership or strength or aggression, but 
when a woman unquestionably does show the 
putatively desired traits, she is held back 
because of the different but related notion 
that women shouldn't be aggressive or 
dominant. The latter is not an assumption 
about how most women are, it is a normative 
belief about howall women should be. 
I fully accept the conclusion that that kind of 
discrimination is prohibited, and that it 
imposes different conditions of employment 
on men and on women. Not only does such 
discrimination require women to behave 
differently in the workplace than men, but it 
also actively deters women from engaging in 
kinds of behavior that are required for 
advancement to certain positions, and thus 
effectively bars them from such 
advancement. The key element here is that 
one sex is systematically disadvantaged in a 
particular workplace. In that circumstance, 
sexual stereotyping is sex discrimination.  
But as Judge Sykes points out in 
her Hively dissent, the homophobic employer 
is not deploying a stereotype about men or 
about women to the disadvantage of either 
sex. Such an employer is expressing 
disapproval of the behavior or identity of a 
class of people that includes both men and 
women. That disapproval does not stem from 
a desire to discriminate against either sex, nor 
does it result from any sex-specific 
stereotype, nor does it differentially harm 
either men or women vis-à-vis the other sex. 
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Rather, it results from a distinct type of 
objection to anyone, of whatever gender, who 
is identified as homosexual. The belief on 
which it rests is not a belief about what men 
or women ought to be or do; it is a belief 
about what all people ought to be or do — to 
be heterosexual, and to have sexual attraction 
to or relations with only members of the 
opposite sex. That does not make workplace 
discrimination based on this belief better or 
worse than other kinds of discrimination, but 
it does make it something different from sex 
discrimination, and therefore something that 
is not prohibited by Title VII. 
 
B 
 
The "associational discrimination" theory is 
no more persuasive. That theory rests on 
cases involving race discrimination.  Many 
courts have found that Title VII prohibits 
discrimination in cases in which, as in our 
case of Holcomb v. Iona College, a white 
plaintiff alleged that he was fired because he 
was married to a person of a different race. 
It would require absolute blindness to the 
history of racial discrimination in this 
country not to understand what is at stake in 
such cases, and why such allegations 
unmistakably state a claim of discrimination 
against an individual employee on the basis 
of race. Anti-miscegenation laws constituted 
a bulwark of the structure of institutional 
racism that is the paradigm of invidious 
discrimination in this country. African-
Americans were condemned first to slavery, 
and then to second-class citizenship and 
virtual apartheid, on the basis of an ideology 
that regarded them as inferior. Such an 
ideology is incompatible with fraternization, 
let alone marriage and reproduction, between 
African-Americans and whites. A prohibition 
on "race-mixing" was thus grounded in 
bigotry against a particular race and was an 
integral part of preserving the rigid 
hierarchical distinction that denominated 
members of the black race as inferior to 
whites. 
Thus, as the Supreme Court noted in striking 
down Virginia's law prohibiting marriage 
between a white person and a person of color, 
the Supreme Court of Virginia had upheld the 
statute because Virginia defined its 
"legitimate" purposes as "'preserv[ing] the 
racial integrity of [the state's] citizens,' and [] 
prevent[ing] 'the corruption of blood,' 'a 
mongrel breed of citizens,' and 'the 
obliteration of racial pride,'" purposes the 
Court correctly identified and rejected 
as "obviously an endorsement of the doctrine 
of White Supremacy.” The racist hostility to 
"race-mixing" extended well beyond a 
prohibition against interracial marriage. The 
beatings of "freedom riders" attempting to 
integrate interstate bus lines in the South in 
the early 1960s, inflicted on white as well as 
black participants in the protests, 
demonstrated that racial bigotry against 
African-Americans manifested itself in direct 
attacks not only on African-Americans, but 
also on whites who associated with African-
Americans as equals. The entire system of 
"separate but equal" segregation in both state-
owned and private facilities and places of 
public accommodation was designed, as 
Charles Black made plain in a classic 
deconstruction of the legal fiction of 
"separate but equal," to confine black people 
to "a position of inferiority." Thus, the 
associational discrimination reflected in 
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cases such as Loving and Holcomb was a 
product of bigotry against a single race by 
another. That discrimination is expressly 
prohibited in employment by Title VII. 
Workplace equality for racial minorities is 
thus blatantly incompatible with a practice 
that ostracizes, demeans, or inflicts adverse 
conditions on white employees for marrying, 
dating, or otherwise associating with, people 
of color. The prohibition of that kind of 
discrimination is not simply a matter of 
noting that, in order to effectuate it, the 
employer must identify the races of the 
employee and the person(s) with whom he or 
she associates. Just as sexual harassment 
against female employees presents a serious 
obstacle to the full and equal participation of 
women in the workplace, discrimination 
against members of a favored race who so 
much as associate with persons of another 
race reflects a deep-seated bigotry against the 
disfavored race(s) that Title VII undertakes to 
banish from the workplace. The principle 
was well stated by the Sixth Circuit in a case 
cited by the majority, Barrett v. Whirlpool 
Corporation: 
Title VII protects individuals who, 
though not members of a protected 
class, are victims of discriminatory 
animus toward protected third 
persons with whom the individuals 
associate. 
Discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation, however, is not discrimination of 
the sort at issue in Holcomb and Barrett. In 
those cases, the plaintiffs alleged that they 
were discriminated against because the 
employer was biased — that is, had a 
"discriminatory animus" — against members 
of the race with whom the plaintiffs 
associated. There is no allegation in this case, 
nor could there plausibly be, that the 
defendant discriminated against Zarda 
because it had something against men, and 
therefore discriminated not only against men, 
but also against anyone, male or female, who 
associated with them. I have no trouble 
assuming that the principle 
of Holcomb and Barrett applies beyond the 
category of race discrimination: an employer 
who fired or refused to promote an Anglo-
American, Christian employee because she 
associated with Latinos or Jews would 
presumably run afoul of that principle just as 
much as one whose animus ran against black 
Americans. Such an employer would clearly 
be discriminating against the employee on 
the basis of her friends' ethnicity or religion 
— in the formulation from 
the Barrett opinion, that employer would be 
victimizing an employee out of 
"discriminatory animus toward protected 
third persons with whom the [employee] 
associate[d]."   
It is more difficult to imagine realistic 
hypotheticals in which an employer 
discriminated against anyone who so much as 
associated with men or with women, though 
I suppose academic examples of such 
behavior could be conjured. But whatever 
such a case might look like, discrimination 
against gay people is not it. Discrimination 
against gay men, for example, plainly is not 
rooted in animus toward "protected third 
persons with whom [they] associate."  An 
employer who practices such discrimination 
is hostile to gay men, not to men in general; 
the animus runs not, as in the race and 
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religion cases discussed above, against a 
"protected group" to which the employee's 
associates belong, but against an (alas) 
unprotected group to which they belong: 
other gay men.  
The majority tries to rebut this 
straightforward distinction in various ways. 
First, it notes — but declines to rely on — 
academic "research suggesting that sexual 
orientation discrimination has deep 
misogynistic roots." It is certainly plausible 
to me that the "deep roots" of hostility to 
homosexuals are in some way related to the 
same sorts of beliefs about the proper roles of 
men and women in family life that underlie at 
least some employment discrimination 
against women. It may also be that the "roots" 
of all forms of discrimination against people 
who are different in some way from a socially 
defined dominant group can be found in 
similar psychological processes of 
discomfort with change or difference, or with 
"authoritarian personality traits"— or that 
there are other links among different forms of 
prejudice. And it can plausibly be argued that 
homosexual men have historically been 
derided because they were seen as abdicating 
their masculinity, and therefore the 
advantage they have over women.  
But the majority is right not to go searching 
for such roots, whatever they might be, 
because legislation is not typically 
concerned, and Title VII manifestly is not 
concerned, with defining and eliminating the 
"deep roots" of biased attitudes. Congress 
legislates against concrete behavior that 
represents a perceived social problem. Title 
VII does not prohibit "misogyny" or 
"sexism," nor does it undertake to revise 
individuals' ideas (religious or secular) about 
how families are best structured. Rather, it 
prohibits overt acts: discrimination in hiring, 
promotion, and the terms and conditions of 
employment based on sex. Similarly, states, 
like those in our Circuit, that have prohibited 
discrimination based on sexual orientation do 
not seek to eradicate disapproval of 
homosexual practices (whether rooted in 
religious belief or misogyny or some other 
theory, or caused by some conditioned or 
other visceral reaction). People may believe 
what they like, but they may not discriminate 
in employment against those whose 
characteristics or behaviors place them 
within the ambit of a protected category. 
Unlike those states, though, Congress has not 
enacted such a prohibition, and the fact that 
some of us believe that sexual orientation 
discrimination is unfair for much the same 
reasons that we disapprove of sex 
discrimination does not change that reality. 
Second, the majority suggests that my 
analysis of associational discrimination is 
"squarely foreclosed by" cases like Oncale. It 
is not. As noted above, I do not maintain that 
Title VII prohibits only those practices that 
its framers might have been principally 
concerned with, or only what was 
"traditionally," seen as sex discrimination. To 
reiterate: sexual harassment plays a large role 
in hindering women's entry into, and 
advancement in, the workplace, and thus it is 
no surprise that courts have interpreted Title 
VII to prohibit it. And because Title VII 
protects both men and women from such 
practices, it does not matter whether the 
victim is male or female. Sexual harassment 
in the workplace quite literally imposes 
conditions of employment on one sex that are 
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not imposed on the other, and it does not 
matter whether the employer who perpetrates 
such discriminatory disadvantage is male or 
female, or of the same or different sex than 
the employee. The victim of discrimination in 
such situations is selected by his or her sex, 
and the disadvantage is imposed on him or 
her by reason of his or her membership in the 
protected class. It is not a question of what is 
"traditionally conceptualized as sexism." It is 
a question of the public meaning of the words 
adopted by Congress in light of the social 
problem it was addressing when it chose 
those words. 
C 
In the end, perhaps all of these arguments, on 
both sides, boil down to a disagreement about 
how discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation should be conceptualized. 
Whether based on linguistic arguments or 
associational theories or notions of 
stereotyping, the majority's arguments 
attempt to draw theoretical links between one 
kind of discrimination and another: to find 
ways to reconceptualize discrimination on 
the basis of sexual orientation as 
discrimination on the basis of sex. It is hard 
to believe that there would be much appetite 
for this kind of recharacterization if the law 
expressly prohibited sexual orientation 
discrimination, or that any opponent of 
sexual orientation discrimination would 
oppose the addition of sexual orientation to 
the list of protected characteristics in Title 
VII on the ground that to do so would be 
redundant or would express a 
misunderstanding of the nature of 
discrimination against men and women who 
are gay. I believe that the vast majority of 
people in our society — both those who are 
hostile to homosexuals and those who 
deplore such hostility — understand bias 
against or disapproval of those who are 
sexually attracted to persons of their own sex 
as a distinct type of prejudice, and not as 
merely a form of discrimination against 
either men or women on the basis of sex. 
The majority asserts that discrimination 
against gay people is nothing more than a 
subspecies of discrimination against one or 
the other gender. Discrimination against gay 
men and lesbians is wrong, however, because 
it denies the dignity and equality of gay men 
and lesbians, and not because, in a purely 
formal sense, it can be said to treat men 
differently from women. It is understandable 
that those who seek to achieve legal 
protection for gay people victimized by 
discrimination search for innovative 
arguments to classify workplace bias against 
gays as a form of discrimination that is 
already prohibited by federal law. But the 
arguments advanced by the majority ignore 
the evident meaning of the language of Title 
VII, the social realities that distinguish 
between the kinds of biases that the statute 
sought to exclude from the workplace from 
those it did not, and the distinctive nature of 
anti-gay prejudice. Accordingly, much as I 
might wish it were otherwise, I must 
conclude that those arguments fail. 
IV 
The law with respect to the rights of gay 
people has advanced considerably since 
1964. Much of that development has been by 
state legislation. As noted above, for 
example, twenty-two states now prohibit, by 
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explicit legislative pronouncement, 
employment discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation. But other advances have 
come by means of Supreme Court decisions 
interpreting the Constitution. Perhaps the 
most striking advance, from the vantage of 
the early 1960s, has been the legalization of 
same-sex marriage as a matter of 
constitutional law. 
Nothing that I have said in this opinion 
should be interpreted as expressing any 
disagreement with the line of cases running 
from Lawrence v. Texas, through Obergefell 
v. Hodges. But those cases provide no 
support for the plaintiff's position in this case, 
or for the method of interpretation utilized by 
the majority. 
For one thing, it is noteworthy that none of 
the Supreme Court's landmark constitutional 
decisions upholding the rights of gay 
Americans depend on the argument that laws 
disadvantaging homosexuals constitute 
merely a species of the denial of equal 
protection of the laws on the basis of gender, 
or attempt to assimilate discrimination 
against gay people to the kinds of sex 
discrimination that were found to violate 
equal protection in cases like Frontiero v. 
Richardson, Craig v. Boren, and Orr v. Orr, 
in the 1970s. Instead, the Court's gay rights 
cases were based on the guarantee of 
"liberty" embodied in the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
There is also a more fundamental difference. 
The Supreme Court's decisions in this area 
are based on the Constitution of the United 
States, rather than a specific statute, and the 
role of the courts in interpreting the 
Constitution is distinctively different from 
their role in interpreting acts of Congress. 
There are several reasons for this. 
First, the entire point of the Constitution is to 
delimit the powers that have been granted by 
the people to their government. Our 
Constitution creates a republican form of 
government, in which the democratically 
elected representatives of the majority of the 
people are granted the power to set policy. 
But the powers of those representatives are 
constrained by a written text, which prevents 
a popular majority — both in the federal 
Congress and, since the Civil War 
Amendments, in state legislatures — from 
violating certain fundamental rights. As 
every law student reads in his or her first-year 
constitutional law class, "[t]he powers of the 
legislature are defined and limited; and that 
those limits may not be mistaken, or 
forgotten, the constitution is written." To the 
extent that the courts exercise a non-
democratic or counter-majoritarian power, 
they do so in the name of those rights. 
Particular exercises of that power, including 
the gay rights decisions of this new 
millennium, may be controversial, and fierce 
disagreements exist over the legitimacy of 
various methods of constitutional 
interpretation. And it is not controversial that 
the power to assess the constitutionality of 
legislation must be exercised with restraint, 
and with a due deference to the judgments of 
elected officials who themselves have taken 
an oath to defend the Constitution. But it has 
long been generally accepted that the courts 
have a special role to play in defending the 
liberties enshrined in the Constitution against 
encroachment even by the people's elected 
representatives. 
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Within the limits imposed by constitutional 
principles, however, the will of the majority, 
as expressed in legislation adopted by the 
people's representatives, governs. As the 
Supreme Court has instructed, the role of 
courts with respect to statutes is simply "to 
apply the statute as it is written — even if we 
think some other approach might accord with 
good policy." Just last Term, a unanimous 
Supreme Court foreclosed judicial efforts to 
"update" statutes, declaring that, although 
"reasonable people can disagree" whether, 
following the passage of time, "Congress 
should reenter the field and alter the 
judgments it made in the past[,] . . . the proper 
role of the judiciary in that process . . . [is] to 
apply, not amend, the work of the People's 
representatives." In interpreting statutes, 
courts must not merely show deference or 
restraint; their obligation is to do their best to 
understand, in a socially and politically 
realistic way, what decisions the democratic 
branches of government have embodied in 
the language they voted for (and what they 
have not), and to interpret statutes 
accordingly in deciding cases. 
Second, the rights conferred by the 
Constitution are written in broad language. 
As the great Chief Justice Marshall 
commented, our Constitution is "one of 
enumeration, and not of definition." 
Examples are easily cited: The Constitution 
does not contain a list of specific 
punishments that are too cruel to be imposed; 
it prohibits, in general language, "cruel and 
unusual punishments." It does not enact a 
code of police procedure that explains 
exactly what kinds of searches the police may 
conduct, under what particular 
circumstances; it prohibits "unreasonable 
searches and seizures." It does not, as 
relevant here, identify particular types of 
discriminatory actions by state governments 
that it undertakes to forbid; it demands that 
those governments provide to all people 
within our borders "the equal protection of 
the laws." 
Legislation, in contrast, can and often does 
set policy in minute detail. It does not 
necessarily concern itself with deep general 
principles. Rather, legislators are entitled to 
pick and choose which problems to address, 
and how far to go in addressing them. Within 
the limits of constitutional guarantees, 
Congress is given "wide latitude" to legislate, 
City of Boerne, but courts must struggle to 
define those limits by giving coherent 
meaning to broad constitutional principles. 
The majestic guarantee of equal protection in 
the Fourteenth Amendment is a very different 
kind of pronouncement than the prohibition, 
in Title VII, of specific kinds of 
discrimination, by a specified subset of 
employers, based on clearly defined 
categories. The language of the Constitution 
thus allows a broader scope for interpretation. 
Third, and following in part from above, the 
Constitution requires some flexibility of 
interpretation, because it is intended to 
endure; it was deliberately designed to be 
difficult to amend. It is difficult to amend 
because the framers believed that certain 
principles were foundational and, for 
practical purposes, all but eternal, and should 
not be subject to the political winds of the 
moment. A constitution is, to quote Chief 
Justice Marshall yet again, "framed for ages 
to come, and is designed to approach 
immortality as nearly as human institutions 
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can approach it." The choice of broad 
language reflects the framers' goal: they did 
not choose to prohibit "cruel and unusual 
punishments," rather than listing prohibited 
punishments, simply to save space, on the 
assumption that future courts could consult 
extra-constitutional sources to identify what 
particular penalties they had in mind; they did 
so in order to enshrine a general principle, 
leaving its instantiation and elaboration to 
future interpreters. 
Those enduring principles would not, could 
not, endure if they were incapable of 
adaptation — at times via judicial 
interpretation — to new social 
circumstances, as well as new understandings 
of old problems. That idea is not new. In 
1910, the Supreme Court wrote, in the 
context of the Eighth Amendment, that 
"[t]ime works changes, brings into existence 
new conditions and purposes. Therefore a 
principle, to be vital, must be capable of 
wider application than the mischief which 
gave it birth. This is peculiarly true of 
constitutions. More recently, in Obergefell, 
the Court noted that "in interpreting the Equal 
Protection Clause, the Court has recognized 
that new insights and societal understandings 
can reveal unjustified inequality within our 
most fundamental institutions that once 
passed unnoticed and unchallenged." 
Legislation, on the other hand, is not intended 
to last forever. It must be consistent with 
constitutional principles, and ideally it will be 
inspired by a principled concept of ordered 
liberty. But it nevertheless remains the 
domain of practical political compromise. 
Congress and the state legislatures are in 
frequent session, and are capable — 
notwithstanding criticisms of "gridlock" and 
praise of "checks and balances" — of acting 
to repeal, extend, or modify prior enactments. 
In interpreting the Constitution, courts speak 
to the ages; in interpreting legislation, federal 
courts speak to — and essentially for — 
Congress, which can always correct our 
mistakes, or revise legislation in light of 
changing political and social realities. 
Finally, the Constitution, as noted above, is 
designed, with very limited exceptions, to 
govern the government. The commands of 
equal protection and respect for liberties that 
can only be denied by due process of law tell 
us how a government must behave when it 
regulates the people who created it. 
Legislation, however, generally governs the 
people themselves, in their relation with each 
other. 
The question of how the government, acting 
at the behest of a possibly temporary political 
majority, is permitted to treat the people it 
governs, is a different question, and is 
answered by reference to different principles, 
than the question of what obligations should 
be imposed on private citizens. The former 
question must ultimately be answered by 
courts under the principles adopted in the 
Constitution. The latter is entrusted primarily 
to the legislative process. Courts interpreting 
statutes are not in the business of imposing on 
private actors new rules that have not been 
embodied in legislative decision. It is for that 
reason that segregation in public facilities 
was struck down by constitutional command, 
long before segregation of private facilities 
was prohibited by federal legislation adopted 
by Congress. Whether or not the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments have something to 
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say about whether the state and federal 
governments may discriminate in 
employment against gay Americans — a 
question that is not before us, and about 
which I express no view — it is the 
prerogative of Congress or a state legislature 
to decide whether private employers may do 
so. 
In its amicus submission, the EEOC quite 
reasonably asks whether it is just that a gay 
employee can be married on Sunday, and 
fired on Monday — discriminated against at 
his or her job for exercising a right that is 
protected by the Constitution. I would answer 
that it is not just. But at the same time, I 
recognize that the law does not prohibit every 
injustice. The Constitution protects the 
liberty of gay people to marry against 
deprivation by their government, but it does 
not promise freedom from discrimination by 
their fellow citizens. That is hardly a novel 
proposition: absent Title VII, the same 
injustice could have been inflicted on the 
Lovings themselves. The Constitution 
protected them against governmental 
discrimination, but (except for specific 
vestiges of slavery prohibited by 
the Thirteenth Amendment) only an act of 
Congress can prohibit one individual from 
discriminating against another in housing, 
public accommodations, and employment. It 
is well to remember that whether to prohibit 
race and sex discrimination was a 
controversial political question in 1964. 
Imposing an obligation on private employers 
to treat women and minorities fairly required 
political organizing and a political fight. 
At the end of the day, to paraphrase Chief 
Justice Marshall, in interpreting statutes we 
must never forget that it is not a Constitution 
we are expounding. When interpreting an act 
of Congress, we need to respect the choices 
made by Congress about which social 
problems to address, and how to address 
them. In 1964, Congress — belatedly — 
prohibited employment discrimination based 
on race, sex, religion, ethnicity, and national 
origin. Many states have similarly 
recognized the injustice of discrimination on 
the basis of sexual orientation. In doing so, 
they have called such discrimination by its 
right name, and taken a firm and explicit 
stand against it. I hope that one day soon 
Congress will join them, and adopt that 
principle on a national basis. But it has not 
done so yet. 
For these reasons, I respectfully, and 
regretfully, dissent. 
LIVINGSTON, Circuit Judge, dissenting:  
I dissent for substantially the reasons set forth 
in Sections I, II, and III of Judge Lynch's 
opinion, and I join in those sections. I share 
in the commitment that all individuals in the 
workplace be treated fairly, and that 
individuals not be subject to workplace 
discrimination on the basis of their sexual 
orientation, just as on the basis of their "race, 
color, religion, sex, [and] national origin." I 
cannot conclude, however, as the majority 
does, that sexual orientation discrimination is 
a "subset" of sex discrimination, et passim, 
and is therefore included among the 
prohibited grounds of workplace 
discrimination listed in Title VII. 
The majority's efforts founder on the simple 
question of how a reasonable reader, 
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competent in the language and its use, would 
have understood Title VII's text when it was 
written — on the question of its public 
meaning at the time of enactment. The 
majority acknowledges the argument "that it 
is not 'even remotely plausible that in 1964, 
when Title VII was adopted, a reasonable 
person competent in the English language 
would have understood that a law banning 
employment discrimination 'because of sex' 
also banned discrimination because of sexual 
orientation.'" It does not contest the point, 
however, but seeks merely to justify its 
departure from ordinary, contemporary 
meaning by claiming that "[e]ven if that [is] 
so," its approach no more departs from the 
ordinary meaning of words in their 
contemporary context than supposedly 
occurred when sexual harassment and hostile 
work environment claims were first 
recognized by courts. But as Judge Lynch has 
cogently explained, that is simply not the 
case. The majority does not discover a "plain" 
yet hidden meaning in Title VII, sufficiently 
obscure as to wholly elude every appellate 
court, including this one, until the Seventh 
Circuit's decision in Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. 
Coll. of Ind., last year. Instead, it sub silentio 
abandons our usual approach to statutory 
interpretation. 
Because Sections I, II, and III of Judge 
Lynch's dissent are sufficient to answer the 
statutory question that this case presents, I do 
not go further to address the subject of 
constitutional interpretation, and do not join 
in Section IV. I agree with Judge Lynch, 
however, that constitutional and statutory 
interpretation should not be confused: that 
while courts sometimes may be called upon 
to play a special role in defending 
constitutional liberties against encroachment 
by government, in statutory interpretation, 
courts "are not in the business of imposing on 
private actors new rules that have not been 
embodied in legislative decision." To do so 
chips away at the democratic and rule-of-law 
principles on which our system of 
governance is founded — the very principles 
we rely on to secure the legitimacy and the 
efficacy of our laws, including 
antidiscrimination legislation.  
The Supreme Court said unanimously, just 
last Term, that the proper role of the judiciary 
in statutory interpretation is "to apply, not 
amend, the work of the People's 
representatives," even when reasonable 
people might believe that "Congress should 
reenter the field and alter the judgments it 
made in the past." "[I]t is for Congress, not 
the courts, to write the law," and where 
"Congress' . . . decisions are mistaken as a 
matter of policy, it is for Congress to change 
them. We should not legislate for them." 
This hornbook separation-of-powers 
principle and the reasons behind it need not 
be elaborated here, for both should be well 
known to every law student. Together, they 
explain why judges interpreting statutes do 
their best to discern the ordinary, 
contemporary, common meaning of the 
statute's language. This is the law that was 
enacted through the democratic process, and 
the law we are to apply. 
This approach does not always yield results 
that satisfy the judge charged with the task of 
statutory interpretation. It has not done so 
today. But I cannot faithfully join in the 
majority's opinion. I agree with 
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Judge Lynch that when Title VII was written 
and, indeed, today, "bias against or 
disapproval of those who are sexually 
attracted to persons of their own sex" was and 
is viewed "as a distinct type of prejudice," 
and not as a subcategory of "discrimination 
against either men or women on the basis of 
sex." Dissenting Op. at 56. Accordingly, and 
agreeing with him that in interpreting an act 
of Congress, we must "respect the choices 
made by Congress about which social 
problems to address, and how to address 
them,” I respectfully dissent. 
RAGGI, Circuit Judge, dissenting:  
A majority of the court today extends Title 
VII's prohibition of employment 
discrimination "because of . . . sex," to 
discrimination based on sexual orientation. I 
respectfully dissent substantially for the 
reasons stated by Judge Lynch in Parts I, II, 
and III of his dissenting opinion and by 
Judge Livingston in her dissenting opinion. 
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“Supreme Court to Decide Whether Landmark Civil Rights Law Applies to Gay 
and Transgender Workers”  
 
 
The New York Times 
 
Adam Liptak 
 
April 22, 2019  
 
The Supreme Court announced on Monday 
that it would decide whether the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 guarantees protections from 
workplace discrimination to gay and 
transgender people in three cases expected to 
provide the first indication of how the court’s 
new conservative majority will approach 
L.G.B.T. rights. 
The Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission has said the 1964 act does 
guarantee the protections. But the Trump 
administration has taken the opposite 
position, saying that the landmark legislation 
that outlawed discrimination based on race, 
religion, national origin and, notably, sex, 
cannot fairly be read to apply to 
discrimination based on sexual orientation or 
transgender status. 
The three cases the court accepted are the first 
concerning L.G.B.T. rights since 
the retirement last summer of Justice 
Anthony M. Kennedy, a champion of gay 
rights. His replacement by the more 
conservative Justice Brett M. Kavanaugh 
could shift the court’s approach to cases 
concerning gay men, lesbians and 
transgender people. 
Most federal appeals courts have interpreted 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act to exclude 
sexual orientation discrimination. But two of 
them, in New York and Chicago, recently 
issued decisions ruling that discrimination 
against gay men and lesbians is a form of sex 
discrimination. 
The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case 
from New York, Altitude Express Inc. v. 
Zarda, No. 17-1623, along with one from 
Georgia that came to the opposite 
conclusion, Bostock v. Clayton County, Ga., 
No. 17-1618. 
The New York case was brought by a 
skydiving instructor, Donald Zarda, who said 
he was fired because he was gay. His 
dismissal followed a complaint from a female 
customer who had voiced concerns about 
being tightly strapped to Mr. Zarda during a 
tandem dive. Mr. Zarda, hoping to reassure 
the customer, told her that he was “100 
percent gay.” 
Mr. Zarda sued under Title VII and lost the 
initial rounds. He died in a 2014 skydiving 
accident, and his estate pursued his case. 
Last year, a divided 13-judge panel of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit allowed the lawsuit to 
proceed. Writing for the majority, Chief 
Judge Robert A. Katzmann concluded 
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that “sexual orientation discrimination is 
motivated, at least in part, by sex and is thus 
a subset of sex discrimination.” 
In dissent, Judge Gerard E. Lynch wrote that 
the words of Title VII did not support the 
majority’s interpretation. 
“Speaking solely as a citizen,” he wrote, “I 
would be delighted to awake one morning 
and learn that Congress had just passed 
legislation adding sexual orientation to the 
list of grounds of employment discrimination 
prohibited under Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964. I am confident that one day — 
and I hope that day comes soon — I will have 
that pleasure.” 
“I would be equally pleased to awake to learn 
that Congress had secretly passed such 
legislation more than a half-century ago — 
until I actually woke up and realized that I 
must have been still asleep and dreaming,” 
Judge Lynch wrote. “Because we all know 
that Congress did no such thing.” 
The arguments in the Second Circuit had a 
curious feature: Lawyers for the federal 
government appeared on both sides. One 
lawyer, representing the E.E.O.C., said Title 
VII barred discrimination against gay people. 
Another, representing the Trump 
administration, took the contrary view. 
The Georgia case was brought by a child 
welfare services coordinator who said he was 
fired for being gay. The 11th Circuit, in 
Atlanta, ruled against him in a short, 
unsigned opinion that cited a 1979 
decision that had ruled that “discharge for 
homosexuality is not prohibited by Title 
VII.” 
The justices also agreed to decide the 
separate question of whether Title VII bars 
discrimination against transgender people. 
The case, R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes 
v. Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission, No. 18-107, concerns Aimee 
Stephens, who was fired from a Michigan 
funeral home after she announced in 2013 
that she was a transgender woman and would 
start working in women’s clothing. 
“What I must tell you is very difficult for me 
and is taking all the courage I can muster,” 
she wrote to her colleagues. “I have felt 
imprisoned in a body that does not match my 
mind, and this has caused me great despair 
and loneliness.” 
Ms. Stephens had worked at the funeral home 
for six years. Her colleagues testified that she 
was able and compassionate. 
Two weeks after receiving the letter, the 
home’s owner, Thomas Rost, fired Ms. 
Stephens. Asked for the “specific reason that 
you terminated Stephens,” Mr. Rost said: 
“Well, because he was no longer going to 
represent himself as a man. He wanted to 
dress as a woman.” 
The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit, in Cincinnati, ruled for Ms. 
Stephens. Discrimination against transgender 
people, the court said, was barred by Title 
VII. 
“It is analytically impossible to fire an 
employee based on that employee’s status as 
a transgender person without being 
motivated, at least in part, by the employee’s 
sex,” the court said, adding, “Discrimination 
‘because of sex’ inherently includes 
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discrimination against employees because of 
a change in their sex.” 
John J. Bursch, a lawyer with Alliance 
Defending Freedom, which represents the 
funeral home, said the appeals court had 
impermissibly revised the federal law. 
“Neither government agencies nor the courts 
have authority to rewrite federal law by 
replacing ‘sex’ with ‘gender identity’ — a 
change with widespread consequences for 
everyone,” Mr. Bursch said in a statement. 
“The funeral home wants to serve families 
mourning the loss of a loved one, but the 
E.E.O.C. has elevated its political goals 
above the interests of the grieving people that 
the funeral home serves.” 
James D. Esseks, a lawyer with the American 
Civil Liberties Union, which represents Ms. 
Stephens and Mr. Zarda’s estate, said the 
cases concern elementary principles of 
fairness. 
“Most of America would be shocked if the 
Supreme Court said it was legal to fire Aimee 
because she’s transgender or Don because he 
is gay,” Mr. Esseks said in a statement. “Such 
a ruling would be disastrous, relegating 
L.G.B.T.Q. people around the country to a 
second-class citizen status.” 
There is a second issue in Ms. Stephens’s 
case, one that could allow her to win however 
the Supreme Court might rule on whether 
Title VII applies to discrimination against 
transgender people. In 1989, the court 
said discrimination against workers because 
they did not conform to gender stereotypes 
was a form of sex discrimination. 
The Sixth Circuit ruled for Ms. Stephens on 
that ground, too, saying she had been fired 
“for wishing to appear or behave in a manner 
that contradicts the funeral home’s 
perception of how she should behave or 
appear based on her sex.” 
All three cases present the question of how 
courts should interpret statutes whose 
drafters might not have contemplated the 
sweep of the language they wrote. 
In January, in a minor arbitration case, 
Justice Neil M. Gorsuch wrote that courts 
should ordinarily interpret statutes as they 
were understood at the time of their 
enactment. In a concurring opinion, Justice 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg said that was not 
always so. 
“Congress,” she wrote, “may design 
legislation to govern changing times and 
circumstances.” Quoting from an earlier 
decision, she added: “Words in statutes can 
enlarge or contract their scope as other 
changes, in law or in the world, require their 
application to new instances or make old 
applications anachronistic.” 
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April 25, 2019  
 
It was no snap judgment. 
That’s one thing that is clear about the order 
the Supreme Court issued on Monday adding 
to its docket three cases on whether current 
federal law protects L.G.B.T. employees 
from being fired for their sexual orientation 
or transgender identity. 
The court had the three petitions under active 
review beginning in early January, and the 
cases were taken up 11 times at the justices’ 
weekly private conference. Three or four 
“relistings” would not be particularly 
noteworthy these days. A typical reason for 
such a delay is that a petition has failed to 
attract the necessary four votes and some 
justices are writing a dissent to explain why 
their colleagues should have agreed to take 
the case. But 11 conferences, ending not with 
a dissenting opinion but with a grant of 
review, is highly unusual. 
So something else is clear about Monday’s 
order: If the court didn’t make a snap 
judgment, neither should we when it comes 
to understanding what just happened and 
what might come next. I was surprised to see 
predictions of doom being offered by 
progressive court watchers. “The absolute 
worst case scenario,” Ian Millhiser 
warned on Think Progress. The cases “could 
demolish sex discrimination law as we know 
it,” Mark Joseph Stern wrote on Slate. 
I don’t mean to single out two writers whose 
consistently smart Supreme Court analysis I 
admire. I understand the progressive concern 
that the court might conclude that judges lack 
a legitimate basis for retrospectively writing 
“sexual orientation” or “transgender” into 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
which prohibits discrimination in 
employment “because of” an individual’s sex 
(along with race, religion and national 
origin). If the court were to conclude that the 
statute’s meaning is controlled by what those 
who voted for it 55 years ago thought they 
were doing, it would eviscerate its own 
precedents interpreting Title VII generously 
to cover, for example, sexual harassment, not 
only of women by men but also between 
members of the same sex. 
But here’s the thing: The court indicated on 
Monday that it is not going to do that. In 
granting review of the transgender case, R.G. 
& G.R. Harris Funeral Homes v. Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission, the 
justices rejected the questions posed to them 
by the employer, which lost in the lower court 
and consequently is the petitioner in this case. 
The employer, a small chain of funeral homes 
in Michigan that dismissed a longtime 
employee who was transitioning from male 
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to female, is represented by Alliance 
Defending Freedom, a prominent Christian-
right litigating organization. These were the 
questions the group told the justices were 
presented by the appeal: 
“1. Whether the word ‘sex’ in Title VII’s 
prohibition on discrimination ‘because of 
sex’ meant ‘gender identity’ and included 
‘transgender status’ when Congress enacted 
Title VII in 1964. 
“2. Whether Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins prohibits employers from applying 
sex-specific policies according to their 
employee’s sex rather than their gender 
identity.” 
And here is the single question that the 
justices have chosen to answer instead: 
“Whether Title VII prohibits discrimination 
against transgender people based on (1) their 
status as transgender or (2) sex stereotyping 
under Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.” 
The difference between the two approaches 
to the case is clear. The answer to Alliance 
Defending Freedom’s first question is 
obviously “no” — gender identity wasn’t on 
the screen for Congress or for most of society 
in 1964. On the basis of that question, the 
transgender plaintiff, Aimee Stephens, loses. 
The group’s second question requires a bit 
more explanation, but the answer would take 
the court to the same place. The funeral home 
had a dress code for its funeral directors that 
required men to wear business suits and 
women to wear jackets and skirts. When 
Anthony Stephens, soon to become Aimee, 
informed that funeral home’s owner that part 
of the transition process would involve 
dressing and appearing as a woman before 
gender reassignment surgery, the owner 
replied, “This is not going to work out.” The 
owner later testified that he fired Anthony 
Stephens because “he was no longer going to 
represent himself as a man. He wanted to 
dress as a woman.” 
There is a body of employment law holding 
that differential dress codes for men and 
women don’t ordinarily amount to sex 
discrimination. So if that’s the question for 
the Supreme Court, Aimee Stephens loses on 
that score as well. 
Both versions of the questions, from the 
Alliance Defending Freedom and the court, 
invoke the case of Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins. This 1989 decision expanded the 
concept of discrimination to hold that an 
employer who penalizes an employee who 
doesn’t conform to a stereotypical idea of the 
proper appearance or behavior for that 
person’s gender can be found to violate Title 
VII. The precedent has played an important 
role in litigation on behalf of gay men and 
lesbians, and it will play an important one in 
this case as well. The court’s rephrased 
question makes it clear that the justices read 
Price Waterhouse as encompassing a broad 
view of stereotyping, well beyond the dress 
code issue. That was the view taken by the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit in its ruling on behalf of Ms. 
Stephens. By discriminating against a 
transgender employee, the appeals court said, 
an employer is necessarily “imposing its 
stereotypical notions of how sexual organs 
and gender identity ought to align.” 
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I have no inside information about what went 
on at the court during the prolonged 
consideration of this case. But I believe that 
there was an extended negotiation among the 
justices, aimed at crafting questions that 
would open up the case rather than skew it in 
the employer’s direction. 
I’m reminded of something that happened a 
quarter-century ago when another potential 
landmark case, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 
reached the court. The petition was filed in 
late 1991 by abortion-rights advocates who 
believed that the court, following the 
retirements of its leading liberal justices, was 
about to overturn Roe v. Wade. The 
advocates’ calculation was that if this was 
going to be the outcome, it would be better 
for it to happen quickly and decisively, in 
time for the 1992 presidential election to 
become a referendum on the right to abortion 
and to awaken what polls showed to be a 
large silent majority favoring abortion rights. 
So they asked the court to decide a broad 
question: Was Roe v. Wade still good law? 
The court refused to put itself to that all-or-
nothing test. Instead, it rewrote the question 
to address specifically the constitutionality of 
the three Pennsylvania abortion restrictions 
that were at issue. As I later learned from 
internal court correspondence when I was 
writing a biography of Justice Harry 
Blackmun, the author of Roe v. Wade, the 
instigator of this change was Justice David 
Souter, who said he wanted to rephrase the 
question “in such a way as 
to avoid overruling Roe.” Justice Souter, 
who was then one of two justices recently 
appointed by President George H.W. Bush, 
went on to provide a crucial vote as one of the 
five justices who preserved the right to 
abortion. 
The times, the cases and the court are 
different now, of course. But the Casey story 
shows us that the justices are capable of 
taking great care not to permit overly zealous 
advocacy to back them into a corner. 
The other two Title VII cases the court 
granted on Monday are Bostock v. Clayton 
County, Ga. and Altitude Express v. Zarda. 
The justices did not reword the questions in 
either of these cases. The wording in both is 
straightforward and to the point. The Bostock 
petition asks “Whether discrimination 
against an employee because of sexual 
orientation constitutes prohibited 
employment discrimination ‘because 
of … sex’ within the meaning of Title 
VII. …” The Altitude Express petition’s 
question is only slightly different: “Whether 
the prohibition in Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 … against employment 
discrimination ‘because of … sex’ 
encompasses discrimination based on an 
individual’s sexual orientation.” 
These petitions also spent four months being 
listed for conference after conference. My 
guess is that they were simply being carried 
along while the justices were negotiating 
about how to proceed with the transgender 
case. These cases clearly merited review. The 
employer had won in the Bostock case in the 
United States Court of Appeals for the 11th 
Circuit, while the gay employee had won in 
the Altitude Express case in the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. This 
is the type of division over the core meaning 
of a federal statute that the Supreme Court 
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views as its obligation to resolve. While the 
court granted review in both cases, it has 
consolidated them for a single one-hour 
argument, probably in November and 
probably on the same day as the transgender 
case. 
And what happens then? I offer my analysis 
less as a prediction than a caution against 
jumping to conclusions. But if the court is 
true both to the direction of its sex-
discrimination precedents and to ordinary 
uses of the English language, all three cases 
ought to be easy wins for the plaintiffs. No 
need to rely on me; ask Judge José A. 
Cabranes of the Second Circuit. He is one of 
the judiciary’s more prominent conservatives 
and a judge whose opinions get the attention 
of conservatives on the Supreme Court. In the 
Second Circuit sexual orientation case, he 
concurred with the majority in finding that 
the plaintiff, Donald Zarda, had a valid Title 
VII claim. 
“This is a straightforward case of statutory 
construction,” Judge Cabranes wrote. “Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits 
discrimination ‘because of sex.’ Zarda’s 
sexual orientation is a function of his sex. 
Discrimination against Zarda because of his 
sexual orientation therefore is discrimination 
because of his sex, and is prohibited by Title 
VII.” 
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The Supreme Court will hear three cases 
concerning whether gay and transgender 
people are protected from discrimination on 
the job, marking the first major LGBT rights 
issue to reach the court since its 2015 opinion 
legalizing same-sex marriage. 
Lower courts have differed sharply on 
whether the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which 
prohibits sex discrimination, necessarily 
covers sexual orientation or gender identity. 
Congress, unlike some two dozen states, 
hasn’t explicitly added those classifications 
to federal antidiscrimination laws. 
The court’s calendar all but ensures decisions 
will come in the late spring or early summer 
of 2020, injecting a significant social issue—
and likely the makeup of the Supreme Court 
itself—into the presidential election season. 
With four liberal justices expected to read 
LGBT-rights claims more broadly, the focus 
will be on the court’s conservative wing, 
recently bolstered by two Trump appointees 
vetted by the president’s social-conservative 
allies. 
That places the spotlight squarely on Justice 
Brett Kavanaugh, whose predecessor, Justice 
Anthony Kennedy, led a closely divided 
court through a series of landmark opinions 
culminating with the constitutional 
recognition of same-sex marriage. Justice 
Kavanaugh, 54 years old, once clerked for 
Justice Kennedy, who enthusiastically 
promoted the younger jurist’s career. 
Justice Kavanaugh didn’t face such matters 
during his years as a judge on a lower court, 
but conservatives have tended to interpret 
antidiscrimination laws narrowly, typically 
resolving ambiguities in employers’ favor. 
Important as the issues are across the political 
spectrum, the Supreme Court has appeared in 
no hurry to confront them in recent years. All 
three appeals were filed last year and lingered 
on the court’s agenda for months beyond the 
typical case. At the end, the justices may have 
had little choice, as lower courts have issued 
conflicting decisions. 
Two of the court’s new cases involve gay 
people who allege they were fired because of 
their sexual orientation. 
In one, the New York-based Second U.S. 
Circuit Court of Appeals overruled its own 
precedents to allow the late Donald Zarda, a 
skydiving instructor, to sue his former 
employer. Mr. Zarda said he sometimes told 
female customers he was gay to ease their 
potential discomfort in being strapped 
together with a man for a tandem dive. One 
client alleged Mr. Zarda touched her 
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inappropriately and disclosed his sexual 
orientation as a way to excuse his behavior, a 
claim he denied. Mr. Zarda was fired in 2010 
and died in an accident in 2014. 
Chief Judge Robert Katzmann wrote that the 
Zarda estate should be permitted to pursue its 
lawsuit. “Sexual orientation discrimination is 
predicated on assumptions about how 
persons of a certain sex can or should be,” he 
wrote. Because it “is motivated by an 
employer’s opposition to romantic 
association between particular sexes,” it 
qualifies as “discrimination based on the 
employee’s own sex.” 
The second case comes from the Atlanta-
based 11th Circuit, which rejected 
discrimination claims by a gay man fired 
from his job as child-welfare services 
coordinator for the juvenile court system in 
Clayton County, Ga. Gerald Lynn Bostock 
alleged his sexual orientation, as well as his 
participation in a gay recreational softball 
league, led to his termination. 
Last year, a three-judge panel issued a brief 
unsigned opinion based on a footnote from a 
1979 decision by an earlier court stating that 
“discharge for homosexuality is not 
prohibited.” That footnote, in turn, relied on 
an earlier opinion siding with an insurance 
company that in 1969 turned down a male job 
applicant because of his “effeminate 
characteristics.” 
The employers in both the New York and 
Georgia cases deny they fired the workers 
because they were gay, but argue that Title 
VII—the employment provision of the Civil 
Rights Act that prohibits discrimination 
based on “race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin”—doesn’t address sexual 
orientation. 
The cases also highlight a reversal in the 
federal government’s view of gay rights. The 
Obama-era Justice Department argued that 
federal civil-rights law protected workers 
against sexual-orientation discrimination. 
The Trump administration takes the opposite 
position. 
The third case accepted on Monday concerns 
a transgender worker and will be considered 
separately from the other two. Aimee 
Stephens alleges a Detroit funeral home fired 
her as a funeral director after she said she was 
transitioning and would no longer present as 
male after six years with the company. The 
employer, R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral 
Homes Inc., said the change in Ms. 
Stephens’s gender presentation would violate 
its dress code and disrupt the grieving process 
for clients. 
Last year, the Sixth Circuit, in Cincinnati, 
allowed the U.S. Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission to sue on Ms. 
Stephens’s behalf. 
“Neither government agencies nor the courts 
have authority to rewrite federal law by 
replacing ‘sex’ with ‘gender identity’—a 
change with widespread consequences for 
everyone,” said an attorney for the employer, 
John Bursch of Alliance Defending Freedom, 
an evangelical advocacy group. “The EEOC 
has elevated its political goals above the 
interests of the grieving people that the 
funeral home serves.” 
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“What happened to me was wrong, it was 
hurtful and it harmed my family. I hope the 
Supreme Court will see that firing me 
because I’m transgender was 
discrimination,” Ms. Stephens said in a 
statement released by the ACLU, which 
represents her. 
The high court is likely to hear oral 
arguments in the fall, with decisions expected 
by July 2020. 
The court’s series of gay-rights landmark 
opinions, all written by Justice Kennedy, 
began in 1996 with a decision striking down 
a Colorado ballot measure that had 
invalidated local laws protecting gay people 
from discrimination and prohibited such 
protections in the future. 
In 2003, the court struck down a Texas statute 
criminalizing gay sex, overruling a 1986 
decision that upheld sodomy laws. In 2013, 
the court voided a federal ban on benefits to 
legally married same-sex couples. That 
decision paved the way for Obergefell v. 
Hodges, the court’s 2015 ruling recognizing 
same-sex marriages under the Constitution. 
The late Justice Antonin Scalia, a 
conservative stalwart, dissented every time. 
But in 1998, he wrote one opinion that gay-
rights advocates cite as a major precedent in 
their favor. The court’s unanimous ruling 
allowed a male employee on an oil rig to sue 
for sex discrimination by other men who 
harassed him in ways suggesting they 
thought he was gay. 
While few lawmakers in 1964 may have 
expected the Title VII to cover such conduct, 
“statutory prohibitions often go beyond the 
principal evil to cover reasonably comparable 
evils,” Justice Scalia wrote. 
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[Excerpt; some sections omitted] 
 
The Supreme Court announced today that it 
will weigh in next term on whether federal 
employment discrimination laws protect 
LGBT employees. After considering a trio of 
cases — two claiming discrimination based 
on sexual orientation and the third claiming 
discrimination based on transgender status — 
at 11 consecutive conferences, the justices 
agreed to review them. Until today, the cases 
slated for oral argument next term had been 
relatively low-profile, but this morning’s 
announcement means that the justices will 
have what will almost certainly be 
blockbuster cases on their docket next fall, 
with rulings to follow during the 2020 
presidential campaign. 
 
In Altitude Express v. Zarda, the justices will 
decide whether federal laws banning 
employment discrimination protect gay and 
lesbian employees. The petition for review 
was filed by a New York skydiving company, 
now known as Altitude Express. After the 
company fired Donald Zarda, who worked as 
an instructor for the company, Zarda went to 
federal court, where he contended that he was 
terminated because he was gay – a violation 
of (among other things) Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, which bars 
discrimination “because of sex.” 
The trial court threw out Zarda’s Title VII 
claim, reasoning that Title VII does not allow 
claims alleging discrimination based on 
sexual orientation. But the full U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the 2nd Circuit reversed that 
holding, concluding that Title VII does apply 
to discrimination based on sexual orientation 
because such discrimination “is a subset of 
sex discrimination.” 
 
Altitude Express took its case to the Supreme 
Court last year, asking the justices to weigh 
in. In 2017, the justices had denied review 
of a similar case, filed by a woman who 
alleged that she had been harassed and passed 
over for a promotion at her job as a hospital 
security officer in Georgia because she was a 
lesbian. However, that case came to the court 
in a somewhat unusual posture: Neither the 
hospital nor the individual employees named 
in the lawsuit had participated in the 
proceedings in the lower courts, and they had 
told the Supreme Court that they would 
continue to stay out of the case even if review 
were granted, which may have made the 
justices wary about reviewing the case on the 
merits. 
 
Altitude Express’ case will be consolidated 
for one hour of oral argument with the second 
case involving the rights of gay and lesbian 
employees: Bostock v. Clayton County, 
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Georgia. The petitioner in the case, Gerald 
Bostock, worked as a child-welfare-services 
coordinator in Clayton County, Georgia. 
Bostock argued that after the county learned 
that he was gay, it falsely accused him of 
mismanaging public money so that it could 
fire him – when it was in fact firing him 
because he was gay. 
Bostock went to federal court, arguing that 
his firing violated Title VII. The county 
urged the court to dismiss the case, arguing 
that Title VII does not apply to discrimination 
based on sexual orientation. The district court 
agreed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
11th Circuit upheld that ruling
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After 11 private conferences during which 
the U.S. Supreme Court justices debated 
whether to hear the cases, the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari[1] in three cases involving 
the extent of protection — if any — provided 
by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
against employment-based discrimination on 
the basis of sexual orientation and gender 
identity. The court consolidated the two 
sexual orientation cases, Altitude Express v. 
Zarda and Bostock v. Clayton County, 
Georgia, and allocated a total of one hour for 
oral argument for both cases.  
In the gender identity case, R.G. & G.R. 
Harris Funeral Homes Inc. v. U.S. Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission et al., 
the court limited its consideration to the 
question of whether Title VII prohibits 
discrimination against transgender people 
based on (1) their status as transgender or (2) 
pursuant to the theory of sex stereotyping 
announced in Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins.[2]  
The current federal stance on Title VII and 
LGBT discrimination is conflicting, to say 
the least. The court’s rulings in these cases 
will provide employers with some much- 
needed clarity regarding whether federal law 
requires that their discrimination policies 
protect gay and transgender individuals.  
Background  
Under Title VII, it is illegal for an employer 
to discriminate against an employee “because 
of ... sex.” The statute does not on its face 
prohibit sexual orientation or gender identity 
discrimination, and circuit courts are split as 
to whether Title VII’s protection against sex-
based discrimination also prohibits sexual 
orientation discrimination, with the Second 
and Seventh Circuits of the view that Title 
VII prohibits sexual orientation- based 
discrimination and the Eleventh and Fifth 
Circuits reaching the opposite conclusion.  
In Zarda, a male skydiving instructor whose 
employment was allegedly terminated 
because of his sexual orientation filed a Title 
VII claim against his employer. The U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held 
that the plaintiff was wrongfully terminated 
from his job, stating that, “because sexual 
orientation is a function of sex and sex is a 
protected characteristic under Title VII, it 
follows that sexual orientation is also 
protected.”  
The Second Circuit’s decision was in line 
with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit’s 2007 holding in Hively v. 
Ivy Tech Community College where that 
court held that discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation violates Title VII. A few 
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months after Zarda was decided, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
reached a contrary conclusion in Bostock, 
relying on previous circuit precedent.  
The last of the trio, Harris Funeral Homes, 
contemplates whether Title VII implicitly 
prohibits gender identity discrimination. In 
that case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit became the first federal circuit 
court of appeals to recognize transgender 
discrimination as a form of prohibited sex-
based discrimination under Title VII, relying 
heavily on the reasoning in Zarda.  
In addition to the trio of cases currently 
before the court, other circuit courts have 
recently grappled with the issue of whether 
Title VII protects against LGBT 
discrimination. For instance, the issue of 
sexual orientation discrimination is currently 
before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit. The court heard oral argument 
on April 17, 2019, in Horton v. Midwest 
Geriatric Management LLC, a case brought 
by a man who was offered a job as vice 
president of sales and marketing, only to have 
the offer rescinded after the company 
discovered that he is gay.  
Further, on April 19, 2019, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit deepened the 
circuit split in Bonnie O’Daniel v. Industrial 
Services Solutions et al. and held that Title 
VII does not prohibit employers from 
terminating the employment of straight 
workers because of their sexuality, 
reaffirming the circuit’s long- standing 
position that Title VII does not protect 
against sexual orientation discrimination. In 
that case, the plaintiff claimed that her 
employer terminated her employment 
because of her sexual orientation 
(heterosexual) after she made a transphobic 
comment on Facebook.  
The Fifth Circuit rejected the plaintiff’s Title 
VII retaliation claim, holding that, based on 
the circuit’s  
“unbroken and unequivocal precedents, it is 
not ‘reasonable’ in the Fifth Circuit to infer 
that Title VII embraces an entirely new 
category of persons protected for their sexual 
orientation.” The court also dismissed the 
plaintiff’s claim that her former employer 
violated state law by suppressing her free 
expression on grounds that the law does not 
cover private employers.  
This decision comes shortly after the same 
circuit’s decision in Wittmer v. Phillips 66 
Company. In that discrimination case 
involving a transgender plaintiff, the Fifth 
Circuit ruled in favor of the employer without 
addressing the question of whether Title VII 
protects against LGBT discrimination; 
however, U.S. Circuit Judge James Ho, who 
was nominated by President Donald Trump, 
wrote a lengthy and detailed concurrence 
analyzing the issue and concluded that Title 
VII does not provide such protections.  
In his concurrence, Judge Ho opined that 
“[o]nly the Supreme Court can resolve this 
circuit split.” With its decision to grant 
certiorari in this trio of cases, the Supreme 
Court has chosen to do just that. The court 
will hear arguments in these cases next term, 
meaning employers can expect to see a 
decision by June 2020. Until then, this issue 
will continue to be closely watched by the 
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nation, with government agencies, Congress 
and employers weighing in on the debate.  
Federal Agencies Muddied the Waters  
The fall of 2018 brought a wave of federal 
agency activity regarding LGBT 
discrimination protection. For example, in 
October 2018, a U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services memo garnered national 
attention for defining “sex” to exclude 
transgenderism.  
The memo defines “sex” as “a person’s status 
as male or female based on immutable 
biological traits identifiable by or before 
birth.” In other words, HHS wants to rely on 
birth certificates as the main identifier of an 
individual’s sex, a policy that would 
essentially abolish federal recognition and 
protection of transgender individuals. The 
memo requests that other federal agencies — 
including the U.S. Department of Justice, 
U.S. Department of Education and U.S. 
Department of Labor — alter their own 
understanding of the word “sex” to match 
HHS’ proposed definition.  
Shortly after the HHS memo became public, 
the DOJ, appearing before the Supreme Court 
on behalf of the federal government, urged 
the court in a brief[3] to postpone 
consideration of Harris Funeral Homes until 
it decides whether to review Zarda and 
Bostock because the Sixth Circuit relied 
heavily on Zarda in concluding that Title VII 
prohibits transgender discrimination.  
Further, the DOJ contended, consistent with 
the HHS memo, that Title VII does not 
prohibit employers from discriminating 
against employees based on gender identity. 
Not all agencies agree with HHS’ and the 
DOJ’s interpretation of Title VII. 
Specifically, in response to the other 
agencies’ proclamations on the topic, the 
acting chair of the EEOC, Victoria Lipnic 
(who was appointed by Trump in 2017), 
announced that the EEOC plans to continue 
prosecuting transgender discrimination 
claims in accordance with the agency’s stated 
policies.  
The Legislative Branch Weighs In  
On March 13, 2019, the House Democrats, 
spearheaded by Rep. David Cicilline, an 
openly gay congressman from Rhode Island, 
reintroduced a bill to expand LBGT 
discrimination protections. The Equality Act, 
first introduced in 2015, would change 
existing civil rights legislation to ban 
discrimination against LGBT individuals in 
employment, housing and public 
accommodations, among other areas.  
Further, the proposed bill would bar reliance 
on the Religious Freedom Restoration Act as 
justification of sexual orientation and 
transgender discrimination. The act is 
currently being considered in various 
committee hearings and a floor vote is 
expected in the House by early summer 2019. 
Although the bill has a chance to pass in the 
House, which has a Democratic majority, it is 
unlikely that it would pass in the Republican- 
controlled Senate.  
The American Public Shows Increasing 
Support of LGBT Rights  
A recent poll[4] from the Public Religion 
Research Institute, or PRRI, indicates that a 
majority of Americans in every religion, 
 94 
party and U.S. state supports policies that 
protect against gender identity and sexual 
orientation discrimination.  
Further, nearly 200 companies — including 
Amazon, Apple, PepsiCo, Twitter and Uber 
— have decided to take the issue into their 
own hands and signed the Business 
Statement for Transgender Equality[5] 
opposing “any administrative and legislative 
efforts to erase transgender protections 
through reinterpretation of existing laws and 
regulations.” Even without federal 
protections in place, corporate America has 
chosen to instill its own protections for 
employees, with over 80% of Fortune 500 
companies prohibiting LGBT discrimination 
in their employment policies. Moreover, 
many of these companies have publicly 
supported the proposed Equality Act now 
before Congress.  
On March 27, 2019, some of America’s most 
influential companies weighed in on this 
issue at the state level. In a letter,[6] 
companies like Amazon, Google and IBM 
warned Texas legislators against a pair of 
bills that the companies deem discriminatory, 
explaining that they would “continue to 
oppose any unnecessary, discriminatory, and 
divisive measures that would damage Texas’ 
reputation” including “policies that explicitly 
or implicitly allow for the exclusion of 
LGBTQ people, or anyone else.”  
Conclusion  
Considering the court’s current makeup and 
recent decisions in other employment cases, 
it is uncertain how the nine justices will 
ultimately rule on whether Title VII prohibits 
sexual orientation and gender identity 
discrimination, but pundits largely believe 
that the conservative majority will take a 
narrow view in interpreting the extent of Title 
VII’s sex-based discrimination prohibitions. 
Until the court provides clarity on these 
questions, it is important for employers to 
remember that, although there are currently 
no express federal protections against sexual 
orientation or transgender discrimination, 
many state and local governments prohibit 
such discrimination.  
In fact, over 20 states and Washington, D.C., 
have explicit laws prohibiting LGBT-related 
discrimination. Employers are encouraged to 
consult with counsel to ensure compliance 
with state and local laws regarding 
transgender and sexual orientation 
discrimination in the workplace. In addition, 
employers should continue to use best 
practices whenever making adverse hiring 
and employment decisions and should 
adequately document performance 
deficiencies or other legitimate concerns 
regarding applicants and employees, so they 
are able to establish an independent, 
nondiscriminatory reason for their 
employment decisions.  
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“This landmark ruling could bring logic to civil rights laws”  
 
 
CNN  
Caroline Polisi 
February 27, 2018 
 
The most important and culturally significant 
legal battles are often waged through 
piecemeal victories won at a glacial pace -- 
two steps forward, one step back. The federal 
Defense of Marriage Act, which was enacted 
by Congress in 1996 in an attempt to curb 
states from legally recognizing same-sex 
marriage, was not ruled unconstitutional by 
the Supreme Court until 2013.  
Consequently, the unwieldy machine that is 
"the law," inevitably lags behind the zeitgeist 
and develops idiosyncrasies that are 
confusing at best, and illogical at worst. 
 
The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit this week took a bold 
step toward correcting this landscape in the 
area of employment discrimination law, 
which in many jurisdictions illogically holds 
that discrimination based on sexual 
orientation is distinct from, rather than an 
example of, sex discrimination.  
 
In Zarda v. Altitude Express, the Second 
Circuit ruled with a resounding 10-3 majority 
that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
prohibits not only sex discrimination based 
on gender-nonconformity, but also includes a 
prohibition on discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation. Shockingly to some, this 
is a controversial decision, and it is not the 
law of the land throughout the United States. 
In fact, the Justice Department's official 
position is that the Civil Rights Act should 
not be construed to protect LGBT 
individuals, and they filed a brief asserting so 
in the Zarda case. 
 
Enacted by Congress in 1964, Title 
VII makes it an "unlawful employment 
practice for an employer ... to fail or refuse to 
hire or to discharge ... or otherwise to 
discriminate against any individual with 
respect to his (or her) compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, 
because of such individual's race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin ..." 
 
The shorthand courts use when analyzing 
Title VII sex-discrimination claims is that a 
plaintiff alleging disparate treatment in 
violation of Title VII must show that he or 
she was discriminated against "because of ... 
sex." 
 
The first landmark interpretation of this 
language by the Supreme Court came in 1989 
in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, which 
paved the way for what we now consider a 
"gender stereotyping" claim -- when an 
employee is discriminated against for failing 
to fit into a gender-conforming mold. The 
female plaintiff in Price Waterhouse was 
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denied a promotion because of her 
nonconformity with stereotypes about how a 
woman "should" act. She was told to "walk 
more femininely, talk more femininely, dress 
more femininely, wear makeup, have her hair 
styled, and wear jewelry," and was criticized 
for being too "macho." The decision now 
stands for the principle that employers cannot 
legally discriminate against employees for 
failing to adhere to traditional gender norms.  
 
The controversy in this latest Title VII 
litigation still lies where it always does: in the 
text of the statute itself. Those who wrote 
amicus briefs against the plaintiff in Zarda -
- including the Trump Justice Department -- 
argue that Title VII was never meant to afford 
the LGBT community protection, and to do 
so now would be an impermissible expansion 
of legislative intent. Never mind that the 
Supreme Court has 
repeatedly admonished against this kind of 
argument, or that we now live in a world in 
which a woman could marry her same-sex 
partner one day, only to be fired for it the next 
(an absurdity pointed out specifically by the 
majority opinion in Zarda). According to the 
Second Circuit, for the purposes of Title VII 
protections, discrimination based on sex and 
discrimination based on sexual orientation is 
a distinction without a difference; both are 
included in the statute's prohibitions. 
 
Gay, lesbian, and bisexual employees' 
personal experiences bear out the necessity of 
this ruling. It's likely that there will be 
significant overlap between the specific 
hostility on display against a targeted 
employee; if one were to draw a Venn 
diagram of motivation, "sex discrimination" 
and "sexual orientation discrimination" 
would often overlap. Social psychologists 
have repeatedly demonstrated that animus 
against gender nonconformity is inextricably 
linked with animus against sexual orientation 
nonconformity. Because these types of 
discrimination are often indistinguishable in 
the mind of the offender, it is certainly 
beyond the capacity of the court process to 
decipher such nuances; they must therefore 
both be included in the protections of the law. 
 
Take the case of Brian Prowel, who was 
continually harassed at his factory job in 
Western Pennsylvania, including repeatedly 
being called "Princess," "Rosebud," "fag," 
and "faggot." In his case, the Third Circuit 
noted that even though it was allowing Mr. 
Prowel's Title VII claims to proceed under a 
sex-discrimination theory, it was very 
possible that his harassment had more to do 
with his "sexual orientation" than his 
"effeminacy."  
 
In keeping with the pace of our cultural 
understanding of sex discrimination, in 2015, 
the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission held, for the first time, that 
"sexual orientation is inherently a 'sex-based 
consideration;' accordingly an allegation of 
discrimination based on sexual orientation is 
necessarily an allegation of sex 
discrimination under Title VII." For many, 
this was a crucial step in the evolution of our 
legal doctrine, which can and should change 
with the times. 
  
But it may take many more years before this 
issue finally makes it to the Supreme Court. 
Until that time, there will be a "circuit split" 
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on the issue, in which different jurisdictions 
will adhere to different standards. Currently 
only two Circuits (the Second and Seventh), 
those governing the states of New York, 
Connecticut, Vermont, Illinois, Indiana, and 
Wisconsin, have affirmatively held that 
discrimination based on sexual orientation is 
prohibited under the Civil Rights Act. 
 
The Supreme Court declined to review a 
different case addressing the same issue last 
year, but some speculate that Zarda may 
prompt the Court to look at the issue anew. 
One can only hope that it makes the logical 
conclusion that discrimination based on 
sexual orientation is and should be prohibited 
under Title VII as discrimination "based on ... 
sex." 
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“Two new petitions call on SCOTUS to decide workplace protections for gays, 
lesbians” 
 
 
Reuters 
 
Alison Frankel 
 
May 31, 2018 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court doesn’t have to 
explain or justify its decisions to accept or 
reject requests for review, but a pair of newly 
filed petitions present an awfully strong case 
that the moment has come for the justices to 
decide whether gay and lesbian employees 
are protected from workplace discrimination 
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.  
One petition was filed by Altitude Express, a 
New York skydiving outfit accused of firing 
instructor Donald Zarda after he told a 
customer he was gay. In February, you may 
recall, the 2nd U.S. Circuit Court of 
Appeals held that Zarda’s estate could bring 
Title VII claims against Altitude Express 
because the law’s prohibition against sex 
discrimination encompasses discrimination 
based on sexual orientation. To simplify 
ruthlessly: The 2nd Circuit, like the en banc 
7th Circuit in 2017’s Hively v. Ivy Tech said 
its conclusion was the logical outgrowth of 
the Supreme Court’s prohibition on gender 
stereotyping in 1989’s Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins and recognition in 1998’s Oncale v. 
Sundowner Offshore Services that Title VII 
protects both men and women from 
discrimination.  
Altitude Express, represented by Saul Zabell 
of Zabell & Associates, said the 7th and 2nd 
Circuits’ decisions “departed from more than 
50 years of established precedent” from 
every other federal appellate court to have 
ruled on the scope of Title VII protection for 
gay and lesbian employees. Its petition called 
on the Supreme Court to step in to resolve the 
circuit split.  
The exact same call comes from a second 
Supreme Court petition filed this week – this 
one from an employee denied the right to sue 
his employer under Title VII for anti-gay 
discrimination. Gerald Bostock claims he 
was fired from his job as a child welfare 
services coordinator for a Georgia county’s 
juvenile court system when his employer 
found out he is gay. On May 10, a three-judge 
panel at the 11th Circuit ruled in an 
unpublished, per curiam decision that 
Bostock cannot sue Clayton County under 
Title VII because the law does not bar 
discrimination based on sexual orientation. 
Bostock’s lawyer, Brian Sutherland of 
Buckley Beal, had simultaneously asked the 
11th Circuit to reconsider en banc its binding 
precedent on the scope of Title VII 
protection. The 11th Circuit denied that 
request when it issued its per curiam 
decision. Sutherland then hustled to get his 
petition to the Supreme Court a mere two 
weeks later.  
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Sutherland and his client are asking the 
Supreme Court to confirm that the 11th 
Circuit was wrong and the 2nd and 7th 
Circuits correctly interpreted its precedent in 
Hopkins and Oncale. “The court must grant 
the writ of certiorari in this case not only to 
resolve the circuit split and prevent further 
erosion of Price Waterhouse and Oncale by 
the lower courts struggling with how to apply 
them, but also because justice demands the 
unequivocal determination that 
discrimination against an employee because 
of sexual orientation is discrimination 
“because of ... sex” in violation of Title VII,” 
the petition said. 
In other words, both an employer and an 
employee are asking the justices to resolve 
entrenched appellate disagreement – based 
on competing interpretations of the Supreme 
Court’s own precedent - about workplace 
rights of gays and lesbians. Both petitions 
also highlight disagreement within President 
Trump’s own administration about whether 
Title VII shields gay and lesbian employees 
from discrimination. In the 2nd Circuit’s en 
banc consideration of the Zarda case, the 
Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission sided with Zarda’s estate, 
reiterating arguments the EEOC pioneered in 
a 2015 case that informed the 7th Circuit’s 
Hively opinion. The Justice Department 
submitted a competing amicus brief, arguing 
that discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation is different from discrimination 
based on sex. If even the government can’t 
agree on the scope of Title VII protection, the 
briefs said, the Supreme Court must provide 
clarity.  
None of this is a guarantee, of course, that the 
justices will grant either or both when they 
conference on the petitions in September, 
after their summer break. Last December, the 
Supreme Court denied a petition for review 
of a different 11th Circuit ruling on Title VII 
and sexual orientation, 2017’s Evans v. 
Georgia Regional, despite an already-
existing split between the 7th and 11th 
Circuits. On the other hand, the Evans case 
presented the procedural complication - the 
defendant, a hospital, disputed the 11th 
Circuit’s jurisdiction and refused to 
participate in the appeals court or at the 
Supreme Court – that may have 
compromised it as a vehicle to decide an issue 
with broad nationwide implications. And the 
circuit split has only deepened since the 
justices turned down the Evans case, with the 
en banc 2nd Circuit ruling in Zarda and the 
11th Circuit decision in Bostock.  
“It’s time,” said Bostock counsel Sutherland. 
“The more time that goes by without clarity 
from the Supreme Court, the more confusion 
there will be in the lower courts.”  
Donald Zarda’s estate, meanwhile, will 
oppose Supreme Court review, according to 
its lawyer, Gregory Antollino. “I think more 
circuits need to weigh in,” he told me, citing 
a pending Title VII discrimination suit by a 
gay employee at the 8th Circuit. “There have 
to be more than three circuits before the 
Supreme Court jumps in.”  
Clayton County, the defendant in the Bostock 
case, was represented at the 11th Circuit 
by Freeman Mathis & Gary.  
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“11th Circ. Draws Judge’s Ire With En Banc Review Refusal” 
 
 
Law360 
 
Kat Green 
 
July 18, 2018 
 
The full Eleventh Circuit on Wednesday 
declined to hear whether a gay Clayton 
County, Georgia, government employee was 
discriminated against, prompting one of its 
judges to pen a blistering dissent that 
proclaimed her peers relied on “the 
precedential equivalent of an Edsel with a 
missing engine.” 
 
Ostensibly, Wednesday’s order was a routine 
one-liner in which the appeals court reported 
that, after a vote of its judges, it had decided 
not to take up an appeal by Gerald Lynn 
Bostock, a former child welfare services 
worker who claimed his firing was 
discriminatory under Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964. 
 
But it came together with a six-page dissent 
from U.S. Circuit Judge Robin Rosenbaum, 
who excoriated her fellow judges for keeping 
in place the underlying panel decision — 
which affirmed the lower court’s finding that 
Title VII doesn’t protect gay and lesbian 
individuals — saying the court was relying 
on a 39-year-old precedent that has since 
been abrogated by a U.S. Supreme Court 
ruling. 
 
“I cannot explain why a majority of our Court 
is content to rely on the precedential 
equivalent of an Edsel with a missing engine, 
when it comes to an issue that affects so many 
people,” Judge Rosenbaum wrote. “I 
continue to firmly believe that Title VII 
prohibits discrimination against gay and 
lesbian individuals because they fail to 
conform to their employers’ views when it 
comes to whom they should love.” 
 
She said that, her personal opinion aside, she 
was dissenting for the “even more basic 
reason” that regardless how the court does 
eventually rule on the issue, it should at least 
permit the parties to fight it out in court so the 
judges can have a “reasoned and principled 
explanation for our position on this issue — 
something we have never done.” 
 
She noted that the Second and Seventh 
Circuits in recent months have taken up the 
same issue en banc, and that the Eleventh 
should be no different. The Seventh Circuit 
became the first federal appellate court in the 
country to extend Title VII protections to 
sexual orientation with a decision in April 
2017, and the Second Circuit broke with its 
own precedent to find the same in February 
of this year, according to decisions in those 
cases. 
 
In the instant suit, Bostock said that he had 
been working as a child welfare services 
coordinator for the southern Atlanta 
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metropolitan area county when he started 
playing in a gay recreational softball league. 
After several comments from people at work, 
he was subjected to an internal audit on the 
funds he managed, according to filings in the 
case. 
 
That audit, Bostock alleged, was a pretext for 
discrimination against him for his sexual 
orientation and his failure to conform to a 
gender stereotype, and the termination that 
followed was not because of the audit’s 
findings but because he was gay, he said. 
 
He filed suit in August 2016, but Clayton 
County won dismissal of the case after it 
argued that the Civil Rights Act doesn’t 
protect gay and lesbian employees in those 
contexts, according to filings in the case. 
 
On appeal, the three-judge Eleventh Circuit 
panel cited the Fifth Circuit's 1979 ruling in 
Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp.  in which that court 
held that “discharge for homosexuality is not 
prohibited by Title VII," saying that because 
the Eleventh Circuit has cited that precedent 
in the past, it cannot now overrule that 
finding without an intervening Supreme 
Court or en banc decision. 
 
In her dissent, Judge Rosenbaum noted that 
an intervening decision has actually been 
issued, in the form of the high court’s 1989 
decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins , in 
which the court found that former accounting 
firm employee Ann Hopkins was 
discriminated against when she was denied 
partnership because she didn’t fit the firm’s 
picture of how a female employee should 
look and act. 
Judge Rosenbaum wrote that Price 
Waterhouse abrogated Blum and requires the 
conclusion that Title VII prohibits 
discrimination against gay and lesbian people 
because their sexual preferences don’t 
conform to their employers views of who 
their partners should be, according to the 
dissent filed Wednesday. 
 
At the very least, she said, the eight million 
or more people who publicly identify as gay 
or lesbian in America are affected by such 
policies, so the “legitimacy of the law 
demands we explain ourselves.” 
 
Bostock has already filed a petition for 
certification of the issue to the U.S. Supreme 
Court. The high court in December declined 
to review an Eleventh Circuit ruling in a 
similar case, in which worker Jameka Evans 
accused Georgia Regional Hospital of 
discriminating against her because she’s a 
lesbian and doesn’t dress in line with 
feminine stereotypes. 
 
Bostock’s attorney Brian J. Sutherland of 
Buckley Beal LLP said his team agrees with 
Judge Rosenbaum’s view that the issue is one 
of extraordinary importance, not only for his 
client, but also for all the other gay and 
lesbian people working in America. 
 
“We certainly hope that the Supreme Court 
will grant Mr. Bostock’s petition and answer 
this important question that the Eleventh 
Circuit declined again to consider en banc,” 
he told Law360 on Wednesday. 
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A representative for Clayton County didn’t 
immediately respond to a request for 
comment late Wednesday. 
 
Bostock is represented by Brian J. Sutherland 
and Thomas J. Mew IV of Buckley Beal LLP. 
 
Clayton County is represented by Jack R. 
Hancock and William H. Buechner Jr. of 
Freeman Mathis & Gary LLP. 
 
The case is Gerald Lynn Bostock v. Clayton 
County Board of Commissioners et al., case 
number 17-13801, in the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. 
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“11th Circuit Joins Others in Holding Sexual Orientation Discrimination Not 
Covered Title VII” 
 
 
Schiff Hardin 
 
Julie Furer Stahr  
 
March 21, 2017 
 
Joining nearly all other federal circuit courts, 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit has held that Title VII does not cover 
discrimination based on sexual 
orientation. Evans v. Georgia Regional 
Hospital, 2017 WL 943925 (11th Cir. March 
10, 2017). While closing the door on Title VII 
sexual orientation discrimination claims, the 
court re-affirmed that other theories of sex 
discrimination, such as gender non-
conformity and same-sex discrimination, 
remain actionable. 
Jameka Evans, who is a lesbian, was a 
security guard at Georgia Regional Hospital. 
Evans alleged that she was denied equal pay 
and work, harassed, and physically assaulted. 
According to Evans, it was evident that she 
identified with the male gender due to such 
things as her wearing a male uniform, haircut 
and shoes. Furthermore, she claims she was 
subjected to a hostile work environment 
because her status as a gay female did not 
comport with her superiors’ gender 
stereotypes.  According to Evans, she had 
doors closed on her, she was subjected to 
scheduling problems and shift changes, and 
her work equipment was tampered with. She 
also claimed a less qualified employee was 
promoted to become her supervisor, who then 
also began to harass her. Evans eventually 
resigned. 
Evans filed suit against the hospital and 
others, claiming she was discriminated 
against based on her sexual orientation and 
gender non-conformity, and retaliated against 
after she complained. Her claims were 
initially addressed by a magistrate judge. 
With respect to Evans’s claim of 
discrimination based on her sexual 
orientation (her status as a gay female), the 
magistrate judge determined that Title VII 
“was not intended to cover discrimination 
against homosexuals.” The magistrate judge 
further concluded that her gender non-
conformity claim was “just another way to 
claim discrimination based on sexual 
orientation,” no matter how it was titled, and 
thus that claim too was barred. The 
magistrate judge also recommended 
dismissal of the retaliation claim; because 
sexual orientation discrimination is not 
prohibited under Title VII, Evans did not 
allege opposition to an unlawful employment 
practice when she complained. Over Evans’ 
objection, the district court adopted the 
magistrate’s recommendation in full and 
dismissed the case. 
Evans appealed to the Eleventh Circuit. The 
court first held that Evans’ gender non-
 104 
conformity claim should not have been 
dismissed. A gender non-conformity claim is 
not “just another way to claim discrimination 
based on sexual orientation,” according to the 
court, but rather is a separate cause of action 
available under Title VII. Although Evans’ 
complaint did not plead facts sufficient to 
suggest that her decision to present herself in 
a masculine manner led to any adverse 
employment actions, the court allowed Evans 
to amend her complaint to try to sufficiently 
plead these facts. 
The court next addressed the sexual 
orientation discrimination claim. Citing legal 
precedent, the court held that Title VII does 
not permit such a claim: “[W]e are bound to 
follow a binding precedent in this Circuit 
unless and until it is overruled by this court 
en banc or by the Supreme Court.” Evans 
argued that the U.S. Supreme Court has 
already held that both same-sex 
discrimination claims, and gender non-
conformity discrimination claims, are 
allowed under Title VII, and that these 
decisions should also include within their 
purview sexual orientation-based 
claims. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 
U.S. 228 (1989); Oncale v. Sundowner 
Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998). 
The Eleventh Circuit did not agree, finding 
that those Supreme Court decisions were not 
sufficiently on-point to interfere with 
established legal precedent. In doing so, the 
court’s opinion notes the decisions from all 
other federal circuits (except D.C.) holding 
that sexual orientation discrimination is not 
actionable under Title VII. While the law in 
the D.C. Circuit is less clear, indications can 
be found in earlier decisions that the court is 
trending in the same direction. 
What Now? 
The near-unanimous exclusion of sexual 
orientation protection under federal law may 
or may not be significant for employers, 
depending on the jurisdiction. Initially, as 
noted in this case, non-traditional sex 
discrimination theories can overlap making it 
difficult to decipher, certainly at the 
management and human resources level, 
what type of conduct may or may not be 
prohibited under federal law. Moreover, in 
many states, sexual orientation 
discrimination is expressly prohibited at the 
state and local level, and employers in these 
jurisdictions can face similar or even greater 
legal penalties than under federal law. Thus, 
the practical effect of the roadblock under 
Title VII may be a rise in state court claims 
in some states by employees seeking to bring 
sexual orientation-based claims. For all these 
reasons, the sensible approach from both a 
legal and personnel perspective is to continue 
to strive for respect and fairness for all 
employees. 
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“2nd Circuit demolishes key DOJ argument against workplace protection for gays” 
 
 
Reuters 
 
Alison Frankel 
 
February 26, 2018 
 
The en banc 2nd U.S. Circuit Court of 
Appeals stood up against workplace 
prejudice on Monday, ruling in Zarda v. 
Altitude Express that the Civil Rights Act 
bars discrimination based on employees’ 
sexual orientation. The 2nd Circuit’s decision 
deepens an existing circuit split on whether 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, which bars 
on sex discrimination, encompasses 
discrimination based on sexual orientation. 
The 10 judges in the 2nd Circuit majority in 
Zarda lined up with the en banc 7th Circuit in 
2017’s Hively v. Ivy Tech Community 
College - and against a divided three-judge 
panel at the 11th Circuit, which said in 
2017’s Evans v. Georgia Regional 
Hospital that Title VII does not protect gay 
and lesbian workers. Three judges dissented. 
 
There’s no guarantee when, if ever, the U.S. 
Supreme Court will step in. The justices 
denied a petition last year for review of the 
11th Circuit’s decision, which had a weird 
procedural defect because the hospital 
insisted it was never properly served so the 
appellate courts didn’t have jurisdiction. The 
community college defendant in the 7th 
Circuit case didn’t petition the Supreme 
Court, and it’s not clear whether Altitude 
Express, a skydiving company accused of 
firing Donald Zarda after it learned he was 
gay, will ask the justices to take its case. 
Altitude counsel Saul Zabell of Zabell & 
Associates told my Reuters colleague Dan 
Wiessner that he actually agreed with the 2nd 
Circuit on the scope of Title VII protection 
for gay and lesbian employees, but that his 
client didn’t discriminate against Zarda based 
on his sexual orientation. 
 
But if the justices eventually have to decide 
whether discrimination against gay and 
lesbian employees is a form of sex 
discrimination – and therefore a violation of 
Title VII protections – the 2nd Circuit’s 
decision will be important not just for its 
affirmation that sex discrimination 
encompasses discrimination against gays and 
lesbians but also for its demolition of the lead 
argument to the contrary. As I’ve said, the 
7th Circuit’s Hively ruling, which was, in 
turn, based on the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission’s 2015 ruling 
in Foxx v. Baldwin, shrewdly used Supreme 
Court precedent to show why workplace bias 
against gays and lesbians is a form of sex 
discrimination. The 2nd Circuit in Zarda 
explained why Hively critics, led by the U.S. 
Justice Department, are promoting a 
misguided framework. 
 
The critics’ argument, as the Justice 
Department laid it out in an amicus brief in 
the Zarda case is that workplace sex 
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discrimination is defined by disparate 
treatment of male and female employees. If 
an employer, for instance, pays a woman less 
than a man with the same experience, that’s 
discrimination. The test, according to this 
theory, is to compare workers who are the 
same in every way except for their gender. 
And to figure out if sex discrimination 
encompasses prejudice against gays and 
lesbians, this theory goes, you don’t ask 
whether employers treat lesbian employees 
differently than straight women and gay 
employees different than straight men but 
whether employers treats gays and lesbians 
similarly. 
 
In other words, according to proponents of 
this theory, discrimination based on sexual 
orientation is only sex discrimination if an 
employer is biased against gays or lesbians – 
but not if it’s equally inhospitable to men and 
women who are attracted to people of the 
same sex. 
 
“The but-for ‘comparison can’t do its job of 
ruling in sex discrimination as the actual 
reason for the employer’s decision … if 
we’re not scrupulous about holding 
everything constant except the plaintiff’s 
sex,’” the Justice Department wrote in its 
Zarda amicus brief, quoting 7th Circuit Judge 
Diane Sykes’ dissent in the Hively case. “The 
EEOC and the 7th Circuit majority fail to 
hold everything else constant because their 
hypothetical changes both the employee’s 
sex (from male to female) and his sexual 
orientation (from gay to straight). The proper 
comparison would be to change the 
employee’s sex (from male to female) but to 
keep the sexual orientation constant (as 
gay).” 
 
The 2nd Circuit majority in Zarda said the 
government is pushing the wrong 
comparison: The correct test doesn’t compare 
gay men to lesbians but rather considers 
disparate treatment between lesbian 
employees and heterosexual male 
employees; or gay men to heterosexual 
women. 
 
The court looked at the Supreme Court’s 
1978 decision in City of Los Angeles v. 
Manhart, which struck down a city water 
department rule requiring female employees 
to contribute more than men to the employee 
pension fund because women live longer. 
The justices concluded that life expectancy 
was a proxy for sex, so the rule violated Title 
VII. Similarly, in 1989’s Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins the Supreme Court used a 
comparison test to conclude Title VII 
protects employees who don’t conform to 
gender stereotypes, in the case of a female 
auditor who claimed she didn’t make partner 
because she was as brusque and aggressive as 
male counterparts. 
 
Based on that precedent, the 2nd Circuit said, 
the question to be answered in the 
comparison test isn’t whether employers treat 
gays and lesbians the same way but whether 
sexual orientation is a function of sex, like 
life expectancy or “ladylike” behavior. Using 
the test advocated by the government (and 
Judge Sykes in her Hively dissent) “would 
not illustrate whether a particular stereotype 
is sex dependent but only whether the 
employer discriminates against gender non-
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conformity in only one gender,” the 2nd 
Circuit said. “Instead, just as Price 
Waterhouse compared a gender non-
conforming woman to a gender conforming 
man, both of whom were aggressive and did 
not wear makeup or jewelry, the Hively court 
properly determined that sexual orientation is 
sex dependent by comparing a woman and a 
man with two different sexual orientations, 
both of whom were attracted to women.” 
 
The law, according to the 2nd Circuit, leads 
to an inescapable destination: “To determine 
whether a trait operates as a proxy for sex, we 
ask whether the employee would have been 
treated differently ‘but for’ his or her sex,” 
wrote Chief Judge Robert Katzmann for the 
majority. “In the context of sexual 
orientation, a woman who is subject to an 
adverse employment action because she is 
attracted to women would have been treated 
differently if she had been a man who was 
attracted to women. We can therefore 
conclude that sexual orientation is a function 
of sex and, by extension, sexual orientation 
discrimination is a subset of sex 
discrimination.” 
 
The Justice Department, as you probably 
recall, muscled into the Zarda case without an 
invitation. The 2nd Circuit had asked the 
EEOC to submit an amicus brief in the 
private dispute. The EEOC, operating at the 
time with a Democratic majority, sides with 
Zarda and its own precedent from the 2015 
Baldwin case. The Justice Department broke 
with tradition to assert a competing argument 
in a case in which the EEOC appeared as an 
amicus. 
 
DOJ’s reward for meddling is the 2nd 
Circuit’s very firm rejection of its lead 
argument. That doesn’t mean, of course, that 
the government can’t or won’t continue to 
push its comparison test theory in other 
circuits or, if it comes to that, the Supreme 
Court. Justice, moreover, has other 
arguments for why the prohibition on sex 
discrimination doesn’t cover gay and lesbian 
employees, most notably Congress’s refusal 
to shield gays and lesbians against prejudice 
in the workplace. 
 
As Judge Gerard Lynch wrote Monday in 
the lead dissent to the 2nd Circuit’s majority 
opinion in Zarda, it would sure be great if 
Congress were suddenly to pass such a law. 
(He said he was speaking as a private citizen; 
as a judge, he said, he was constrained to 
conclude that Title VII, as written, “did not, 
and does not, prohibit discrimination against 
people because of their sexual orientation.”) 
But absent congressional action, it’s up to the 
courts to decide the scope of the law – and 
Title VII’s aegis is expanding. 
 
“Legal doctrine evolves,” the Zarda majority 
said. “Applying (Supreme Court) precedents 
to sexual orientation discrimination, it is clear 
that there is ‘no justification in the statutory 
language ... for a categorical rule excluding’ 
such claims from the reach of Title VII. 
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“2nd Circuit (again) finds anti-gay discrimination legal under Title VII”  
 
 
Washington Blade  
Chris Johnson  
April 18, 2017   
 
In a case filed by a now deceased gay 
skydiver who alleged sexual-orientation 
discrimination in the workforce, the U.S. 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals on Tuesday 
declined to accept the legal argument that 
anti-gay discrimination is prohibited under 
current federal civil rights law. 
 
In a 13-page decision, the three-judge panel 
cites a 2000 decision in the Simonton case, a 
2nd Circuit ruling that determined Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of the 1964, which 
bars sex discrimination in the workforce, 
doesn’t apply to sexual orientation. As a 
result of that precedent, the panel concludes 
Title VII cannot be applied in the pending 
case, named Zarda v. Altitude Express. 
 
The unanimous ruling concludes that 
precedent “can only be overturned by the 
entire Court sitting en banc,” which would 
require consideration of the case by the full 
court as opposed to the three-judge panel. 
 
It’s the second time within a month the 2nd 
Circuit has found sexual-orientation 
discrimination is permitted under federal 
civil rights law. Last month in the case 
Christiansen v. Omnicom Group, a different 
three-judge panel found that precedent 
precluded the court from determining that 
anti-gay bias is illegal, although the judges 
still ruled in favor of the plaintiff on the basis 
that the nature of the discrimination he faced 
was sex stereotyping. 
 
The decision stands in contrast to the 
recent groundbreaking “en banc” decision by 
the U.S. Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals that determined anti-gay 
discrimination in the workforce amounts to 
sex discrimination under current law. A 
growing number of trial courts and the U.S. 
Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission have also reached that 
conclusion. 
The 2nd Circuit case was filed by Donald 
Zarda, a gay skydiver who alleged he was 
terminated from his position at Altitude 
Express for disclosing his sexual orientation 
to his client. In response, the company 
maintained the client “had various 
complaints about Zarda’s behavior” other 
than disclosure of his sexual orientation and 
he was fired because “he failed to provide an 
enjoyable experience for a customer.” 
According to media reports, the client 
accused him of fondling her in mid-air. 
 
According to the ruling, Zarda died in a 
skydiving accident before the case went to 
trial, and two executors of his estate have 
replaced him as plaintiff. Zarda’s obituary 
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states he died in Switzerland in 2014 as he 
was pursuing European Union citizenship. 
 
At trial court, Zarda contended his firing was 
illegal both under Title VII and New York 
state law, which explicitly bars 
discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation. The trial court rejected his Title 
VII claim and also ruled in favor of Altitude 
Express under state law, saying Zarda didn’t 
meet the burden of proof he could keep his 
job if only he wasn’t gay. 
 
The Second Circuit determines Zarda may be 
qualified for relief under Title VII because 
federal law has a less stringent “motivating-
factor” test of causation, but nonetheless the 
judges say they can’t rule for him because of 
precedent within the circuit. 
 
Although judges in the Christiansen case 
granted the plaintiff relief on the basis that he 
suffered discrimination on sex-stereotyping 
claims, the Second Circuit in the Zarda case 
determines it cannot reach a similar 
conclusion. 
“That route is unavailable to Zarda, since, as 
explained above, the district court found that 
Zarda failed to establish the requisite 
proximity between his termination and his 
failure to conform to gender stereotypes, and 
Zarda did not challenge that determination on 
appeal,” the decision says. “Consequently, 
Zarda may receive a new trial only if Title 
VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination 
encompasses discrimination based on sexual 
orientation — a result foreclosed by 
Simonton.” 
 
The three-judge panel consists of U.S. Circuit 
Judge Dennis Jacobs, a George H.W. Bush 
appointee; U.S. Circuit Judge Robert Sack, a 
Clinton appointee; and U.S. Senior Judge 
Gerard Lynch, an Obama appointee. 
 
Gregory Antollino, the New York-based 
attorney representing the Zarda estate, told 
the Washington Blade his legal team intends 
to file for “en banc” review of the decision 
before the full Second Circuit. 
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“Trump’s Battle Over LGBT Discrimination is Just Beginning” 
 
 
The Atlantic 
 
Emma Green 
 
July 28, 2017 
 
LGBT issues have been all over the news this 
week. On Wednesday, President Trump 
announced a ban on transgender Americans 
serving in the military. That evening, the 
Department of Justice made another 
significant move in the fight over LGBT 
rights, albeit with less flash than a tweet 
storm: It filed an amicus brief in a major 
case, Zarda v. Altitude Express, arguing that 
it’s not illegal to fire an employee based on 
his or her sexual orientation under federal 
law. 
 
LGBT advocates were quick to decry the 
DOJ’s position as bigotry. But there’s a 
deeper context here: The brief was a throw-
down in nuanced fight about the nature of the 
administrative state. During the Obama 
years, federal agencies slowly began 
expanding their interpretation of sex 
discrimination, which is prohibited by a 
number of civil-rights laws. The Equal 
Opportunity Employment Commission, the 
independent agency focused on workplace 
discrimination, arguably pushed the 
definition of sex discrimination further than 
any other regulatory body. In 2015, the 
EEOC ruled that Title VII, the civil-rights 
statute that protects workers, covers bias 
based on sexual orientation; it took a similar 
position in Zarda. Critics argued that this 
interpretation reads something into the law 
that isn’t there and accused the Obama 
administration of enforcing its political 
agenda through executive fiat. In effect, 
that’s exactly what Trump’s DOJ argued in 
its brief. 
While this case will ultimately be decided by 
the courts, it’s a sign of conflict ahead in the 
long-brewing battle over LGBT rights and 
the meaning of sex discrimination. It also 
shows the limits of executive action in 
contested areas of law. The Obama 
administration may have believed gay people 
should be protected by federal civil-rights 
statutes, but it may prove challenging to 
make that interpretation stick now that a new 
party controls Washington. 
 
In 2010, a skydiving instructor named 
Donald Zarda lost his job with Altitude 
Express, Inc., after he told a client about his 
sexual orientation. As a three-judge panel of 
the Second Circuit noted in its ruling on the 
case this spring, “Zarda often informed 
female clients of his sexual orientation—
especially when they were accompanied by a 
husband or boyfriend—in order to mitigate 
any awkwardness that might arise from the 
fact that he was strapped tightly to the 
woman.” Zarda sued, arguing in part that 
Altitude Express violated Title VII by firing 
Zarda based on his sexual orientation. He lost 
in district court and on initial appeal. Now, 
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the case is being heard by the full Second 
Circuit. 
 
Enter the battling briefs. In June, the EEOC 
weighed in supporting Zarda, arguing that 
sexual-orientation-based discrimination is by 
definition based on sex and involves sex 
stereotyping, which has long been prohibited 
by the Supreme Court. A month later, the 
DOJ filed a brief making the exact opposite 
argument. “The sole question here is 
whether, as a matter of law, Title VII reaches 
sexual-orientation discrimination,” the 
department wrote. “It does not, as has been 
settled for decades. Any efforts to amend 
Title VII’s scope should be directed to 
Congress rather than the courts.” 
 
In other words, the government has two 
opposing opinions on one case, and two 
opposite interpretations of how the same law 
should be applied. “It is super wacky, yes,” 
said Justin Levitt, an associate dean and 
professor of law at Loyola Law School in Los 
Angles. “It is very unusual. The federal 
government usually makes great efforts to be 
on the same page of this sort of thing.” 
 
Neither the DOJ nor the EEOC is a party in 
the case—both agencies were essentially 
offering advice to the court on what to do. 
That’s part of what makes the battling briefs 
significant: The DOJ chose to take up this 
fight when it didn’t have to. 
 
“This Justice Department felt strongly 
enough that they took the affirmative step to 
weigh in to undercut the EEOC’s position,” 
said Vanita Gupta, the president and CEO of 
the Leadership Conference on Civil and 
Human Rights.  “That likely required a high 
degree of vetting at a very high level in the 
Justice Department.” Gupta led the Justice 
Department’s civil-rights division during the 
final years of the Obama administration. 
 
The sex-discrimination provision of federal 
civil-rights laws has always been 
controversial, but it has become even more 
charged in recent years. Cases on this topic 
regularly bubble up through the court system, 
and some have made it to the top: This spring, 
the Supreme Court planned to take up a high-
profile case concerning a transgender student 
in Virginia, but punted when the Trump 
administration back-pedaled the Obama 
administration’s previous guidance on how to 
deal with this kind of issue in schools. Court 
battles over how to interpret “sex 
discrimination” have become a proxy war 
over LGBT rights. 
 
Unfortunately, there is not a high wall 
between law and politics sometimes. That’s 
the case on both sides here,” said Michael 
Harper, a professor of law at Boston 
University. “This is a question of statutory 
interpretation. … Whether the 
statute should [prohibit LGBT 
discrimination] and whether the 
statute doesare two different questions.” 
 
LGBT-rights advocates argue that DOJ-style 
reasoning is straightforwardly incorrect and 
fundamentally grounded in prejudice. When 
the Zarda brief came out, the Human Rights 
Campaign called it “a shameful retrenchment 
of an outmoded interpretation that forfeits 
faithful interpretation of current law to 
achieve a politically driven and legally 
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specious result.” Former Attorney General 
Eric Holder weighed in on Twitter: 
 
Trump team within 24 hours reverses 
Obama DOJ positions for gays 
seeking employment and trans people 
seeking to serve. This is 2017 not 
1617 
— Eric Holder (@EricHolder) July 
27, 2017 
But according to Harper, the law is not so 
settled. This “is a fine legal brief,” he said. “It 
makes good legal arguments.” When 
lawmakers passed Title VII in 1964, they 
weren’t thinking of sexual orientation, the 
DOJ brief argues. Until very recently, courts 
of appeal and the EEOC agreed. Efforts to 
pass explicit protections for gay, lesbian, and 
bisexual workers have also always failed in 
Congress, effectively ratifying legislators’ 
intent to keep the law the way it is. “One can 
take this position … without being bigoted or 
prejudiced,” Harper said. 
 
While politics might have motivated the 
arguments in the Trump administration’s 
brief—they “play to the political beliefs, and 
I would say prejudice, of their base,” Harper 
said—“that doesn’t make them bad legal 
arguments.” 
 
Levitt, who previously led the Department of 
Justice’s efforts on workplace discrimination 
as a deputy-assistant attorney general in its 
civil-rights division, disagreed. 
 
“It is not a crazy liberal [argument] … to say 
that what the words of the statute mean aren’t 
bound to what was in the heads of the 
legislature that passed it,” he said. While the 
sex-discrimination issue is part of an 
important debate about administrative law, 
it’s not an option to put off interpreting and 
enforcing statutes while waiting on Congress 
to pass clearer legislation, he said: “You have 
to interpret statutes somehow.” 
 
The downside of that approach is that 
elections regularly boot parties out of power. 
If one administration has taken an aggressive 
stance on a controversial issue, it’s inevitable 
that their opponents will reverse course when 
they get in office. “There are limits, when the 
administration changes, to what the executive 
can do without Congress,” said Harper. “To 
have secure change, you have to have 
congressionally passed legislation.” Even 
though the circumstances of the DOJ’s brief 
were unusual, the context was unsurprising. 
“I can’t say that I’m altogether shocked,” said 
Gupta. “I’m disappointed, obviously.” 
In this particular case, the Second Circuit will 
decide who’s right, but there’s drama ahead. 
“This isn’t a good look for the federal 
government. It is unusual and conflict-
seeking,” said Levitt. “The decision to 
independently file does not reflect a lot of 
respect for another federal agency with a 
whole lot of enforcement power.” 
 
The EEOC isn’t obliged to change how it 
does business just because the DOJ has 
weighed in, Levitt said: It has binding 
authority in disputes raised by federal-
government employees, and it can continue 
offering advice based on its current 
interpretation of Title VII in other cases. 
What’s more likely to happen is a war of 
attrition. The two agencies “will stand 
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fuming at each other” until the Second 
Circuit decides Zarda, Levitt said, and after 
that, the “fuming will continue.” 
 
It’s impossible to know how this legal throw-
down will affect the relationship between the 
Department of Justice and the EEOC, Levitt 
said, but the commission surely can’t be 
happy that another agency stepped on its turf. 
There will be “a lot of frostier emails,” he 
said. “I’m sure about that.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
